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In this Article, Brian C. Murchison, John Soloski, Ran-
dall P. Bezanson, Gilbert Cranberg, and Roselle L. Wissler
examine the development of libel law in America since the
United States Supreme Court's watershed decision New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and suggest that
Sullivan affords members of the press less protection than
many have hitherto believed.
According to the authors, Sullivan's actual malice stan-
dard of care invites judges to create norms of acceptable jour-
nalistic conduct for all three stages of news gathering, namely,
research, writing, and editing. These norms are reflected in
judicial decisions, which members of the press and their law-
yers use as maps to navigate around libel liabiliiy.
The authors examine a large number of these judicial de-
cisions and note the types of journalistic conduct at issue in
libel cases. They highlight the types of conduct courts view
positively and suggest strategies for defending libel lawsuits.
The authors also examine the modes of decision making that
courts employ in libel decisions and suggest that judges may
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take a more restrictive approach in cases concerning research
than in cases concerning writing and editing.
The problem with these judicial decisions, according to
the authors, is that they leave judges considerable leeway to
decide cases the way they want to decide them. This problem
presents a serious threat to press freedom. Thus, the authors
urge law reformers to abandon Sullivan's actual malice stan-
dard and adopt alternative forms of First Amendment
protection.
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INTRODUCTION
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' the United States Supreme
Court fashioned a rule to protect the "citizen-critic of government,"'
including the press, from libel judgments based on publications about
the conduct of public officials. The rule required officials bringing li-
bel actions to prove actual malice, defined as knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard of the truth.3 In a" 'majestic opinion' ",4 that trans-
formed the common-law tort of libel, the Court placed libel suits in
the context of "a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open."'5 The Court's new rule would serve this ideal of democratic
debate, allowing the press to report and editorialize without the chill
of potentially debilitating libel suits. Journalism was to be free from
the supervision of libel law; only a calculated lie would endanger that
freedom.
For many, the Sullivan decision was cause for celebration.6 In a
period of complex social struggle and change,7 the case allowed the
press a measure of" 'breathing space' "I to operate without the spec-
ter of strict liability for defamatory error. With journalists free to
work without fear or favor, responsibility for the press's performance,
except in the rare instance of "actual malice," lay with the press itself.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id. at 282.
3. Id. at 279-80.
4. First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams, quoted in ANTHONY LEwis, MAKE No
LAW, THE Sullivan Case and the First Amendment 156 (1991).
5. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
6. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191,221 n.125 (citing conversation with philoso-
pher Alexander Meiklejohn who said the decision was "an occasion for dancing in the
streets").
7. See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING
YEARS, 1954-63 (1988) (detailing the social unrest during the Civil Rights Movement).
8. Sullivan, 376 U.S at 272 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
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Thirty years later, however, the promise of Sullivan remains un-
fulfilled. Libel litigation has not disappeared.9 The specter of unpre-
dictable litigation and large libel judgments has been replaced by the
certainty of legal costs that make the judgment in Sullivan pale in
comparison. While the incidence of judgments against the press is
very low, as Sullivan promised, the cost to the press of obtaining
favorable judgments is crushing. As observed more than six years
ago, libel plaintiffs often "win" by losing and, more important for
present purposes, libel defendants-the press-almost always "lose"
by winning.10
Even more disturbing are ominous signs that the freedom from
judicial supervision intended by the Sullivan rule has been compro-
mised by the rule's own logic. Sullivan did not free the press to do its
job; it did not lift the burden of intrusion and second guessing that the
Court had associated with the common-law tort of libel. Instead, by
9. Libel cases continue to be filed on a regular basis. See, e.g., Berry Gordy Files $250
Million Libel Suit Against New York Daily News, JET, May 9, 1994, at 53 (reporting a
public figure's libel suit against a newspaper for republishing charges of misconduct);
Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Battle for the Soul of Internet, TIME, July 24, 1994, at 50, 55-56 (re-
porting the filing of a libel suit based on a reporter's story published on Internet); Front
End: Litigation-Comaford v. Wired, INro. WK., July 11, 1994, at 10 (reporting a $40 mil-
lion libel action brought against magazine); Joseph Gerth, Russell County Foes in Libel
Suits Claim Attacks Are Unfair, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 5, 1994, at
1A (recounting a series of libel suits brought by local official against a newspaper and the
newspaper's fears of being forced out of business as a result); Howard Kurtz, Fall-out From
Faked Photos, WASH. PosT, Aug. 12, 1994, at F1, F6 (reporting a $33 million libel suit filed
by a "whistle-blower" against ime magazine and its managing editor).
While libel lawsuits are often filed, the number of libel trials may be diminishing. The
Libel Defense Resource Center ("LDRC"), which gathers data on libel trials and damage
awards, reported in early 1994 that the number of libel trials in the two-year period be-
tween January 1, 1992 and December 31, 1993 dropped to the lowest figure in fourteen
years, although the average damage award entered against media defendants remained in
excess of $1 million. Trial Results, Damage Awards and Appeals, 1992-93: Is the Recent
Downward Turn in Libel Cases Tried, Media Losses and Damages Awarded a Blip or a
Trend? Too Early To Tell, LDRC BULL. (Libel Defense Resource Center, New York,
N.Y.), Jan. 31, 1994, at 1. The LDRC cautions against "overstat[ing] the significance" of
these findings. Id. at 2. Noting that "experience in this area has shown that a long-term
trend cannot be projected based on data for such a brief period," the LDRC cited the fact
that in 1987-88 it found a reduction in the average damage award to below $500,000, "only
to see the average award skyrocket in succeeding years to $4 million and then to more than
$8 million by the 1990-91 period." Id.
There is some doubt whether New York limes Co. v. Sullivan itself can be credited
with any reduction in libel litigation. Professor Diane Zimmerman noted at a recent pro-
gram of the Practicing Law Institute on libel litigation that she "had encountered no ana-
lysts who could state with confidence that the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Sullivan
has reduced the amount, cost, or uncertainty of libel litigation." PLI Conference Considers
Life After Sullivan, News Notes, Media L. Rep. (BNA), June 28, 1994.
10. RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRss: MYTH AND REAL-
rfy 181-82 (1987).
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permitting the use of circumstantial evidence of journalistic behavior
to prove the journalist's state of mind, the Sullivan rule has spawned a
de facto set of judge-made standards that covers all aspects of journal-
istic behavior. These standards include the use of sources, the quality
of writing, the demand for corroboration, the duties of editorial super-
vision, and the use of quotations.
A press that so staunchly defends its freedom that it rejects the
idea of setting its own detailed industry-wide standards11 has unwit-
tingly relinquished a large measure of that freedom to federal and
-state judges who are now engaged in an exhaustive standard-setting
enterprise. How could this have happened? How is this taking place?
Why has the press not objected to-or, it seems, not even detected-
the phenomenon? Is freedom from ultimate financial liability so valu-
able that it should be purchased at the cost of judicial regulation of the
press? Is freedom of journalistic process, of control over inquiry and
investigation, of choice of material, of confidentiality, and of editorial
judgment over style and content, expendable under the First
Amendment?
Hints of these problems surfaced as we explored the libel litiga-
tion proces§ over the last twelve years.' We began by seeking to un-
derstand the operation of the libel tort, the dynamics of the litigation
process, the actions of the parties to this peculiar and often paradoxi-
cal legal action, and the costs the libel system was imposing on free-
dom of expression. 3 Yet as we saw the problems that plagued the
libel tort, it became apparent that the principal party in interest, the
press, had little interest in questioning the underlying system and little
inclination to grapple with its hidden costs. Few perhaps understood
the costs: judicial intrusion and ultimate loss of control over the prac-
tice of journalism. Almost no one was prepared to trace the problems
to Sullivan's requirement that public plaintiffs prove state of mind as
part of their prima facie case.
The purpose of this project, then, is to examine the unhappy ef-
fects of the Sullivan rule, that is, the extent to which the body of judi-
cial decisions in libel cases is becoming, if it has not already become,
the effective source of standards of journalism in the United States.
11. Many individual newspapers do have detailed internal standards, but there are no
comparable industry-wide rules. See Lynn Wickham Hartman, Contemporary Studies Pro-
ject, Standards Governing the News: Their Use, Their Character, and Their Legal Implica-
tions, 72 IowA L. REv. 637, 639-42 (1987).
12. See BEZANSON Er AL., supra note 10, at 198-99,208 (observing the role of courts in
setting standards of professional conduct).
13. Id. at 170-227.
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The materials for this study are the words of the courts them-
selves: judicial opinions in libel actions, particularly judicial discus-
sions of fault. These discussions usually pertain to the plaintiff's
evidence. The burden on plaintiffs to prove fault often involves intro-
ducing evidence about press behavior in researching, writing, and edit-
ing the challenged stories. Whether in ruling on motions for summary
judgment or reviewing jury verdicts, courts inevitably evaluate jour-
nalistic behavior disclosed by the evidence. Out of such evaluations
have come judicial statements about many aspects of the practice of
journalism. We hypothesized that these statements may contain ex-
plicit or implicit guidelines for the profession of journalism, a develop-
ment that, if true, would be of considerable interest to a profession
that has declined to develop a set of comprehensive rules for itself and
sees Sullivan and its progeny as generally helpful to its interests.
To explore the hypothesis, we engaged in a two-part investiga-
tion. First, we asked: What sorts of press behavior are the courts ex-
amining, and which behaviors appear to be important in their
decisions? Second, we asked: How do courts treat these behaviors
when deciding cases, and how do judges use discussions of behavior in
prior cases to resolve the libel actions before them?
In Part I we examine why press performance plays a critical role
in determining the outcome of libel cases. We begin by reviewing four
important cases in which the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
journalistic performance as evidence of reckless disregard,' 4 which is
one of the two categories of actual malice.'5 We then identify the
journalistic behaviors that are most frequently at issue in libel cases
involving the media.' 6
14. See infra notes 19-74 and accompanying text.
15. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280. The Supreme Court defined actual malice as publication
of false information "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the fault requirement may be met in
either of two ways: by showing knowledge of falsity or by showing "reckless disregard," in
accordance with the meaning that courts have given the latter phrase over time. See infra
text accompanying notes 24-74. Understandably, cases involving proof of knowledge of
falsity are most unusual. See MICHAEL F. MAYER, THE LIBEL REVOLUTION: A NEw
LOOK AT DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY 20 (1987) (noting that it is a "rare case" in which "a
court can find that a defendant knew his comments were false"). As we explain in Part I,
only seven percent of the cases examined in the present study concluded that the evidence
was adequate to support a finding of intentional falsity. See infra note 85 and accompany-
ing text. Thus, the focus of our study is the much larger set of cases involving proof of
reckless disregard.
16. See infra notes 75-288 and accompanying text.
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Other studies have examined how courts evaluate journalistic
performance as evidence of reckless disregard.17 These studies identi-
fied the types of journalistic behaviors that were likely to lead to me-
dia liability in libel cases. Our study examines the meaning of fault
from another angle. Rather than focusing on selected decisions, we
examined all libel cases reported in Volumes 2-17 of the Media Law
Reporter in which courts discussed any type of journalistic perform-
ance. The large number of cases permits a more detailed study of the
journalistic behaviors at issue in libel cases. To the extent that courts
view certain behaviors positively, the data also suggest strategies for
defense. While many of the findings reported in Part I are in line with
those of the previous studies, our data make possible a more compre-
hensive picture of the behaviors addressed by courts, and thus a more
complete assessment of judicial involvement in issues of journalistic
performance.
In Part II, we move from the behaviors themselves to the modes
of decision making used by courts when they evaluate press perform-
ance. Judicial discussion of research, writing, and editing dominated
the libel decisions examined in the study. Through various tech-
niques, courts have stated or strongly suggested the sorts of behavior
that will be required of reporters and editors. Part II examines three
modes of judicial decision making in setting journalistic norms, and
points out dangers or uncertainties associated with each.
Our analysis of libel decisions led to the following conclusions:
* The freedom of the press sought to be furthered by New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan'---the freedom to investigate and publish news
without the chilling effect of intrusion by the judicial system-has
been significantly undermined by developments traceable to the logic
of Sullivan itself. While the actual malice privilege helps to ensure
that the outcomes of most libel cases are favorable to the media, Sulli-
van has had a paradoxical effect on press freedom. In the very process
of implementing the actual malice privilege, courts have developed an
increasingly comprehensive and intrusive set of behavioral standards
for the press.
e These standards embrace a wide range of journalistic behav-
iors, from the purely compositional aspects of writing and editing to
such conventional details of journalistic research as corroboration and
investigation.
17. E.g., BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 8.4 (Supp. 1993); RODNEY A.
SMoLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 3.17-3.23 (1992); Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Proof of Fault
in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 VAND. L. REV. 247, 259-335 (1985).
18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
- While the essential dynamic at work in libel decisions-the
proliferation of objective indicia of mental state-is a familiar one at
common law and should not be surprising, the standards-creating en-
terprise is fundamentally and jarringly at odds with Sullivan's press-
protective spirit.
* Judges have developed at least three modes of analyzing press
behavior: discussion of press behavior considered egregious, produc-
ing an explicit or implicit restrictive norm; fact-oriented discussion of
press behavior, producing an implicit restrictive norm; and law-ori-
ented discussion of press behavior, producing an explicit permissive
norm. These modes of analysis cut across categories of cases reflect-
ing the three principal stages of the journalistic process: research,
writing, and editing.
* Judges appear more willing to imply restrictive norms in discus-
sions of journalistic research than in discussions of writing and editing.
This tendency may reflect a perceived distinction between "objective"
and "subjective" aspects of the journalistic process, with greater judi-
cial solicitude for the subjective aspects, i.e., the compositional or cre-
ative realms of the profession.
* Judicial discretion in a given case to adopt one mode of analysis
instead of another, and to emphasize one sort of behavior over an-
other, allows courts considerable leeway to decide libel cases the way
they want to decide them.
We also conclude that the study has implications for the profes-
sion of journalism and the future of libel law in the United States:
a The journalistic profession should question whether it is desira-
ble for courts to be engaged in the explicit and implicit fashioning of
professional standards, a role that allows courts to intrude into the
autonomy of the press and encourages an oversight role for lawyers in
the journalistic process and in editorial decision making.
* United States law should consider abandoning the actual mal-
ice requirement that has led to the phenomenon discerned in the pres-
ent study, and explore alternative forms of First Amendment
protection.
The Article thus demonstrates the way in which judges are creat-
ing a unique kind of regulatory system for the press. The behavioral
focus of the libel tort has resulted in a system in which professional
norms are the by-products of much litigation. The behaviors ex-
amined by the courts are wide-ranging, and the techniques of norm-
creation can be straightforward or, as is often the case, sufficiently
subtle to avoid drawing attention to the judicial role. Even though the
norms are often generous to the press, the regulatory system of mod-
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em libel law, properly understood, presents a serious threat to press
freedom because it makes the courts the ultimate arbiters of press
behavior.
I. AssEssING PPrss BEHAVIOR IN LIBEL CASES
A. Origins of Standards-Creation in Libel Decisions
The judicial creation of journalistic standards arises from two dy-
namics: one related to process, the other to substance. The first dy-
namic is the common law process-the development, over time, of a
set of objective guidelines to meet a subjective test of liability. In the
context of the libel tort, this process has involved the accumulation of
behavioral norms under the actual malice test.
The second dynamic is a substantive judicial effort to respond to
the perceived power of the press, particularly the press's role as a for-
midable checking institution in a democratic society. Many judicially-
created norms are permissive; they accord the press wide leeway in
fulfilling its checking function through the gathering and publication
of news and commentary. Other judicially-created norms are rela-
tively demanding, insisting on certain levels of press responsibility and
thereby culminating in an aggregate of legal duties.
Thus, journalistic standards emerge from a combination of fac-
tors. An abstract requirement of intent or recklessness begets
pragmatically developed objective indicia with the potential to assume
a life of their own. At the same time, courts ruling on motions and
reviewing verdicts focus on the substantive balance of freedom and
restraint appropriate for a vital cultural entity such as the press.
1. The Common-Law Process
The common-law dynamic can be illustrated by a survey of four
Supreme Court cases: three seminal decisions from the first decade of
the constitutionalized tort, and a recent case in which the process of
objectifying the subjective test of liability continued.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,19 the Supreme Court trans-
formed the libel tort from a strict-liability cause of action to a fault-
based cause of action; the Court defined "fault" with reference to the
publisher's state of mind.20 This change made journalistic conduct an
essential focus of libel litigation.21 Because direct evidence of mental
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
20. Id. at 279-80.
21. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979) (discussing the relevance of evi-
dence of journalistic conduct).
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state rarely is available, post-Sullivan plaintiffs have attempted to
prove the requisite mental state through inferences from conduct. 2
Before Sullivan, details of journalistic behavior were relevant only on
the issue of punitive damages and the applicability of certain privi-
leges. 3 Sullivan, however, dictated that a public-official plaintiff's
case include clearly convincing evidence of intentional falsity or reck-
less disregard of the truth by the defendant in developing and publish-
ing the contested information.24
The Sullivan Court applied the test by discussing and characteriz-
ing the Times' pre-publication behavior, particularly its failure to ver-
ify the accuracy of the disputed advertisement?5 The Court first
stressed that the "mere presence" of conflicting stories in the Times'
files "does not, of course, establish that the Times 'knew' the adver-
tisement was false. 26 The Court then stated that responsible persons
at the Times relied on the "good reputation[s]" of the transmitter of
the advertisement and those who had signed it,27 a finding relevant to
the "reckless disregard" prong of the actual malice test. However, the
Court also stated that the Times was "reasonable" in believing the
advertisement to be" 'substantially correct' " and was "not unreason-
able" in not perceiving the advertisement to be a personal attack.28
"Reasonable" behavior and judgment therefore were relevant to the
inquiry into mental state.
Surely part of Justice Black's refusal to acquiesce in the actual
malice test2 9 was a sense that intimations of unreasonableness would
lead judges (and juries) too swiftly to conclude that the actual malice
test had been met. Hence Justice Black's somber warning: "The re-
quirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent pro-
tection for the right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly
does not measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First
Amendment."30
22. Id. at 160.
23. Id. at 164-67.
24. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 286-88 (analyzing the New York Times's process of publishing
the defamatory advertisement).
25. Id. at 287-88.
26. Id. at 287.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 286-87.
29. Id. at 293-97 (Black, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 293 (Black, J. concurring). Justice Black interpreted the First Amendment,
which states that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech or of
the press," U.S. CONsT. amend. I, to guarantee "the people and the press" freedom "to
criticize officials and discuss public affairs with impunity." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 296 (Black,
J., concurring).
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In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,31 the process of elaborating the
actual malice test continued. There the Court split on the appropriate
level of fault that a public figure, rather than a public official, should
be required to prove in a libel action. Five members of the Court
voted for either the actual malice test or absolute immunity for the
press. 2 The four remaining Justices preferred what they considered a
lesser standard of fault for public-figure plaintiffs, namely, a showing
that the media defendant engaged in "highly unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. '33
Thus, while the case yielded a subjective test of fault, a minority em-
braced an objective standard akin to gross negligence or gross irre-
sponsibility to be applied (it seemed) by comparing the behavior at
issue with professional standards.
It is unlikely that any significant practical difference existed be-
tween the two formulations in terms of the behavioral evidence that
would be considered relevant under each. In applying the actual mal-
ice test and upholding a jury verdict against the Saturday Evening
Post, Chief Justice Warren "measured ... the conduct of the pub-
lisher" in two paragraphs that also explicitly referenced and adopted
Justice Harlan's analysis of the facts in applying the "extreme depar-
ture" test 4.3  The Chief Justice noted the defendant's commercial mo-
tivation for changing its "image" and adopting a provocative style of
"sophisticated muckraking.""5 He also noted the defendant's "slip-
shod and sketchy investigatory techniques"; 36 its lack of further inves-
tigation once apprised of the plaintiff's position (and that of the
plaintiff's daughter) that the story about to be published was false;37
and its awareness of the harm that would result from publication.3 8
However, the Chief Justice glossed over the critical step of linking
these objective behaviors to a conclusion about mental state. He sim-
ply finished the discussion with the statement: "I am satisfied that the
31. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
32. Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice White agreed that the actual
malice test should apply. Id. at 162-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result), 172 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in the result). Justice Black and Justice Douglas took the view that the
First Amendment prohibited any libel judgments against the press. Id. at 170-72 (Black, J.,
concurring in the result).
33. Id at 155. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, was joined by Justices Clark,
Stewart, and Fortas. Id. at 133.
34. Id. at 163-69 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
35. Id. (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
36. Id. (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
37. Id. at 169-70 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
38. Id. at 170 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
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evidence here discloses that degree of reckless disregard for the truth
of which we spoke in New York Times ....
The Chief Justice's opinion thus insisted on a subjective test, but
focused on the unprofessional quality of the defendant's conduct with
a blunt-edged conclusory holding that the requisite mental state had
been proven. The clear signal was that behavioral analysis was inevi-
table and that an exacting delineation of the nexus between behavior
and state of mind was not necessary.
Despite his use of a different standard of fault, Justice Harlan's
approach to the facts was not far-removed from Chief Justice War-
ren's approach. Although favoring a rule that would test for "extreme
departure from the standards of investigating and reporting ordinarily
adhered to,"4 Justice Harlan did not discuss such standards, and cer-
tainly did not measure the defendant's conduct against any specific
external rule. Instead, like the Chief Justice, Justice Harlan concen-
trated on the defendant's own behavior. Indeed, Justice Harlan ap-
peared to equate his test of "extreme departure from the standards of
investigating and reporting ordinarily adhered to" to a shorter formu-
lation: "investigation [that was] grossly inadequate in the circum-
stances."41 This formulation dispensed with comparisons to ordinary
professional behavior and focused on the defendant's behavior alone.
Some lower courts mistook Justice Harlan's opinion to be the
controlling opinion in Curtis and employed the "extreme departure"
test in cases involving public figures.42 Other courts equated Justice
Harlan's short formulation-"investigation [that was] grossly inade-
quate under the circumstances"-with the actual malice require-
ment,43 although this does not appear to have been Justice Harlan's
meaning. A number of subsequent appellate decisions applying the
actual malice test" have addressed whether press conduct was
39. Id. (Warren, CJ., concurring in the result).
40. Id. at 155.
41. Id. at 156.
42. See, e.g., Connaughton v. Harte Hanks Communications, Inc., 842 F.2d 825, 840-44
(6th Cir. 1988) (relying in part on Justice Harlan's formula), affd, 491 U.S. 677 (1989). But
see Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989) (clarify-
ing the actual malice test).
43. See, e.g., Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 441 F.2d 378, 380 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 864 (1971).
44. See, e.g., Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631, 643, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1097,
1106 (11th Cir. 1983); Silvester v. ABC, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 766, 779, 13 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1817, 1826 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 1491, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1138
(11th Cir. 1988); Pemberton v. Birmingham News Co., 482 So. 2d 257, 266, 12 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1465,1472 (Ala. 1985); Fisher v. Larsen, 188 Cal. Rptr. 216,226 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 959 (1983).
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"grossly inadequate under the circumstances" and have produced con-
siderable discussion about specific journalistic behaviors.
In Curtis, then, both camps focused on conduct. Because the
same conduct "counted" in both Chief Justice Warren's subjective in-
quiry and in Justice Harlan's objective inquiry, the difference between
the two, even if technically clear, was practically blurred. What re-
mained indisputable was that press behavior was central to libel litiga-
tion and that judges would engage in analysis and characterization of
the behavior as a matter of course.
A third major case, St. Amant v. Thompson,4 again rallied be-
hind the subjective test of actual malice and then proceeded to list
objective behaviors that could be used by plaintiffs to meet the test.
In effect, the opinion provided two principal quotations for divergent
use by the lower courts: one stressing mental state and the other
stressing objective analysis.
The first passage affirmed the actual malice test as different in
kind from any test of negligence: The "cases are clear," the Court
stated, "that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reason-
ably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated
before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to
-the truth of his publication."46
However, another passage in St. Amant emphasized the objective
evidence that may be offered as proof of actual malice. In language
reminiscent of Justice Harlan's opinion in Curtis, the Court held that a
media defendant will not "be likely to prevail when the publisher's
allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man
would have put them in circulation. Likewise, recklessness may be
found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the
informant or the accuracy of his reports." 47 The key words were "in-
herently" and "obvious." They suggested that if published allegations
would have appeared "inherently improbable" to a reasonable person,
or if reasons to doubt a source would have been "obvious" to a rea-
sonable person, a jury could infer reckless disregard. The practical
meaning of these words would become the subject of a number of
subsequent appellate decisions discussing and evaluating press behav-
ior and, in the process, signalling norms of journalistic research. 48
45. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
46. Id. at 731.
47. Id. at 732.
48. See infra notes 95-115 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving use of an
unreliable source), and notes 122-27 and accompanying text (discussing reliance on an "im-
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These early cases demonstrate how the addition of state-of-mind
to the public plaintiff's case led to judicial analysis of journalistic be-
havior and how judicial opinions began to be vehicles for, statements
of journalistic standards. In Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.
Connaughton,4 9 the Court contributed further to what it called the
"case-by-case adjudication [through which] we give content to these
otherwise elusive constitutional standards."5 As in St. Amant, the
Court affirmed the actual malice standard.5 1 At the same time, the
Court upheld a verdict against a media defendant based on inferences
drawn from omissions in verification.5 2 Where the defendant had cho-
sen not to interview an important source and not to listen to relevant
recorded tapes of that source, the Court posited a "purposeful avoid-
ance of the truth" supporting the jury's verdict for the plaintiff.5 3
"Purposeful avoidance of the truth," like the phrases "inherently
improbable" and "obvious reasons to doubt," called for a conclusion
about state of mind based on evaluation of behavior. Writing for the
Court in Harte-Hanks, Justice Stevens indicated that journalistic be-
havior was relevant, at the very least, to credibility. For example, Jus-
tice Stevens found the defendant's omissions "utterly bewildering in
light of the fact that the [defendant] committed substantial resources
to investigating [another source's] claims. 54 In addition, Justice Ste-
vens found the omissions "difficult to understand,"5 given the de-
fendant's claim that it was about to decide whether to endorse the
plaintiff in a political race. He noted that "an editor in the process of
determining which candidate to endorse would normally have an in-
terest [in the omitted research.], 56 Again, Justice Stevens seemed to
suggest what credible editorial behavior should look like (although he
cited no expert information for his view). Thus, determining whether
there was a "purposeful avoidance of the truth" involved the prelimi-
nary step of evaluating conduct, including what was done, what was
left out, and why. These preliminary speculations were the stuff of
standards-creation.
probable" source in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657
(1989)).
49. 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
50. Id. at 686.
51. Id. at 666-67.
52. Id. at 688-93 (independently reviewing a finding of actual malice).
53. Id. at 692.
54. Id. at 682.
55. Id. at 683.
56. Id.
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2. Substantive Policy Making
Norms are also a function of substantive judicial concerns about
power. Another look at the four cases discussed above reveals that
judge-made norms derive in part from judicial perceptions of press
power. Permissive norms encourage the power of the press as a vital
checking institution in a democratic society, while restrictive norms
respond to a perceived need to check the press's unique ability to in-
ffict harm on individuals and to disserve the public.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan declared that the mere failure to
investigate a factual assertion that turns out to be false does not con-
stitute actual malice. This declaration produced a permissive norm:
a newspaper need not investigate the accuracy of a statement as long
as it does not doubt the statement's truth. The background of this
norm was the Court's effort to secure "breathing space" for the press,
a margin of error to facilitate coverage of "the major public issues of
our time."58 With its explicit references to the instrumental value of
citizen criticism of government,59 and to the inconsistency between the
Sedition Act of 1798 and the First Amendment,6" the Sullivan Court
focused on the press's function of checking governmental authority
through informing and enlightening the public. Sullivan's permissive
norm of investigation of factual accuracy derived in part from the
Court's substantive interpretation of the First Amendment as protect-
ing the checking function and hence a range of press behaviors. 61
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court recognized another
power inherent in the press: the potential, as Chief Justice Warren
57. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964).
58. Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
59. Id. at 269-70.
60. Id. at 273-76. As Justice Brennan noted, the Sedition Act made it a crime, punish-
able by a $5,000 fine and five years in prison,
if any person shall write, print, utter or publish ... any false, scandalous and
malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or
either house of Congress .... or the President .... with intent to defame ... or to
bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against
them, or either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United
States.
Id. at 273-74. Justice Brennan pointed out that both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
attacked the Act as unconstitutional, and that while the Act was never tested in the
Supreme Court, "the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history."
Id. at 274-76. The Justice noted "a broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it
imposed upon critidsm of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the First
Amendment." Id. at 276.
61. For a thoughtful discussion of this function, see Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value
in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. BAR FOUND. Ras. J. 521 (1977).
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wrote, "to destroy lives or careers."'62 The Chief Justice's comment
was oddly consistent with his discussion in the same case of the magni-
tude of non-governmental institutional power in the United States. In
discussing the "public figure" issue, the Chief Justice wrote: "[P]ower
has ... become much more organized in what we have commonly
considered to be the private sector. In many situations, policy deter-
minations which traditionally were channeled through formal political
institutions are now originated and implemented through a complex
array of boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and associa-
tions ... "63 While Chief Justice Warren clearly was not consciously
referring to press corporations, this comment perhaps reflected a gen-
eral concern for checking a range of powerful institutions outside gov-
ernment. It is interesting that this concern was consistent with his
impatience with the press behavior in Curtis and his conclusion that
"[fireedom of the press under the First Amendment does not include
absolute license to destroy lives or careers." 6" The norms-in this
case, restrictive norms-apparently backed by both Justices Warren
and Harlan65 were that reporters should verify serious allegations re-
ceived from a suspect source with available independent sources, and
that editors should require verification of serious allegations when
their reporters lack expertise in the subject matter and may not be
fully objective.66
St. Amant v. Thompson67 brought together the substantive con-
cerns of both Sullivan and Curtis. On the one hand, St. Amant af-
firmed Sullivan's commitment to the power of the press to check
government with respect to "public business.",68 Hence, the first prin-
cipal quotation discussed earlier69 stressed the highly protective sub-
jective test of actual malice. On the other hand, St. Amant grasped
62. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (Warren, CJ., concurring
in the result).
63. Id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
64. Id. at 170 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result). For commentary on the regula-
tion of the press from the standpoint of power relationships, see Marshall S. Shapo, Media
Injuries to Personality: An Essay on Legal Regulation of Public Communication, 46 TEx.
L. REv. 650 (1968).
65. Compare Justice Harlan's application of the "extreme departure" test to the facts
of Curtis, 388 U.S. at 156-58, with Chief Justice Warren's application of the actual malice
test in the same case, id. at 169-70 (Warren, CJ., concurring in the result). Both opinions
concentrate on essentially the same press behavior offered as evidence in the case, with the
Chief Justice making additional comments about the Saturday Evening Post's motivation.
Id. (Warren, CJ., concurring in the result).
66. See id. at 169-70 (Warren, CJ., concurring in the result).
67. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
68. Id. at 731-32.
69. See id. at 731; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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the lessons of Curtis-the power of the press to destroy as a result of
grossly inadequate investigation. The second passage in St. Amant70
thus affirmed the behavioral language and focus of the Justices in Cur-
tis. St. Amant, in effect, allowed the press to check power but also
subjected the press itself to the check of behavioral norms.
By the time Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton71
was decided at the end of the 1980s, the Court's experience with press
cases had disclosed another power of the press, perhaps more subtle
than either the noble power to check or the pernicious power to de-
stroy. Harte-Hanks concerned a much more difficult-to-observe
power: the power to influence political events-in that case, an elec-
tion-through the release of incompletely researched information.72
In preparing an account of alleged "dirty tricks" by a political candi-
date, the media defendant cut short its research and produced what
the plaintiff, the jury, and the Supreme Court regarded as a report
that omitted important, relevant facts.73 A concern for the press's
ability to engage in subtle political distortion by omission may well
have prompted the Court's adoption of the category "purposeful
avoidance of the truth."74
3. Conclusion
The intersection of a procedural dynamic and a substantive con-
cern has produced a regulatory system for the journalistic profession.
The procedural dynamic is the common-law process of fleshing out
the libel tort's element of fault, first through a catch phrase such as
"reckless disregard," then through phrases such as "obvious reasons
to doubt" and "purposeful avoidance of the truth," and finally
through identification of behaviors deemed relevant to the meaning of
those phrases. The substantive concern is the judiciary's perceived re-
sponsibility to balance freedom and restraint of the press in society
through a combination of permissive and restrictive professional stan-
dards. Through the law of libel, judges have filled a vacuum, indicat-
ing what will pass for acceptable journalism.
70. See id at 732; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
71. 491 U.S. 654 (1989).
72. I& at 692 (viewing the newspaper's insufficient research as "a product of a deliber-
ate decision not to acquire knowledge of facts that might confirm the probable falsity of
[charges published against candidate for office]").
73. See, e.g., iL at 682.
74. hM at 692.
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B. Journalistic Behaviors in the Adjudication Process
1. The Study: Objectives and Methods
Here we identify the journalistic behaviors that courts have dis-
cussed in libel decisions involving actual malice. Our purpose is to
show the extent to which courts have evaluated journalistic perform-
ance. We find that courts have considered virtually all aspects of the
journalistic enterprise, from the gathering of information by reporters
to the writing, editing and presentation of stories.75
To identify the types of behavior that have come under scrutiny,
the Iowa Libel Research Project76 analyzed all libel cases reported in
Volumes 2-17 of the Media Law Reporter" in which courts discussed
any type of journalistic performance. Most of the excluded cases dealt
with procedural issues or with the determination of a plaintiff's status
as public or private.
We completed a questionnaire for each case. The questionnaire
elicited detailed information, such as the year of the decision, the level
of judicial activity, the plaintiff's legal status, and the case outcome.
The questionnaire also elicited information on four key variables,
where applicable: the journalistic behaviors at issue in each opinion;
the reasons given by the court for determining the appropriateness or
inappropriateness of the journalistic behaviors; whether the court de-
termined the truth or falsity of the challenged statements and, if so,
the reasons given by the court; and the reasons given by the court for
deciding the actual malice issue presented.78
75. See Gilbert Cranberg, Malice in Wonderland: Intrusion in the Newsroom, Iowa
Center for Communication Research (on file with the authors).
76. The Iowa Libel Research Project is a joint effort of the School of Journalism and
Mass Communication and the College of Law at the University of Iowa and the School of
Law at Washington and Lee University.
77. The study did not include Volume 1 of the Media Law Reporter. That volume
gathers an array of cases considered by the editors to be the most significant media cases
decided before January 1977. Introduction, 1 Media L. Rep. (BNA) vi (1978). Volume 2
gathers decisions published in loose-leaf form beginning January 11, 1977 and continuing
through September 20, 1977. Introduction, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) v (1977). Subsequent
volumes attempt to report all media cases decided in the United States. Volume 17 gathers
cases published in loose-leaf form through September 25, 1990. The data base for the
present study included cases from the beginning of Volume 2 through White v. Fraternal
Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2137 (D.C. Cir. 1990) in Volume
17.
The most current volume of Media Law Reporter is Volume 23. While we have not
examined the cases in Volumes 18-23 in the same systematic way as the cases in the present
study, we are aware of no cases therein that cast doubt on our conclusions about the cases
in Volumes 2-17.
78. Our research also included all cases in which negligence was the standard of fault
and all cases in which gross irresponsibility was the standard of fault. However, analysis of
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Because most libel opinions are complex, two research assistants
with the necessary legal training to comprehend the court's reasoning
read each case.79 To ensure accurate descriptions of the journalistic
performance in the cases, research assistants with backgrounds in
journalism evaluated and verified all of the questionnaires.8 0 This
method of data collection ensured that research assistants who were
knowledgeable about both law and journalism read and coded each
case.
8 1
those cases is beyond the scope of the present Article. We deal here exclusively with actual
malice cases, statistically a much larger group of cases than the negligence cases and the
gross irresponsibility cases. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
In some 34 jurisdictions, negligence is the standard of fault for private plaintiffs when
the challenged statement involves a matter of public concern. See generally ROBERT D.
SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 5.9, at 340
(1994) (discussing jurisdictions that use the negligence standard). Gross irresponsibility is
the standard of fault in New York for private plaintiffs when the challenged statement is
"arguably within the sphere of public concern." Id. § 5.9.3, at 350 (citing Chapadeau v.
Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 1 Media L Rep. (BNA) 1693, 1694
(N.Y. 1975)).
79. After a case was selected, its first reader was a research assistant with a back-
ground in libel law, either a third-year law student or an attorney. This research assistant
completed a questionnaire for the case. Then a second research assistant, either a third-
year law student or an attorney, read the case. This research assistant verified all of the
information contained in the questionnaire and coded it for computer entry. If there were
disagreements between the second reader and the first, the questionnaire was set aside for
further review.
80. If there were no disagreements between the first and second readers, the coded
questionnaire was checked and verified by another research assistant who was a graduate
student in journalism. If this research assistant disagreed with the coding of the question-
naire or if any of the information was unclear, the questionnaire was set aside for further
review. If there were no disagreements, the coded information was entered into a comput-
erized data base. For those cases in which there were disagreements among the research
assistants, the case was read by another research assistant who attempted to resolve the
disagreement. If that research assistant was unable to resolve the disagreement, the case
was referred to one of the principal members of the Iowa Libel Research Project for a final
decision.
81. The use of social science research methods to study libel litigation in the United
States was pioneered by Marc Franklin. See generally Marc A. Franklin, Suing The Media
for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 797 (1981) [hereinafter Frank-
lin, Suing The Media] (summarizing the results of nearly 300 libel cases brought against the
media during a four-year period); Marc A. Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A
Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. Rs. J. 455 (1980) [hereinafter Frank-
lin, Winners and Losers] (summarizing the results of a study of over 500 reported defama-
tion cases); see also BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 10 (analyzing the libel litigation process
from the appearance of the alleged libelous story to the outcome of the case through inter-
views, surveys, case studies, and research of information drawn from media libel insurers).
The findings of these studies yielded important information about libel litigation and re-
sulted in the development of an alternative method for dealing with libel disputes. See John
Soloski & Roselle L. Wissler, The Libel Dispute Resolution Program: A Way to Resolve
Disputes Out of Court, in BEYOND THE CouRTRooM: ALTERNATIVES FOR RESOLVING
PRESS DisprrEs 83 (Richard T. Kaplar ed., 1991). These studies also resulted in legislative
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The data gathered in this phase of the study disclosed the exten-
sive range of journalistic behaviors discussed by the courts. We ex-
amine these behaviors below.' 2 Once these discrete behaviors were
isolated and defined, we undertook the second part of the project: an
examination of the nature of the courts' decision-making process in-
volving journalistic performance. We grouped the discrete behaviors
into categories reflecting three principal stages of journalistic practice:
research, writing, and editing. We then analyzed a number of cases
addressing charges of actual malice in each of these categories. In
gauging the nature of judicial discussion of journalistic behavior, we
looked for similarities or differences, or both, in the courts' approach
to each category. In cases involving more than one category, we
looked for indications of how the categories related to each other in
the courts' analyses. We also examined whether, in cases involving
more than one category, courts at different levels of review in the
same case focused on different categories. We present findings and
conclusions from this phase of the study in Part II.
2. Range of Behaviors Discussed by Courts
Most libel suits involving the media require plaintiffs to prove ac-
tual malice. Of the 840 cases in the present study, 449 were actual
malice cases; that is, they discussed actual malice as the standard of
fault the plaintiff was required to prove. Of these 449 cases, 421 dis-
cussed journalistic behavior as evidence of actual malice.8 3
proposals for reforming libel law at both the federal and state levels. Id. (citing H.R. 2846,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) and state bills from California, Connecticut, Illinois, and Iowa).
See also NORTHWESTERN UNIV. LIBEL REFORM PROJECT, THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON
PROGRAM, PROPOSAL FOR THE REFORM OF LIBEL LAW (1988) [hereinafter ANNENBERG
PROPOSAL] (proposing a comprehensive model Libel Reform Act with an emphasis on
nonmonetary damage remedies); David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A
Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. REv. 847 (1986) (arguing that libel defendants and plaintiffs
should be given the option to choose declaratory relief in suits by public officials and public
figures); Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74
CAL. L. REv. 809 (1986) [hereinafter Franklin, Declaratory Judgment Alternative] (propos-
ing a declaratory judgment remedy).
82. See infra notes 83-288 and accompanying text.
83. The 449 actual malice cases represent 53.5% of the cases in the study. There were
72 cases involving negligence (8.6% of the cases), 46 cases involving gross irresponsibility
(5.5% of the cases), and six cases in which the fault standard was neither of the above (.7%
of the cases). In 267 cases (31.8%), the courts did not discuss the standard of fault. In the
28 actual malice cases deleted from Table I (see Appendix), the courts did not address the
media's journalistic behavior as evidence of actual malice.
Our finding that most libel cases involve actual malice is consistent with a finding in
our previous study of cases decided between 1974 and 1984. Fifty-seven percent of those
cases were brought by public officials or public figures who by virtue of their public status
were required to prove actual malice. BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 101-03.
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"Actual malice," of course, means publication either with knowl-
edge of falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.84 In less than
seven percent of the actual malice cases examined in this study did the
courts find, or hold that a jury could find, that the media had know-
ingly published false information.85 Most cases focused instead on
reckless disregard and, more particularly, on the facts of journalistic
performance offered by the plaintiff as circumstantial evidence.86 We
begin this section by identifying the range of those journalistic behav-
iors. Next, we examine a number of specific behaviors that figured
prominently in judicial discussions of reckless disregard.
"Journalistic behavior" refers to specific types of journalistic per-
formance at issue in the cases examined in the study. At the outset, it
is important to note that, on average, between two and three journal-
istic behaviors were at issue in each case. Therefore, our data should
not be interpreted to mean that any one behavior, by itself, can sup-
port a conclusion that a defendant acted in reckless disregard.
The journalistic behaviors at issue in the cases in this study have
been grouped into thirty categories. These categories can be divided
into two broad groups: one concerning the media's professional be-
havior and the other concerning behavior relating to the media's atti-
tude towards the published material or the plaintiff.
The professional performance categories include use of a confi-
dential source, use of an unreliable source, failure to verify a source's
information, and use of a source who was hostile towards the plaintiff.
The attitudinal categories include animosity toward the plaintiff, fail-
ure to verify the accuracy of information considered doubtful by the
media, and publication of false information despite indications that
the facts were false. These attitudinal categories are important in de-
termining whether the media acted with reckless disregard. For exam-
ple, a reporter's failure to verify information supplied by an unreliable
source is, standing alone, usually not sufficient evidence to constitute
reckless disregard.s7 However, if another clearly knowledgeable
source is left unchecked, and the reporter or editor appears deter-
mined to publish a preconceived story critical of the plaintiff, the com-
84. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
85. In only 10% of the actual malice cases in the study did plaintiffs attempt to prove
that the media had knowingly published false information.
86. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 682-91
(1989); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 165 (1979).
87. See, e.g., Loeb v. New Times Communications Corp., 497 F. Supp. 85, 92-93, 6
Media L. Rep. 1438, 1442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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bination of the reporter's behavior and attitude is likely to lead to a
finding that the defendant acted recklessly.8
Table 1 (see Appendix) provides a complete list of both profes-
sional and attitudinal behaviors at issue in the 421 decisions in which
actual malice was the standard of fault.8 9 The behaviors are ranked
according to the number of cases in which the behaviors were at is-
sue.90 The behaviors most often at issue in actual malice cases were
failure to verify information provided by a source (29% of cases); un-
clear writing (28% of cases); failure to provide an accurate summary
of information (26.6% of cases); and failure to investigate adequately
the information in the story (23.3% of cases).
While the presence of these behaviors on the list is predictable in
light of Sullivan and its progeny, the number of additional behaviors
included in Table 1 is striking. They encompass every step in the jour-
nalistic process. In terms of research, they include use of an unrelia-
ble source (11.4%), failure to do more after receiving notice that a
story contained false information (7.4%), use of a source known to be
hostile to the plaintiff (5.9%), failure to contact an obvious source
(3.3%), lack of a formal verification procedure (2.1%), and failure to
find additional sources who would contradict information provided by
other sources (1%). In terms of writing, these behaviors include exag-
gerated writing (8.8%), unbalanced writing (8.6%), and writing that
omits pertinent information (5.9%). In terms of editing, they include
failure to make a sufficient correction or apology (5.2%), editing in a
way that leads to defamation (4.8%), use of an inaccurate headline
(4%), and misuse of a photograph (2.1%). The scope of these behav-
iors demonstrates the pervasive entanglement of courts in analysis of
journalistic performance.
Table 1 is not concerned with wins or losses in libel cases. The
data do not indicate which of the behaviors are more or less likely to
lead to a finding of reckless disregard. In fact, the behaviors at the top
of the list-those most frequently at issue-are often of secondary im-
portance in determining whether the media acted recklessly. For ex-
ample, despite the large number of cases in which the clarity of the
media's writing was at issue, there is not a single case in the study in
which this behavior alone was cited as proof that the defendant had
acted recklessly. To identify the journalistic behaviors that are impor-
88. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 683-85, 691-93.
89. See supra text accompanying note 83 (stating number of actual malice cases in
which journalistic behavior was discussed).
90. The total percentage in Table 1 exceeds 100 percent because more than one behav-
ior was cited in most cases.
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tant in determining reckless disregard, the behaviors in Table 1 must
be compared with the cases' outcomes, which we discuss next.
3. Impact of Behaviors on Case Outcomes
Statistical analyses of the data in Table 2 indicate that the follow-
ing journalistic behaviors play an important role in determining reck-
less disregard:91 (1) use of an unreliable source; (2) failure to contact
an obvious source; (3) failure to provide the plaintiff with an opportu-
nity to respond to allegations before publication; (4) use of a confi-
dential source; (5) failure to follow accepted journalistic practices; (6)
republishing false information; (7) failure to include pertinent infor-
mation in the story; (8) failure to correct or retract false information;
and (9) publishing false information despite being informed before
publication that the information was false. Each of these behaviors is
examined below. 2 We also examine two other behaviors that are fre-
quently at issue in libel cases: failure to investigate adequately the
information in the story and hostility towards the plaintiff.93 We iden-
tify the circumstances in which these behaviors could support a find-
ing of reckless disregard.
As shown in the following discussion, the media won most cases
involving the nine journalistic behaviors identified above.94 However,
statistical analyses indicate that plaintiffs tended to do better when
one or more of these nine journalistic behaviors were at issue. This
does not necessarily mean that a plaintiff will prevail if the plaintiff
proves that the defendant engaged in one of these behaviors. Rather,
91. The data in Table 2 were analyzed using a variety of multivariate techniques, par-
ticularly Classification and Regression Trees. These techniques are "multivariate" because
they allow analysis of more than one variable at a time. This was important because more
than one journalistic behavior was at issue in most of the cases examined in the study.
Because the analyses using Classification and Regression Trees are lengthy, they have not
been included in this article. The analyses are on file with John Soloski.
92. See infra notes 95-255 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 256-88 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 95-255 and accompanying text. In this Article, when we say a party
"won" or "lost" a libel case, we mean the party received a favorable or an unfavorable
ruling in court, in the context of either a motion, a verdict, or an appeal of a motion or a
verdict. For example, a media defendant "loses" when the court denies its motion for
summary judgment, when a verdict is entered for the plaintiff, or when an appeal is re-
solved against the media defendant. The fact that a media defendant "loses" a case does
not mean necessarily that a finding of actual malice was made. A media defendant can
"lose" if the court denies its motion for summary judgment on grounds that a jury reason-
ably could infer actual malice based on the evidence. By contrast, a media defendant
"wins" if the court grants its motion for summary judgment, finding that an inference of
actual malice could not be made on the evidence, if the plaintiff fails to win a verdict, or if a
ruling unfavorable to the media on a motion or in a verdict is reversed.
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a plaintiff's odds of prevailing increase, often only slightly, if the plain-
tiff succeeds in proving one of these behaviors.
a. Use of an Unreliable Source
A media defendant's use of an unreliable source, by itself, cannot
establish liability, but it can be probative of reckless disregard. 95 Usu-
ally, the plaintiff must show that there were obvious reasons to doubt
the source's reliability and that the defendant did not verify the
source's information. 6
When examining the reliability of a source, courts probe a broad
range of scenarios, such as use of information provided by a political
enemy of the plaintiff;97 use of information made problematic by the
source's demeanor and by the known inaccuracy and obvious implau-
sibility of some of the information;98 and use of information attributed
to unsubstantiated rumor.99 Courts often link their discussion of a
suspect source to the actual malice inquiry by asking whether "a trier
of fact could find on the record that there were obvious reasons to
doubt veracity and accuracy.' 100
In forty-eight cases in the study (eleven percent of the actual mal-
ice cases), media defendants were accused of using an unreliable
source. Plaintiffs won thirty-five percent of these cases. In nearly
fifty-three percent of the cases won by plaintiffs, the media had not
verified the source's information. For example, in Stevens v. Sun Pub-
lishing,'0 ' a newspaper implied that a state senator was "manipulated
by his con man brother."'1 2 The reporter knew that his source had an
95. Pep v. Newsweek, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1000, 1002-03, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1179,
1180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See also SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION, supra note 17, § 3.19[1]
(explaining that objective reasons to doubt a source's credibility may be used to prove a
reporter's subjective doubt as to the credibility of that source); Bloom, supra note 17, at
279 (arguing that reliance on a source with a criminal record or unsavory background can
be evidence of reckless disregard).
96. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,732 (1968); see also Bloom, supra note 17, at
280 (arguing that an unreliable source may be used if the reporter is convinced of the
source's veracity).
97. See, e.g., Williams v. First Fed. Say. Bank of Puerto Rico, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1033, 1040 (D.V.I. 1987).
98. See, e.g., Nash v. Keene Publishing Corp., 498 A.2d 348, 355, 12 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1025, 1030 (N.H. 1985).
99. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilson Publishing Co., 497 A.2d 322, 327, 12 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1049, 1052-53 (R.I. 1985).
100. Nash, 498 A.2d at 355, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1030.
101. 240 S.E.2d 812, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2025 (S.C.), cen. denied, 436 U.S. 945
(1978).
102. Id. at 814, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2026.
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"obvious bias"1"3 against the plaintiff and that the story would harm
the plaintiff's reputation, but "printed the article without further in-
vestigation."'1 The court affirmed a jury finding of actual malice and
a verdict of $50,000.105
In over a third of the cases won by plaintiffs, an inference of reck-
less disregard was permissible because the media defendant had rea-
son to doubt the truth of the source's information and did not verify it.
For example, in Davis v. Keystone Printing Service, Inc.,106 a newspa-
per reported that the plaintiff, a minister, "lured members of his reli-
gious organization into homosexual encounters, promoted illegal
absences from the U.S. Navy, and encouraged large personal contri-
butions.""1 7 Prior to publication, the plaintiff raised questions with
the reporter about the credibility of the reporter's sources and pro-
duced "undeniable evidence that [one of the sources] had lied" to the
reporter about a business transaction involving the plaintiff.10 In re-
versing summary judgment for the newspaper, the court noted that
"there was reason to doubt the trustworthiness" of this source, 10 9 and
that the reporter failed to conduct sufficient "further investigation." 110
The media's strongest defense against a charge of using an unreli-
able source was evidence of a thorough investigation of the facts. In
thirty-nine percent of the cases won by the media, the courts con-
cluded that the media had thoroughly investigated the source's infor-
mation. For example, in Pemberton v. Birmingham News Co.," the
plaintiff, a state official, challenged a news headline that he said gave
"the false impression that [he] was involved in an illegal or unethical
scheme of buying and selling paroles. 11 2 The plaintiff attacked the
reliability of the source, an ex-convict whose behavior had been incon-
sistent during his contacts with the reporter.1 3 In affirming a judg-
ment for the media defendant, the court minimized the source's
103. Id. at 815, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2026.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 813, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2025.
106. 507 N.E.2d 1358, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (applying an
actual malice standard to a private plaintiff case), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 1219 (Il.
1987).
107. Id. at 1361, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1225-26.
108. Id. at 1368, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1231.
109. Id.
110. Id., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1232.
111. 482 So. 2d 257, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1465 (Ala. 1985).
112. Id. at 264, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1471.
113. Id. at 264-65, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1471.
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credibility problems and stressed the reporter's additional investiga-
tion of the story.114
In addition, in over a quarter of the cases discussing charges that
a reporter's source was unreliable, the courts concluded that no infer-
ence of actual malice could be drawn on this basis in part because the
media had acted in accordance with accepted journalistic practices"15
in verifying the source's information.
b. Failure to Contact an Obvious Source
In general, the media's failure to contact an obvious source, by
itself, cannot establish reckless disregard." 6 However, when a princi-
pal source's information appears "highly improbable," raising "obvi-
ous doubts about her veracity," a court may properly construe the
reporter's failure to contact an obvious additional source as a "delib-
erate decision not to acquire knowledge of facts that might confirm
the probable falsity of [the principal source's] charges."" 7
Courts delve into an array of scenarios when they examine
whether the media should have contacted an obvious source: in the
context of a highly personal, human interest story, the failure to con-
tact the other side of a "self-serving" account of a failed relation-
ship;" in the context of an expos6 of criminal activity, the failure to
test a known liar's allegations by consulting a "critical witness"; 119 and
114. Id. at 266-67, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1472-73.
115. See, e.g., Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446,453, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1849,
1854 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991) (crediting expert testimony that "no
journalism standards were violated in the reporting or editing of the [challenged] articles").
For a separate discussion of cases involving perceived professional standards or internal
news policies, see infra notes 159-80 and accompanying text.
116. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287-88 (1964), cited in SMOLLA,
LAw OF DEFAMATION, supra note 17, 3.18[1]. The Court noted that the failure to use a
newspaper's own files to verify statements in a paid political advertisement
does not, of course, establish that the Times 'knew' the advertisement was false,
since the state of mind required for actual malice would have to be brought home
to the persons in the Times' organization having responsibility for the publication
of the advertisement .... We think the evidence against the Times supports at
most a finding of negligence in failing to discover the misstatements ....
Id.; see also Bloom, supra note 17, at 283-85 (arguing that evidence of a failure to contact
an obvious source is insufficient to establish reckless disregard).
117. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 691-92 (1989);
see also SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION, supra note 17, § 3.18 [1] (noting that a failure to
contact an obvious source must be egregious to raise the inference that the reporter held a
subjective doubt as to the source's credibility).
118. Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1362, 9 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1257, 1264 (Colo. 1983).
119. Pep v. Newsweek, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1000,1002,9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1179,1180
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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in the context of a book about state politics, the author's failure to
take even "very simple" steps to verify with public authorities that a
public official had been indicted.12 0 As one court stated: "[A] re-
porter's failure to pursue the most obvious available sources of possi-
ble corroboration or refutation may clearly and convincingly evidence
a reckless disregard for the truth."''
The media lost fifty-seven percent of the actual malice cases in
the study in which the plaintiff charged that the media had not con-
tacted an obvious source. In half of the cases lost by the media, the
media defendant had not contacted a source who could have contra-
dicted information provided by another source or sources. For exam-
ple, in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., v. Connaughton,122 a
newspaper quoted a source's allegation that a judicial candidate, Con-
naughton, had used "dirty tricks" and had promised jobs and a trip to
Florida to the source and her sister in exchange for their help in dis-
crediting an ally of Connaughton's opponent.123 The court noted the
possible personal motivations for the source's allegations 124 as well as
"the hesitant, inaudible, and sometimes unresponsive and improbable
tone" of the source's answers to the newspaper's "various leading
questions."'" In addition, although the newspaper "was aware that
[the source's sister] was a key witness" to the allegations being re-
ported, the newspaper "failed to make any effort to interview her. ' 126
The failure to contact an obvious source in these circumstances
amounted to a "purposeful avoidance of the truth,"' 2 7 which was suffi-
cient to establish actual malice.
In a third of the cases lost by the media, the court concluded that
a jury could infer reckless disregard on the basis of evidence that the
defendant had reason to doubt the accuracy of the information and
did not make a sufficient effort to investigate before publication. 28
120. Rogers v. Doubleday & Co., 644 S.W.2d 833, 834, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1615,
1616 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd as to the publisher, 674 S.W.2d 751, 10 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2173 (Tex. 1984).
121. Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Publishing Co., 637 P.2d 315, 319, 7 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2137, 2139-40 (Colo. 1981) (en bane).
122. 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
123. Id. at 660.
124. Id. at 673.
125. Id. at 691.
126. Id. at 692.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Publishing Co., 637 P.2d 315,319, 7 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2137, 2139 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (affirming plaintiff's verdict where the re-
porter "admitted he had no bases for most of his erroneous statements").
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The media usually prevailed when they were able to show that they
conducted an adequate investigation of the story.129
Often the source most capable of providing key information is
the prospective plaintiff. In twenty-four actual malice cases in the
study, the plaintiff charged that he or she had not been given an op-
portunity to respond to the allegations before publication. Plaintiffs
won thirty-eight percent of those cases.' 30 In more than half of the
cases won by plaintiffs, the plaintiff possessed information that contra-
dicted information provided by other sources. 31 In most of these
cases, evidence was offered that the media had reason to doubt the
accuracy of the information but published anyway.' 32 However, fail-
ure to contact the plaintiff, standing alone, is unlikely to result in an
unfavorable decision for the media, particularly where the defendant
made efforts to reach the plaintiff.133
c. Use of a Confidential Source
When a media defendant has published information in reliance
on a source whose identity is not disclosed, plaintiffs often attempt to
force disclosure. 34 Plaintiffs pursue this information in order to argue
that the source was unreliable and hence that use of the source's infor-
mation is evidence of reckless disregard,'135 or that the confidential
source's information contradicted a named source's version of facts
129. See, e.g., Doubleday v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 756, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2173, 2177 (Tex. 1984) (holding that despite the availability of contradictory information, a
book publisher's process of substantiating an author's facts does not demonstrate reckless
disregard).
130. See, e.g., Kuhn, 637 P.2d at 317-18, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2138-39; Pep v.
Newsweek, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 n.2, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1179, 1180 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
131. See, e.g., Kuhn, 637 P.2d at 319, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2139-40 (noting that the
reporter did not corroborate allegations with subjects of the story).
132. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 671, 8 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2340,2343 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1024 (1983) (noting that "the total-
ity of [the source's] claims and behavior suggests that [the publisher] should have done
more than it did to authenticate its source for the publication at issue").
133. See Solar Enters. v. Polich, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 184, 1846 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
1985).
134. See generally Robert G. Berger, The 'No-Source' Presumption: The Harshest Rem-
edy, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 603 (1987) (examining the trend in libel cases of declaring a re-
porter's refusal to reveal a confidential source as establishing, as a matter of law, the
nonexistence of that source).
135. See, e.g., Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc., 623 P.2d 103, 107, 6
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1769, 1772 (Idaho 1980) (noting the plaintiff's argument that a fail-
ure to comply with discovery prevented it from proving actual malice).
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that became the basis of the published story.136 Media defendants, in
turn, resist disclosure, invoking a First Amendment-based privilege of
nondisclosure 37 or state shield laws.'3 Judicial treatment of efforts to
force disclosure of confidential sources in defamation cases has va-
ried.' 39 For present purposes, the important point is that the use of a
confidential source is behavior that can and does come under consid-
erable scrutiny in libel litigation.
Despite the litigation complications that can arise from the use of
a confidential source, media success in cases involving this behavior is
frequent. In the present study, the media won nearly sixty-five per-
cent of the seventeen actual malice cases in which use of a confidential
source was discussed. In almost all of these cases, media defendants
were able to show that they thoroughly investigated the accuracy of
the confidential source's information. For example, in Clyburn v.
News World Communications, Inc.,140 a newspaper published reports
of the behavior of the plaintiff, a city official, at the scene of a friend's
drug overdose.'4' The newspaper relied on confidential sources, who
themselves relied on informants. 42 Noting the number of sources and
their positions, the District Court held that reliance on the confiden-
tial sources was not indicative of actual malice. 43 The court added
that all five "provided consistent information," and noted the "inher-
ent reliability and experience" of the law enforcement officers.' 4 The
court concluded that "ihere were no obvious reasons to doubt the
veracity or the accuracy of the salient information provided by the
136. See, e.g., Schultz v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 551,566, 4 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2356, 2367 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (noting the plaintiff's argument that a failure to dis-
close a confidential source should allow the court to assume that the source provided dif-
ferent information than that in the article).
137. See, e.g., Gadsden County Times, Inc. v. Home, 426 So. 2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (noting defendant's argument that forced disclosure of a source will restrict
a reporter's ability to gather news).
138. See, e.g., the defendant's argument in Sprague v. Walter, 543 A.2d 1078, 1080, 15
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1625, 1626 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1988), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 988
(1988).
139. See generally Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confidential
Sources and First Amendment Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 13, 22-25 (1988) (discussing
how different courts invoke Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), for different proposi-
tions regarding existence or nonexistence of privilege).
140. 705 F. Supp. 635, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1522 (D.D.C. 1989), affd, 903 F.2d 29,
17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1888 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
141. Id. at 636, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1523.
142. Id. at 642, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1528.
143. Id. There were five sources, of which three were law enforcement officers, one
was a federal prosecutor, and one was a city employee. Id.
144. Id.
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confidential sources.""14 The court of appeals stressed the credibility
of the sources' information as well.' 46 Under these circumstances, the
defendant's reliance on confidential sources did not give rise to an
inference of reckless disregard, and summary judgment was
granted.147
In Schultz v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,14s the defendant's research
efforts again dispelled any question raised by the use of confidential
sources. The plaintiff sought disclosure of the identities of certain
confidential sources and the information that they had given the de-
fendant magazine.149 The plaintiff's purpose was to show that the in-
formation given by these sources was contrary to the published story
and that as a result the defendant had doubted the story's truth.'
The court declined to force disclosure. 15' The story's nonconfidential
sources were recognized as "clearly reputable,"'5 2 and the reporter's
deposition showed that the confidential sources confirmed "much of
the information contained in the article."' 53
In other cases, courts are unable to find sufficient verification of
the information provided by a confidential source. In two thirds of
the cases in this category lost by the media, defendants did not ade-
quately verify the source's facts. For example, in Savitsky v. Shenan-
doah Valley Publishing Corp.,14 a newspaper relied on an unnamed
source for a story reporting that the plaintiff, a union official
campaigning for reelection, used a company helicopter on election
day.' 55 The "impact" of the particular allegation was "not lost" on the
court. 56 In reversing summary judgment for the defendant, the court
cited the reporter's deposition testimony that "he took his unnamed
informant's word for the accuracy of the information," and failed to
confirm the story with the plaintiff "or anyone else," despite the fact
that the plaintiff had been a reliable source in the past and the story
145. Id. at 643, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1529.
146. Clyburn, 903 F.2d at 34, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1892, affg, 705 F. Supp. 635,
16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1522, 1529 (D.D.C. 1989).
147. Clyburn, 705 F. Supp. at 643, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1529.
148. 468 F. Supp. 551,4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2356 (E.D. Mich. 1979). In this case, the
plaintiff was a private figure. Id. at 558-60, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2361-62. Actual
malice was implicated in a question of whether to divest the defendant's fair comment
privilege. Id. at 562-63, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2362-64.
149. Id. at 566, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2367.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 568, 4 Media L. Rep (BNA) at 2368-69.
152. Id. at 565, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2366.
153. Id. at 566, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2367.
154. 566 A.2d 901, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1219 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
155. Id. at 903, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1221.
156. Id. at 904, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1221.
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was not "hot news."'15 7 The failure to verify the confidential source's
information came close, in the court's view, to willful blindness to the
story's falsity,' raising a jury question on actual malice.
d. Failure to Follow Accepted Publishing Standards
Public plaintiffs in libel actions cannot prove actual malice by
simply demonstrating the media defendant's departure from "ac-
cepted publishing standards."' 59 However, when combined with other
behaviors, such departures may support a finding of reckless
disregard.6 0
As shown in this section, "accepted publishing standards" and
similar phrases refer to two categories of practices discussed in the
cases in this study. First, the phrase refers to journalistic conduct that
is routine behavior in a particular media organization. Second, the
phrase refers to journalistic conduct deemed by the court to be
broadly accepted in the journalistic profession. As part of the effort
to prove actual malice, plaintiffs have focused on whether a media
defendant's practices in researching, writing, or editing a challenged
story conformed to practices usually followed by the defendant or the
profession.
Plaintiffs won forty-eight percent of the study's actual malice
cases in which they argued that the defendant deviated from standard
practice. For example, in DeLoach v. Beaufort Gazette161 and
Stickney v. Chester County Communications,162 the courts discussed
customary in-house practices that reporters violated. In DeLoach, the
reporter failed to check a police station's arrest docket before writing
157. Id. at 903, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1221.
158. Id. at 904, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1222.
159. This phrase comes from Justice Harlan's opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 159 (1967). Justice Harlan proposed that the standard of fault for public-
figure libel plaintiffs should be a showing of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an
extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to
by responsible publishers." Id. at 155. In Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Con-
naughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989), the Supreme Court emphasized that Justice Harlan's pro-
posed test had never commanded a majority of the Court; rather, the proposed standard
"was emphatically rejected by a majority of the Court in favor of the stricter [Sullivan]
actual malice rule." Id. at 665-66.
160. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 668 (noting that "it cannot be said that evidence concern-
ing motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry" (emphasis
added)).
161. 316 S.E.2d 139, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1733 (S.C.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 981
(1984).
162. 522 A.2d 66, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2192 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 533
A.2d 713 (Pa. 1987).
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a story. 63 The story stated erroneously that a private citizen had been
arrested and charged with assault. 64 Besides breaching the reporter's
"usual practice" of checking the docket, the reporter breached an in-
house rule of filing a report concerning his story's error.165 While the
court did not expressly link these lapses to its affirmance of a jury
verdict for the plaintiff,166 the court's mention of the in-house prac-
tices and breaches suggested their relevance to the fault inquiry.
In Stickney, the reporter based his account of "police brutality"
only on the word of the alleged victims, with "virtually no attempt to
corroborate or contradict the allegations."' 67 The court noted that the
newspaper's failure to investigate the allegations "was contrary to [the
newspaper's] own policy of seeking as much corroboration as possible
in articles of this nature. 168 While, as in DeLoach, the court did not
expressly link this fact to its ultimate decision to affirm a verdict for
the plaintiff,169 the court's mention of the reporter's breach of an in-
house rule was surely not gratuitous.
In Savitsky v. Shenandoah Valley Publishing Corp.,'7 ° in which a
newspaper reported a union official's use of a company-owned heli-
copter' 171 the court referred not to in-house rules but to "acceptable
journalistic procedures.' 72 In the court's view, the article was
"marked by clear departures from acceptable journalistic proce-
dures," including "(1) the utter lack of adequate pre-publication in-
vestigation; (2) the use of wholly speculative accusatory inferences;
and (3) the failure to utilize or employ effective editorial review."' 7 3
These departures contributed to the court's holding that a jury could
properly draw an inference of actual malice. 74
On the other hand, a media defendant's own showing that its re-
porters and editors had followed journalistic standards can contribute
to decisions favorable for the media. For example, in Diesen v. Hess-
163. DeLoach, 316 S.E.2d at 141, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1734.
164. Id., 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1733.
165. Id., 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA)'at 1734.
166. Id. at 142, 10 Media L. Rep.'(BNA) at 1734.
167. Stickney, 522 A.2d at 68, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2193.
168. Id., 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2194.
169. Id. at 69-70, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2194-95; see DeLoach, 316 S.E.2d at 142,
10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1734.
170. 566 A.2d 901, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1219 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
171. Id. at 902, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1220.
172. Id. at 904, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1222 (citing Frisk v. News Co., 523 A.2d
347, 351, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1835, 1838 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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burg,175 a reporter aggressively gathered information for a story
charging a local prosecutor with malfeasance in domestic violence
cases.176 The plaintiff claimed that the reporter and his editor omitted
pertinent information and wrote the story in a way that defamed the
plaintiff.177 In reversing an appellate decision to reinstate a verdict for
the plaintiff,171 the court relied on the testimony of a journalism pro-
fessor who said that the reporting techniques used by the reporter
were "a textbook model of how investigative reporting should be
done.' 1 79 The court also concluded that the newspaper editors' re-
fusal to meet with the plaintiff was "in accordance with standard jour-
nalism policy."' 0
e. Repeating False Information
The media's republication of false information after being in-
formed that the information is false can support a finding of actual
malice.'18  Plaintiffs won forty-one percent of the study's actual malice
cases in which media defendants were charged with repeating false
information in subsequent stories.'82 In a third of the cases won by
plaintiffs, the courts concluded that the media's republication was evi-
dence that the media knowingly published false information. 83 In a
quarter of the cases won by plaintiffs, the media did not correct or
175. 455 N.W.2d 446, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1849 (Minn. 1990) (en banc), cert de-
nied, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991).
176. Id. at 453, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1854.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 447, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1849.
179. Id. at 453, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1854.
180. Id. Diesen is one of the few cases in the study in which a court specifically cited an
expert witness's testimony on standard journalistic practices. In less than one percent of
the actual malice cases in the study did courts cite the testimony of an expert witness re-
garding journalistic performance. Despite the frequency of judicial references to standard
or accepted journalistic practices, how courts arrive at their notions of standard practices in
cases not involving internal rules or expert testimony about professional practices remains
mysterious. Judges may simply be offering what they take to be common-sense observa-
tions. See, e.g., Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1122, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1809,
1818 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (suggesting that "responsible journalism" requires presenting a "bal-
anced, neutral picture of th[e] particular controversy").
181. See, e.g., Good Gov't Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 572,
579, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2082, 2088 (Cal. 1978), cerL denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979);
Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 664 P.2d 337, 345, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1769, 1775 (Nev. 1983).
182. See, e.g., Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066, 13 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2438 (5th Cir. 1987); Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 724 P.2d 562, 13 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1282 (Ariz. 1986).
183. See, e.g., Zerangue, 814 F.2d at 1072, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2443; Dombey,
724 P.2d at 576, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1294.
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retract a statement after receiving information raising the possibility
that the statement was false and warranting further investigation.'84
In cases involving republished information, courts usually ex-
amine all the circumstances in which the media defendant learned that
the story initially published could be false. For example, in Dombey v.
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.,85 a newspaper published stories charging
that the plaintiff, an insurance agent, had benefitted from cronyism in
the awarding of county contracts.8 6 The agent provided a wealth of
information to the newspaper, including "an extensive demand for
correction and retraction,"' 87 which detailed "at great length each and
every supposed factual error" and was supported by public records.188
The court catalogued the agent's unsuccessful efforts to obtain a suffi-
cient retraction,' 89 and noted that subsequent stories included false
information. 190 The newspaper argued that it had merely been negli-
gent in not keeping its own files timely with the information and deni-
als provided by the agent, and in not studying the agent's lengthy
submission of records.' 91 Noting that "[g]eneral unspecific demands
for retraction are, of course, of no weight," the court found that the
newspaper's republication of the false information under these cir-
cumstances could support an inference of actual malice. 192
In Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc.,193 a newspaper retracted a
story that had misstated the reason two former law enforcement of-
ficers lost their jobs. 94 The month following the retraction, however,
the newspaper made the same error, publishing that the former of-
ficers had been convicted of felonies when in fact they had been con-
victed of misdemeanors. 95 The reporter who wrote the second story
184. See, e.g., Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 664 P.2d 337,345,9 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1769, 1774-75 (Nev. 1983) (finding that publisher's "correction" could be
taken as a "republication"); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 36, 5 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1113, 1116 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
185. 724 P.2d 562, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1282 (Ariz. 1986).
186. Id. at 563-65, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1283-85.
187. Id. at 565, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1285.
188. Id. at 575, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1293.
189. Id. at 574-75,13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1293-94. The court noted that "a 'retrac-
tion' was published, but it contained further false statements about Dombey." Id. at 574,
13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1293.
190. Id. at 575, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1293-94.
191. Id. at 575-76; 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1293-94.
192. Id., 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1293-95.
193. 814 F.2d 1066, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2438 (5th Cir. 1987).
194. Id. at 1068, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2440.
195. Id. at 1068-69, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2439-40. In discussing the issue of
"substantial truth," the court noted that the newspaper's stories "could be viewed as con-
verting a foolish and irresponsible betrayal of the public trust into a rapacious and calcu-
lated one." Id. at 1073, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2444.
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said that she based the statements on the original story in the paper's
"computer files," that her "computer search did not turn up the [sub-
sequent] retraction and that she was not otherwise aware of the re-
traction."1 96 Both editors who might have edited the second story
were aware of the original story's error and the retraction but they
said that "neither noticed the error"' 9 in the second story. Another
retraction followed the second story.19 Nevertheless, the court held
that a jury could find actual malice in the second story's publication. 99
The court stated: "[O]nce the publisher knows that the story is erro-
neous ... the argument for weighting the scales on the side of first
amendment interests becomes less compelling. The [defendant news-
paper] could have adopted a policy of disseminating retractions widely
or with certainty among newsroom staff, and of revising its computer
files after each retraction."2"
f. Not Including Pertinent Information
As long as a reporter or editor believes the published facts to be
true, the act of selecting disparaging facts rather than other facts can-
not establish reckless disregard.2 ' However, when a defendant has
credible information casting doubt on the truth of facts selected for
inclusion in the story, a decision not to include pertinent information
can be evidence of reckless disregard.2 "2
For example, in Green v. Northern Publishing C0.,.°3 a newspaper
published an editorial implying that a physician had been partially re-
sponsible for the death of a disturbed inmate.2 °4 In reversing sum-
mary judgment for the newspaper, the court concluded that a jury
could find that the newspaper had acted in reckless disregard of the
196. Id. at 1069, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2440.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1074, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2442-43.
200. Id. at 1072, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2443.
201. See, e.g., Reader's Digest Ass'n V,. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 610, 619, 11 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1065, 1072 (Cal. 1984), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1009 (1989); see also SMOLLA,
LAW OF DEFAMATION, supra note 17, § 3.20[2] (maintaining that "lack of balance is not
synonymous with a lack of balance or neutrality in the gathering, reporting or editing of
news").
202. See, e.g., Healy v. New England Newspapers, Inc., 555 A.2d 321, 328, 16 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1753, 1758 (R.I.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989); see also SANFORD, supra
note 17, § 8.4.6.1 (describing the role of denials and contradictions in achieving balanced
reporting).
203. 655 P.2d 736, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2515 (Alaska 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1208 (1983).
204. Id. at 739, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2517.
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truth.205 The newspaper "knew of" but did not mention "substantial
evidence" showing that the coroner's report and inquest had found
that the inmate's death was of natural causes.20 6
Plaintiffs won forty percent of the actual malice cases in the study
in which the plaintiff charged that the media had not included perti-
nent information in the story.207 In some cases, courts held that it
could also be found that the defendant was predisposed to publish
information damaging to the plaintiff.0" In nearly a third of the cases
won by plaintiffs, the courts found that the defendant wrote the chal-
lenged statement in a manner that could cause readers to infer false,
defamatory facts about the plaintiff. For example, in Healy v. New
England Newspapers, Inc.,20 9 a newspaper published two articles
about the collapse and death of a YMCA member during a demon-
stration near a building where a YMCA board meeting was taking
place.21 A local physician who was presiding at the board meeting
heard about the collapse and asked if he could help, but other board
officials informed him that the stricken man was already receiving
help or would receive it momentarily.21' The newspaper's second arti-
cle stated that the family of the deceased man was angry that the doc-
tor had not assisted the man when he collapsed, falsely implying that
the doctor "refused to help a person in need of medical attention. '212
On affirming a jury's award of punitive damages to the doctor, the
court noted that "[t]he 'defamation' at issue here really consists of
what was left unprinted as well as what was actually printed."2 3 Not-
ing too that "information was available to [the reporter] prior to pub-
lishing the.., article to clarify any confusion about what plaintiff was
asked or told and how he responded," the court held that this and
other evidence could support a finding of actual malice.2"4
205. Id. at 744, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2521.
206. Id. at 742, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2520.
207. See, e.g., Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Elliott, 302 S.E.2d 692,695,9 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2252, 2253 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984) (affirming trial
court award of damages for private plaintiff arguing actual malice).
208. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 683-84
(1989); Warford v. Lexington Herald-Leader, 789 S.W.2d 758, 772, 17 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1785, 1796 (Ky. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1047 (1991).
209. 555 A.2d 321, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1753 (R.I.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814
(1989).
210. Id. at 322-24, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1754-56.
211. Id. at 322-23, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1754-55.
212. Id. at 327, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1758.
213. Id. at 326, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1758.
214. Id. at 327, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1758.
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g. Failure of the Media to Correct or Retract
Authorities are mixed on the significance of a refusal to correct or
retract information challenged as false by a prospective plaintiff32 5 In
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 6 the Supreme Court appeared skep-
tical of the use of such proof in a libel action. 1 7 The Court noted that,
"[w]hether or not a failure to retract may ever constitute.., evidence
[of actual malice]," the Times's decision not to retract on the demand
of the plaintiff could not be such evidence in the circumstances of that
case.21 8 The Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests in a comment that
"[u]nder certain circumstances evidence [of a refusal to retract after
the statement has been demonstrated to be both false and defama-
tory] might be relevant in showing recklessness at the time the state-
ment was published. 2 1 9 However, the Restatement does not explain
whether the plaintiff in fact must "demonstrate[ ]" that the statement
was false or whether it is sufficient for the plaintiff merely to raise
doubts in the mind of the defendant. Nor does the Restatement ex-
plain why it uses the tentative phrase "might be relevant. '220 The
problem with such evidence appears to be that actual malice refers to
state of mind at the time of publication, not afterwards.22
Matching the Restatement's tentativeness on the issue, the cases
go in several directions. In some jurisdictions, a refusal to correct or
retract a story can be relevant to actual malice, but standing alone it is
not dispositive.2 2 In others, "failure to retract has no bearing on the
issue of malice."223 Indeed, some courts state that failure to retract
"provides some evidence that [the publisher] reasonably believed [the
plaintiff] had not been defamed. '224
Other cases examine the significance of the media's willingness to
retract. In a case in which the media defendant promptly retracted a
215. See generally Bloom, supra note 17, at 327-29 (analyzing the effect of circum-
stances surrounding a retraction).
216. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
217. Id. at 286.
218. Id. at 286-87 (emphasis added).
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A cmt. d (1977).
220. Id.
221. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 498 (1984)
(stating that the relevant time period for actual malice inquiry is "at the time of publica-
tion"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286 (1964) (same).
222. See, e.g., Golden Bear Distrib. Sys. of Texas, Inc. v. Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d
944, 950, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1857, 1861 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEC-
oND) OF TORTS § 580A cmt. d (1977)).
223. Pelzer v. Minneapolis Tribune, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2507,2509 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
1981).
224. Connelly v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 448 N.W.2d 901, 905, 17 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1204, 1207 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 286-87)).
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challenged statement, the court found that "it is significant and tends
to negate any inference of actual malice on the part of the [newspa-
per] that it published a retraction of the indisputably inaccurate por-
tions of the [challenged] article in the next day's edition."225  Other
courts, however, accord little significance to a defendant's prompt
retraction 22
6
Plaintiffs won half of the actual malice cases in the study in which
the media failed to retract or correct a statement after being informed
that it contained errors. In a number of these cases, the defendant
discovered that the information was false, but failed to correct the er-
rors and failed to prevent republication. For example, in Rinaldi v.
Viking Penguin, Inc., 27 the defendant published a book linking the
plaintiff to organized crime.2- The plaintiff insisted on a retraction
and deletion of false material from unissued copies or future print-
ings. 29 The defendant acknowledged that some of the information
was false and planned to make corrections in subsequent printings.230
However, when the book was reprinted as a paperback, the false in-
formation remained intact. 1' The court found that the defendant's
failure to ensure the correction of concededly false facts was sufficient
evidence of actual malice to warrant denial of summary judgment.232
An insufficient retraction can also be probative of actual malice,
especially if the retraction makes little effort to distance itself from the
original defamation. In Nevada Independent Broadcasting Corp. v.
Allen,-33 the moderator of a televised political program accused the
plaintiff, a gubernatorial candidate, of passing a bad check. 4 During
a commercial break, the candidate's representative demanded an
apology.2 5 When the program resumed, the moderator acknowl-
edged the demand but did not comply3 6 The candidate then made a
225. Hoffman v. Washington Post, 433 F. Supp. 600, 605, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1143,
1146 (D.D.C. 1977), affd, 578 F.2d 442, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2546 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
226. See, e.g., Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066,1071,13 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2438, 2442 (5th Cir. 1987) (crediting retraction of first erroneous story but not
second); DeLoach v. Beaufort Gazette, 316 S.E.2d 139, 141,10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1733
(S.C.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 981 (1984) (recounting retraction in facts but not discussing it
in legal analysis).
227. 420 N.E.2d 377, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1202 (N.Y. 1981).
228. Id. at 378, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1203.
229. Id. at 379, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1203.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 379-80, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1204.
232. Id. at 383, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1207.
233. 664 P.2d 337, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1769 (Nev. 1983).
234. Id. at 340, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1771.
235. Id. at 341, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1771.
236. Id.
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written demand for a retraction. 7 After the station and the candi-
date were unable to agree on an appropriate retraction, the station
issued its own version." 8 The court found that the retraction was tan-
tamount to a republication of the original defamation and that the
republication, following notice of falsity, was evidence of reckless
disregard."M
h. Failure of the Media to Act on False Information
This section covers a number of behaviors separately listed on
Table 2, all relating to publishing information in the face of doubts
about accuracy.
In seventy-four cases (17.6% of the actual malice cases), plaintiffs
offered proof that the media had reason to doubt the accuracy of the
information and yet failed to verify it.240 Plaintiffs won favorable rul-
ings in two-thirds of these cases.24'
In fifty-two cases (12.4% of the actual malice cases), plaintiffs at-
tempted to prove that the media failed to correct information after the
information was challenged as false.24 2 Plaintiffs won forty-four per-
cent of these cases.2 43 In some of these cases, the plaintiff told the
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 345, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1774-75 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 580A cmt. d (1977)).
240. See, e.g., Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 575-76, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1153, 1182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing "equivocal evidence" underlying published alle-
gation); Nash v. Keene Publishing Corp., 498 A.2d 348,355, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1025,
1030 (N.H. 1985) (Souter, J.) (finding evidence of "a failure to verify in the face of affirma-
tive evidence of falsehood and inaccuracy"); Herron v. KING Broadcasting Co., 776 P.2d
98, 106, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1289, 1295 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (discussing evidence
that a reporter's "investigation actually uncovered facts which directly rebutted his false
statement").
241. See, e.g., Sharon, 599 F. Supp. at 588, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1192; Warford v.
Lexington Herald-Leader, 789 S.W.2d 758, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1785 (Ky. 1990);
Nash, 498 A.2d at 355,12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1030; Herron, 776 P.2d at 107, 17 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) at 1296.
242. This category combines two subcategories of cases listed on Table 1: those in
which the media failed to correct information after being informed the information was
false, and those in which the media failed to act on information that the story contained
false information prior to publication. In two cases, Speer v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc.,
828 F.2d 475, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1601 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 970
(1988), and Synanon Found., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1924 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1979), both behaviors were at issue.
243. See, e.g., Synanon Found., 5 Media L. Rep. 1924; Braig v. Field Communications,
456 A.2d 1366, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1057 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
970 (1984).
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media defendant before publication that the information contained
errors,244 and the plaintiff sometimes offered proof of falsity.245
Plaintiffs also prevailed in a number of cases in which they in-
formed the media after publication that the information was false, and
yet the media published the information again.24 Usually courts
found that an inference of recklessness was permissible in connection
with the republication, rather than the original story. For example, in
Braig v. Field Communications,247 a television station broadcast a
public affairs program in which an assistant district attorney criticized
a judge for his handling of a police brutality case.248 After the initial
broadcast, the judge contacted the station's general manager to com-
plain that the statements were false attacks on his integrity. 4 9 After
the station manager reviewed a tape of the program, going "over and
over the tape," the program was rebroadcast without any changes.250
In reversing summary judgment for the station, the court found that a
jury could infer that the defendant entertained "serious doubts" about
the truth of the rebroadcast because of the manager's repeated 'iew-
ing of the tape and his awareness of the judge's claim of falsity. 51
Media defendants prevailed when they showed that they had no
reason to believe the information to be false. In a number of cases,
the courts found that the media had no reason to doubt the accuracy
of the information because it had been provided by a reliable source.
In Speer v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc.,z25 a newspaper published an
editorial charging the plaintiff with excessive force in the arrest of one
of the newspaper's reporters.5 3 The plaintiff charged that the re-
porter's version of the facts was false and that the newspaper's reli-
244. See, e.g., Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363, 1371,2 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1801, 1806 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affd, 623 F.2d 616, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1573 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Davis v. Keystone Printing Serv.,
Inc., 507 N.E.2d 1358, 1368, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1225, 1231 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal
denied, 515 N.E.2d 1219 (Ill. 1987) (applying actual malice standard in private plaintiff
case); Warford, 789 S.W.2d at 772, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1796.
245. See, e.g., Davis, 507 N.E.2d at 1368, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1231.
246. See, e.g., Holter v. WLCY'TV, Inc., 366 So. 2d 445,448-49,4 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2281, 2284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1979).
247. 456 A.2d 1366,9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1057 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983), cert denied, 466
U.S. 970 (1984).
248. Id. at 1369, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1058.
249. Id. at 1376, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1064.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. 828 F.2d 475, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1601 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
970 (1988).
253. Id. at 476, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1602.
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ance on the reporter was evidence of reckless disregard.254 In
affirming a judgment in favor of the defendant, the court concluded
that the defendant was unaware that the information was false and
had no reason to doubt the information because it was "not inherently
improbable" and because the reporter was believed to be honest.5
i. Failure to Investigate Information Adequately
One of the most frequent claims in libel litigation is the broad
charge that the media defendant's investigation of facts was inade-
quate.56 However, proof of inadequate investigation is not, by itself,
sufficient to establish actual malice." 7 As the preceding sections have
demonstrated, plaintiffs can meet the actual malice test by showing
inadequate investigation in conjunction with other facts, such as reli-
ance on a suspect source, 2 8 or awareness of contradictory informa-
tion.259 In thirty-six percent of the cases won by plaintiffs in which the
media had not adequately investigated information, the media also
had not verified a source's information.260 In most of these cases, the
courts determined that the source was unreliable, giving the media
reason to doubt the accuracy of the information. 261
In half of the cases won by plaintiffs in which the courts found
inadequate investigations, the courts also found that the media had
doubts about the truth.262 In twenty-seven percent of these cases, the
254. Id. at 478, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1603.
255. Id.
256. In nearly a quarter of the actual malice cases in the study, courts addressed the
issue of whether the media had adequately investigated the facts before publishing. See,
e.g., Nash v. Keene Publishing Corp., 498 A.2d 348, 355, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1025,
1030 (N.H. 1985).
257. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 733 (1968).
258. See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 240-55 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., Warford v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 789 S.W.2d 758, 772,17 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1785, 1796 (Ky. 1990) (finding that a failure to investigate information
before publishing becomes "probative of malice when viewed cumulatively with other the
[sic] evidence," including circumstances surrounding failure to verify a source's claims in
the face of plaintiff's denials).
261. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 691-92
(1989) (finding that the defendant's "inaction," in the face of a clearly suspect source, was
tantamount to a "purposeful avoidance of the truth").
262. See, e.g., Holter v. WLCY TV, Inc., 366 So. 2d 443, 453, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2281, 2288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that reporter thought there was a possible
"mix-up" in the facts of an unresearched story but rebroadcast the story anyway), cert.
denie4 373 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1979).
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courts concluded that the media had reason to believe the information
was false before publication.263
When the media prevailed in cases involving the adequacy of the
investigation, courts often concluded that the media followed standard
practice in investigating the information.2 4 Moreover, a thorough in-
vestigation will protect the media even if errors are made in the pro-
cess. For example, in Fletcher v. San Jose Mercury News, 265 the court
was troubled by evidence that a reporter had altered a key quote used
in the story.266 However, the court's concerns were outweighed by
evidence of an otherwise thorough investigation and a "sincere at-
tempt" to report information about a public official's questionable
ethics.267
In Peeler v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal,268 a newspaper errone-
ously reported that a school board trustee had done business with the
school district in violation of law.2 69 The allegation was based on the
reporter's misunderstanding of information supplied by a state ethics
commission.270 The court found that the reporter's reliance on the
commission's information was reasonable and that his misreading of a
state document was a technical error that could not support an infer-
ence of actual malice.271
j. Ill Will as Evidence of Actual Malice
A journalist's ill will toward a plaintiff is not itself sufficient to
support a finding of actual malice.272 However, evidence of ill will can
be probative of actual malice.273 As one court has said, "the appropri-
ateness of such evidence must be determined on a case-by-case basis,
bearing in mind that evidence of ill will or bad motives will support a
263. See, e.g., Herron v. KING Broadcasting Co., 776 P.2d 98, 106, 17 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1289, 1295 (Wash. 1989) (finding that inference of actual malice was possible when
reporter "had no basis" for facts reported and had "actually uncovered facts which directly
rebutted his false statement").
264. See supra notes 159-80 and accompanying text.
265. 264 Cal. Rptr. 699, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1321 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 813 (1990).
266. Id. at 707, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1328-29.
267. Id.
268. 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1155 (D.S.C. 1988).
269. Id. at 1155.
270. Id. at 1155-56.
271. Id. at 1157-58.
272. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666
(1989); see also Bloom, supra note 17, at 261 (stating that "a few courts have posited that a
defendant's ill will is completely irrelevant to the issue of reckless disregard").
273. See, e.g., Herron v. KING Broadcasting Co., 776 P.2d 98, 106-07, 17 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1289, 1296 (Wash. 1989).
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finding of actual malice only when combined with other, more sub-
stantial evidence of a defendant's bad faith."274
In twelve percent of the actual malice cases in the study, plaintiffs
charged that the media defendants harbored ill will or hostility against
them.2 75 Plaintiffs won twenty-four percent of these cases.276 In a
third of these cases, the plaintiffs alleged both ill will and failure to
verify.277 In forty-two percent of these cases, the courts found that a
jury could conclude that the journalist had published despite doubts
about accuracy. For example, in Herron v. King Broadcasting Co., 27
a news report inflated the amount of campaign funds a county prose-
cutor had received from bail bonding companies.27 9 In reversing sum-
mary judgment, the court found that a jury could infer actual malice
from the reporter's knowledge of information directly rebutting the
story.1 0 The court added that evidence of the reporter's hostility
could "bolster[ ]" the inference.2 '
Another risky combination can be the use of a source known to
be hostile toward the plaintiff, and the failure to verify the source's
information. 2s2 In Sible v. Lee Enterprises,28 3 a Montana newspaper
published information from a source known to be both hostile to the
plaintiff and "nervous" about the accuracy of his information.284 In
reversing a jury verdict for the newspaper based on erroneous instruc-
tions, the court suggested that the defendant had chosen to "close its
eyes" to the need for further investigation.28 5
The media won more than seventy percent of the actual malice
cases in the study in which plaintiffs charged that the media had relied
on a hostile source.28 6 In most of these cases, defendants were able to
274. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 795, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2377, 2403 (D.C.
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987).
275. See, e.g., Saenz v. Playboy Enters., 653 F. Supp. 552,571, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1977, 1991 (N.D. Ill. 1987), affjd, 841 F.2d 1309, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1043, 1051 (7th
Cir. 1988).
276. See, e.g., Herron, 776 P.2d at 107, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1296.
277. See, e.g., Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 583-84, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1153, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
278. 776 P.2d 98, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1289 (Wash. 1989).
279. Id. at 100, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1290.
280. Id. at 105-06, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1295.
281. Id. at 106-07, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1296.
282. See Bloom, supra note 17, at 280-81.
283. 729 P.2d 1271, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1738 (Mont. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1011 (1987).
284. Id. at 1272, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1739.
285. Id. at 1274, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1740.
286. See, e.g., Janklow v. Viking Press, 459 N.W.2d 415, 421-22, 17 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2220, 2224-25 (S.D. 1990).
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convince the court that they had thoroughly investigated the source's
information before publication.287 In all of the cases lost by the me-
dia, the courts found that defendants had not adequately investigated
a source's information. s
C. Conclusion
The data show clearly that courts are engaged in evaluating each
step of the journalistic process. The relevance of this conduct is a nat-
ural product of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,289 although it is diffi-
cult to believe that the Sullivan Court ever imagined the scope of
behaviors that would come under scrutiny in applications of the actual
malice test.
The data show that a defendant's failure to verify the accuracy of
suspect information or to verify the information provided by a suspect
source are the two behaviors most likely to result in rulings unfavora-
ble to the media. The media defendant's best defense is evidence of
an adequate investigation of the challenged facts. However, the data
disclose more than these broad observations about wins and losses.
They reveal patterns of specific conduct-such as the use of an unreli-
able source for allegations of serious misconduct combined with a fail-
ure to verify that source's facts with available independent
sources29Q-that over time become identified as likely indicators of
actual malice, and thus as behavioral patterns to be avoided.
Having surveyed the patterns of behavior at issue in libel deci-
sions, we now examine how courts discuss journalistic performance
and send signals to the profession in individual cases. Courts employ
several modes of decision making when evaluating performance and
each can be a vehicle for stating or implying a standard of journalism.
II. CREATING JOURNALISTIC STANDARDS
In the second phase of the study, our interests were the nature of
judicial statements in public-plaintiff' libel opinions, whether those
statements emerged from a uniform pattern of analysis or several dif-
ferent patterns, whether different patterns of analysis reflected differ-
287. See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 797, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2377,
2405 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987); Janklow, 459 N.W.2d at 421-
22, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2224-25.
288. See, e.g., Stevens v. Sun Publishing Co., 240 S.E.2d 812, 815, 3 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2025, 2026 (S.C.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945 (1978).
289. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
290. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
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ent underlying values or concerns, and whether different press
behaviors affected judicial analysis in different ways.
To facilitate this examination, we placed the journalistic behav-
iors identified in Part I into three categories that reflect key aspects of
the journalistic process: research, writing, and editing. Within each of
these categories, we identified cases in which that particular journalis-
tic behavior clearly was a central concern to the court. We used the
analyses of behaviors discussed in Part I to help identify cases contain-
ing behaviors that were important to courts. In addition, we focused
only on cases from state supreme courts and federal courts.291 Ulti-
mately we analyzed thirty-two cases in the research category, twenty-
four in the writing category, and twenty-one in the editing category.
Because the cases were not selected randomly, and because they
represent a small percentage of cases in the study overall, we cannot
say whether they are representative of all the cases in each category.
Thus, the models of decision making identified in Part II may or may
not be applicable to all libel cases involving research, writing, or edit-
ing. Nonetheless, our examination of this subgroup of cases provides
a sense of the modes of judicial analysis of press behavior, as well as a
sense of whether those analytic modes were producing standards of
behavior, and, if so, what sorts of standards they produced. As the
sections below explain, we identified three analytic modes as present
in all three categories of behavior.
A. Modes of Standards-Creation
Unlike a regulatory agency, courts do not announce regulations
and publish them in the Federal Register. Instead, norms of journalis-
tic behavior emerge from several different modes of decision-making.
Here we summarize each. In Sections II-B, 292 II-C,2 93 and II-D,294 we
analyze the workings of each type of decision-making and its implica-
tions through discussions of illustrative cases.
1. Discussion of Press Behavior as Egregious, with the
Court Providing Both Factual and Legal Analysis,
Producing a Restrictive Norm
Decisions utilizing this mode of analysis are marked by a strong
tone of judicial disapproval of the press behavior at issue. Another
291. We omitted lower state court opinions so that the number of cases studied would
be manageable.
292. See infra notes 311-96 and accompanying text.
293. See infra notes 397-430 and accompanying text.
294. See infra notes 431-99 and accompanying text.
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common feature is the tripartite structure of decisions: first, a lengthy
review of libel doctrine, beginning with Sullivan; second, a detailed
review of specific facts, often quite damning (sometimes these two
parts are reversed in order); and third, the articulation or strong impli-
cation of a behavioral norm that has been violated, and a linkage of
that norm to the Sullivan rules.
In only a small number of the cases examined did courts utilize
this mode of analysis. Of thirty-two actual malice cases that focused
on journalistic research, only four were classified as treating the re-
search behavior as egregious. 95 Of twenty-four "writing" decisions in
actual malice cases, only three were classified as treating the writing
behavior as egregious.2 96 Of twenty-one "editing" decisions in actual
malice cases, only three were classified as treating editing behavior as
egregious;297 one of these was reversed on appeal.298
2. Fact-Oriented Discussion of Behavior, Implying that
Certain Behavior is Highly Questionable,
Thus Producing an Implied Restrictive Norm
Decisions utilizing this second mode of analysis are marked by a
less certain and less disapproving tone. Typically, these decisions in-
volve a motion for summary judgment,299 requiring only that the court
determine whether the evidence is such that the case may proceed; the
less judgmental tone accords with the procedural posture. The deci-
sions also contain fewer references to case law than the decisions
utilizing the first mode of analysis; factual discussions are paramount.
295. See Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363, 2 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1801 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affd 623 F.2d 616, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1573 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Bums v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d
1351, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1257 (Colo. 1983); Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Publishing
Co., 637 P.2d 315, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2137 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); Nash v. Keene
Publishing Corp. 498 A.2d 348, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1025 (N.H. 1985).
296. See Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 724 P.2d 562, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1282 (Ariz. 1986); Bums v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 9 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1257 (Colo. 1983); Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Publishing Co., 637 P.2d 315, 7
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2137 (Colo. 1981). Note that below we take issue with the court's
treatment of the writing in Burns. See infra notes 355-72 and accompanying text.
297. See Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1097 (11th Cir.
1983); Newton v. NBC, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1066, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1914 (D. Nev.
1987), rev'd, 930 F.2d 662, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1001 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 192 (1991); Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 186 (Cal. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975).
298. See Newton v. NBC, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1066, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1914 (D.
Nev. 1987), rev'd, 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990), 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1001, cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 192 (1991).
299. Of the 18 fact-oriented decisions examined (12 research, 3 writing, and 3 editing),
13 involved motions for summary judgment (9 research, 2 writing, 2 editing).
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Finally, while decisions utilizing the first mode were consistently few
in number across all three behavioral groupings (research, writing,
and editing), that pattern does not repeat itself in the fact-oriented
groupings. Of the thirty-two "research" cases involving allegations of
actual malice, twelve were classified as fact-oriented discussions, 00
whereas of the twenty-four "writing" cases involving allegations of ac-
tual malice, only three were classified as fact-oriented, 311 and of the
twenty-one "editing" cases involving allegations of actual malice, only
three were classified as fact-oriented .3 1 In the larger category-fact-
oriented "research" cases-plaintiffs won twice as many cases as de-
fendants. In the smaller categories-fact-oriented "writing" and "ed-
iting" cases-plaintiffs won in all but one case. 3
3. Law-Oriented Discussion in Which Behavior is Approved,
Producing a Permissive Norm
Decisions utilizing this third mode of analysis call attention to the
wide scope of legal protection afforded by the actual malice privilege
and emphasize the requirement that subjective fault be proven with
convincing clarity. The analysis conforms to a tripartite structure: a
300. See Reuber v. Food Chem. News, 899 F.2d 271,17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1537 (4th
Cir.), vacated, reh'g granted en banc, 922 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 925 F.2d 703, 18
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1689 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc); Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc.,
814 F.2d 1066,13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2438 (5th Cir. 1987); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Ander-
son, 746 F.2d 1563, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 477 U.S. 242
(1986); Schultz v. Newsweek, Inc., 668 F.2d 911, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2552 (6th Cir.
1982); Street v. NBC, 645 F.2d 1227,7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1001 (6th Cir. 1981); Sharon
v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Beech
Aircraft v. National Aviation Underwriters, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1401 (D. Kan. 1984);
Shockley v. Cox Enters., 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1222 (N.D. Ga. 1983), affd, 770 F.2d
174 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102 (1986); Pep v. Newsweek, 553 F. Supp.
1000, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Velle Transcendental Research Ass'n
v. Sanders, 518 F. Supp. 512, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1878 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Costello v.
Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1738 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1985),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 505 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), rev'd, 532 N.E.2d 790, 15
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2407 (Ill. 1988); Thcci v. Guy Gannett Publishing Co., 464 A.2d 161,
9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2344 (Me. 1983).
301. See Golden Bear Distrib. Sys. v. Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d 944, 9 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1857 (5th Cir. 1983); Sisemore v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 662 F. Supp.
1529, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1590 (D. Alaska 1987); Shockley v. Cox Enters., 10 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1222 (N.D. Ga. 1983), affd, 770 F.2d 174 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1102 (1986).
302. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1769 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 11
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Beech Aircraft v. National Aviation Under-
writers, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1401 (D. Kan. 1984).
303. Because cases examined in Part II were not selected randomly, these patterns may
not be representative of the universe of libel cases. Our purpose in providing these data is
to give a fuller picture of the cases examined in this section.
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section devoted to the facts, usually including extensive documenta-
tion of exculpatory factual information; an extensive review of Sulli-
van and its progeny, with focus on the doctrinal impediments to a
successful lawsuit brought by a public plaintiff and reference to the
constitutional gravity of libel actions against the press; and typically a
brief application of the governing law, culminating in a conclusion that
states or strongly implies a permissive behavioral norm. This law-ori-
ented category has the largest number of cases analyzed in the second
phase of the study.3 4 Moreover, the percentages of "writing" and
"editing" cases with a law-oriented discussion were greater than the
percentage of "research" cases with a law-oriented discussion: of
twenty-four writing cases, eighteen were law oriented, 3 5 and of
twenty-one editing cases, fifteen were law oriented.30 6 Of thirty-two
304. Of the 77 cases involving allegations of actual malice in discussions of "research,"
"writing" and "editing," 49 (64%) were classified as law-oriented.
305. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Rees, 852 F.2d 595, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1721 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1010 (1989); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762,13 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2377 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987); Woods v. Evans-
ville Press Co., 791 F.2d 480, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2179 (7th Cir. 1986); Herbert v.
Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182
(1986); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 11 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1577 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Pierce v. Capital Cities Communi-
cations, 576 F.2d 495, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2259 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 861
(1978); Perk v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1115 (N.D. Ohio 1989),
affd, 931 F.2d 408, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2098 (6th Cir. 1991); Contemporary Mission
v. New York Times, Co., 665 F. Supp. 248, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1921 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
affd, 842 F.2d 612, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1180 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 856
(1988); Saenz v. Playboy Enters., 653 F. Supp. 552,13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1977 (N.D. Ill.
1987), affd, 841 F.2d 1309, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1043 (7th Cir. 1988); Coughlin v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 377, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1681
(E.D. Pa.), affd, 780 F.2d 340, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1529 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1187 (1986); Seymour v. A.S. Abell Co., 557 F. Supp. 951,9 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1098 (D. Md. 1983); Pemberton v. Birmingham News Co., 482 So. 2d 257,12 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1465 (Ala. 1985); Reed v. Northwestern Publishing Co., 530 N.E.2d 474, 15 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2233 (Ill. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067 (1989); Major v. Drapeau, 507
A.2d 938, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2032 (R.I. 1986); Margoles v. Hubbart, 760 P.2d 324, 16
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1196 (Wash. 1988); Fremont Energy Corp. v. Seattle Post-Intelli-
gencer, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1569 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd, 688 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1985).
306. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 14 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2249 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988); Steaks Unlimited v. Deaner, 623
F.2d 264, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1129 (3d Cir. 1980); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d
910, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Silvester v.
ABC, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 766,13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1817 (S.D. Fla. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d
1491, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1138 (11th Cir. 1988); Bryant v. Associated Press, 595 F.
Supp. 814, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1090 (D.V.I. 1984); Dowd v. Calabrese, 589 F. Supp.
1206, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2017 (D.D.C. 1984); Seymour v. A.S. Abell Co., 557 F.
Supp. 951, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1098 (D. Md. 1983); Bellamy v. Arno Press, 8 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1420 (E.D.N.C. 1982); Shutt v. Harte-Hanks, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2559
(E.D. Mich. 1981); Goodrick v. Gannett Co., 500 F. Supp. 125, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2165 (D. Del. 1980); Pemberton v. Birmingham News Co., 482 So. 2d 257, 12 Media L.
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research cases, however, sixteen were law oriented.30 7 Another differ-
ence between the law-oriented "writing" and "editing" cases on the
one hand, and the law-oriented "research" cases on the other, is that a
large majority of both the "writing" and "editing" cases involved mo-
tions for summary judgment,308 whereas only about half of the "re-
search" cases involved motions for summary judgment. 0 9 Finally, in
all of the cases classified as law-oriented in all three behavioral group-
ings (research, writing, and editing), the media defendants
prevailed.31o
B. Discussions of Press Behavior as Egregious
The tendency of courts to articulate or imply norms of journalistic
behavior is most pronounced in cases involving press behavior that
Rep. (BNA) 1465 (Ala. 1985); Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Manin County Sup. Ct., 690 P.2d
610, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1065 (Cal. 1984), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1009 (1986); Beamer
v. Nishiki, 670 P.2d 1264, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1171 (Haw. 1983); Diesen v. Hessburg,
455 N.W.2d 446, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1849 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119
(1991); Graham v. New York News, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2356 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
307. See Speer v. Ottaway Newspapers, 828 F.2d 475, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1601
(8th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 970 (1988); McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942,11
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2396 (3d Cir. 1985); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine For Men,
754 F.2d 1072, 11 Media L. Rep, (BNA) 1577 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985);
Hardin v. Santa Fe Reporter, Inc., 745 F.2d 1323, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1026 (10th Cir.
1984); Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. New York Times, 665 F. Supp. 248,14 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1921 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 842 F.2d 612, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1180 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988); Silvester v. ABC, 650 F. Supp 766, 13 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1817 (S.D. Fla. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d 1491, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1138
(11th Cir. 1988); Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 377,
11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1681 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 780 F.2d 340, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1529 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1187 (1986); Murray v. Bailey, 613 F. Supp. 1276,
11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Joseph v. Xerox Corp., 594 F. Supp. 330,
11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1085 (D.D.C. 1984); FoodScience Corp. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 592
F. Supp. 362, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2127 (D. Vt. 1984); Pritchard v. Times S.W. Broad-
casting, 642 S.W.2d 877,9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1048 (Ark. 1982); McCoy v. Hearst Corp.,
727 P.2d 711,13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2169 (Cal. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987);
Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1738 (I11. Cir. Ct.
1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 505 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), rev'd, 532 N.E.2d 790,
15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2407 (I11. 1988); Gulf Publishing Co. v. Lee, 434 So. 2d 687, 9
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1865 (Miss. 1983); Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 485 A.2d 374,
11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1841 (Pa. 1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Gazette, Inc. v. Har-
ris, 325 S.E.2d 713,11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1609 (Va.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 and 473
U.S. 905 (1985).
308. Of the 18 law-oriented cases involving writing, 13 were dispositions of motions for
summary judgment. Of the 15 law-oriented cases involving editing, 10 were dispositions of
motions for summary judgment.
309. Of the 16 law-oriented cases involving research, 7 were dispositions of motions for
summary judgment.
310. Again, these patterns may not be representative of the universe of libel cases. See
supra note 303.
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can be considered patently objectionable. In these cases, in which the
journalistic conduct is not in significant dispute and the court consid-
ers the behavior egregious, courts appear comfortable making rule-
like declarations. Because the press behavior appears unusual, indeed
on the fringe of the profession, judicial signals about journalistic prac-
tice pose little risk of generating controversy or persuasive dissent.
The problem is that such discussions produce language that can be
used by parties in future litigation-and by courts in future deci-
sions-to attack behavior that is decidedly more mainstream.
Below we discuss cases involving behavior clearly considered
"egregious" from each of the principal groups of libel cases: re-
search,3 1 ' writing,312 and editing.313 The discussion outlines what was
considered objectionable in each case and the norm that was declared
or strongly suggested. We then show how each case was later cited, in
cases in which the behavior was arguably less objectionable.
1. Discussions of Press Research
In Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc.,314 a federal judge
ruled in a bench trial that Joseph Alioto, the mayor of San Francisco,
had proven actual malice on the part of a national news magazine that
had accused the mayor of having a "web of alliances with.., leaders
of La Cosa Nostra.' '315 An investigative piece in Look magazine
stated that Alioto, before becoming mayor, had assisted a mob figure
in obtaining bank loans.316 The article implied that the mayor had
associated with "major hoodlums to provide the financial wherewithal
for underworld business activities. 317
The article's principal source was the mob figure's ex-son-in-law
and former business associate, who told the reporters that the infor-
mation was based on talks with the mob figure himself.318 In an inter-
view with the reporters, the source recounted the mob figure's stories
of numerous nighttime meetings with Alioto and several other under-
world figures.319 In a subsequent interview, the source expressed un-
certainty about details of the meetings (i.e., the approximate dates and
311. See infra notes 314-43 and accompanying text.
312. See infra notes 344-72 and accompanying text.
313. See infra notes 373-96 and accompanying text.
314. 430 F. Supp. 1363, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1801 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 623 F.2d
616, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1573 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
315. Id. at 1366, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1802.
316. Id. at 1366-67, 2 Media L. Rep (BNA) at 1802.
317. Id. at 1370-71, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1806.
318. Id. at 1368, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1804.
319. Id. at 1367, 1368, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1803, 1804.
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whether Alioto was always present). 2 ° The reporters were unable to
corroborate the source's information with a local FBI agent; more-
over, a state law enforcement official investigating organized crime
told the reporters that the source's claims were "ridiculous. ' '32 1 An
individual whom the source identified as having attended the meetings
denied the allegations.322
The touchstone for the trial judge's decision in favor of the plain-
tiff was the Supreme Court's language in St. Amant v. Thompson that
"recklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt
the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports." 23
Although the reporters and their editor claimed to have had a "rea-
sonable and good faith belief in [the source's] trustworthiness" be-
cause the source appeared to have "no motivation to lie, '324 the court
was unconvinced. The court considered the clear unreliability of the
source's own source (the mob figure, whom the editor admitted be-
lieving was generally a "liar"), the "hearsay nature" of the informa-
tion, "the time which had passed since the alleged events had taken
place," the unreliable "tenor" of the source's accounts, the reporters'
inability to corroborate the source's charges, and the fact that the
source had made no such charges to the authorities in previous con-
tacts with them.3z The thrust of the court's discussion was that the
reporters' research was egregiously deficient; as a result, there were
"obvious reasons [to] doubt" the veracity of the source and hence the
truth of their own story. 26 A norm about publishing information
from a questionable source could be distilled from the court's analysis:
the press should not publish serious allegations about purported past
events based only on qualified statements of a source whose own
source lacks credibility, and whose information cannot be corrobo-
rated by a knowledgeable, trustworthy source. Journalists or lawyers
distilling this norm could logically conclude that a violation of the
norm would imperil a media defendant in a libel action.
The Alioto case served as the basis for denying a media defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment in a subsequent New York case,
Bruno v. New York News, Inc.327 Like Alioto, Bruno involved an alle-
320. Id. at 1368, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1804.
321. Id. at 1369, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1804.
322. Id., 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1805.
323. Id. at 1366,2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1802 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 732 (1968)).
324. Id. at 1370, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1805.
325. Id. at 1370, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1806.
326. Id.
327. 456 N.Y.S.2d 837 (App. Div. 1982).
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gation of corruption against a public official.3"s The New York court
expressly relied on Alioto in finding a jury question on the issue of
actual malice, based on the newspaper's behavior in publishing an un-
corroborated allegation.3 29 Bruno is important because it demon-
strates how a norm arising from one libel case can. be miscited and
misapplied in a subsequent case. The Bruno court relied on Alioto as
persuasive authority in a case in which the behavior in evidence was
not only significantly different from the behavior in Alioto, but also
less obviously discreditable.
The Bruno court reversed a summary judgment for the media de-
fendant with respect to the last of twelve articles about mismanage-
ment of the New York State Lottery. The article recounted a string of
events that were covered earlier by the same newspaper and
culminated in the temporary shutdown of the Lottery.330 The article
stated that the Lottery had been "deliberately withholding prize
money" and that "[s]tate officials tried to hide the scandal."' a31 The
media defendant named no source for the accusation of intentional
deception and cover-up.332
In finding a triable question of fact on the issue of actual malice,
the court noted that
[i]t is critically significant that [by the date of publication] the
reporters were likely to have been familiar with the contents
of a ... report of the State Comptroller, attached to their
own moving affidavits,... [which] clearly negates any infer-
ence of intentional misconduct by Lottery officials ... [and
contains conclusions] consistent only with inadvertence, not
deliberate choice.333
The court added: "In this respect, the instant case closely resembles
Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc.,... where actual malice was
inferred from the publisher's awareness of an official source contra-
dicting charges of corrupt association. 334
This reference seriously abbreviates Alioto's holding and distorts
the norm that the case produced. Actual malice in Alioto was inferred
from a number of facts suggesting that a norm of research had been
328. The allegation against Alioto concerned activities before he became mayor of San
Francisco, whereas the allegations in Bruno concerned misconduct of a lottery official
while in office. Id. at 838.
329. Id. at 842.
330. Id. at 839.
331. Id. at 842.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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violated,335 not simply "from the publisher's awareness of an official
source contradicting [the] charges. '336 In Alioto, the "official source
contradicting charges of corrupt association" 337 was a state law en-
forcement officer investigating organized crime. After learning about
the allegations against Alioto from one of the reporters, the officer
commented that "the report of the meeting [with a mob figure] was
'ridiculous.' "338 The officer's noncorroboration was one fact among
several leading to the court's conclusion that "there were 'obvious
reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant.' 1331 The court's dis-
cussion of the officer, then, was part of a larger discussion of the unre-
liability of the principal source.
Misciting Alioto allowed the Bruno court to apply the prior case
to a significantly different context and to an arguably less egregious
set of behavioral facts. Alioto dealt with the unreliability of a princi-
pal source, 4° whereas Bruno dealt with the availability of contradic-
tory information. 4' In addition, while the press behavior in Alioto
was shoddy enough to support a finding of "obvious reason[ ] to
doubt, 342 the evidence of culpable behavior in Bruno was compara-
tively slight. In Bruno, the court never said that the reporters had
actual knowledge of the official contradictory source; the court merely
found that "the reporters were likely to have been familiar with the
contents" of a state report exonerating the plaintiff from fraud and
misappropriation. 43 Thus, a norm arising from a discussion of actual
malice in a case involving egregious behavior can reappear and do
mischief in circumstances far less clear cut.
2. Discussions of Writing
In Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Publishing Co.,3 4 the Colorado
Supreme Court reinstated a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, three public
officials of the Greely Department of Parks and Recreation. A news
story reported that the plaintiffs accepted complimentary passes from
335. See supra notes 323-26 and accompanying text.
336. Bruno, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 842 (discussing Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc.,
430 F. Supp. 1363,2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1801 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afj'd, 623 F.2d 616 (9th
Cir. 1980), 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1573, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981)).
337. Id.
338. Alioto, 430 F. Supp. at 1369, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1804.
339. Id. at 1370, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1806.
340. Id.
341. Bruno, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
342. Alioto, 430 F. Supp. at 1370, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1806.
343. Bruno, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
344. 637 P.2d 315, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2137 (Colo. 1981).
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two private ski resorts.345 The story implied that the passes were
bribes-that the gifts influenced the officials to include the two resorts
in a state-sponsored ski program, while excluding other resorts.346
The court's opinion first examined the inadequacies of the re-
porter's research;347 like the court in Alioto,3 41 the Colorado Supreme
Court clearly considered the reporter's efforts egregiously deficient.
However, another serious defect for the court was the way in which
the reporter wrote the story. The court noted that the article's "fac-
tual assertions" implied corruption by including the bald statement
that "recreation officials accepted free passes. '349 At trial the re-
porter admitted that in his research he had never asked "whether rec-
reation officials personally used the passes, ' 3 0 and trial testimony
showed that "no recreation officials used the passes."' 351 The court
quoted the reporter's testimony that "he worded the story so as to
imply that recreation officials personally accepted the passes because,
although he knew that the passes were given to the department [of
parks and recreation], he wanted to 'humanize' the story. '3 2 The
newspaper maintained that the story was "substantially true.
3 53
In effect, the reporter maintained that his "humanized" version of
the facts known to him simply rendered the story more accessible to
the reader. The court was unmoved. Rejecting the "humanization"
argument and ignoring the claim that the story was substantially cor-
rect, the court referred to the writing in its discussion of actual malice,
and implied a norm about language: The press should not use words
that literally go beyond the known facts if the words, read in the con-
text of the story, have the effect of making an accusation of individual
criminal or moral wrongdoing.354
A subsequent case in the same court, Burns v. McGraw Hill
Broadcasting Co.,355 expressly relied on Kuhn.356 But, as in the exam-
345. Id. at 316, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2137.
346. Ild.
347. Id. at 319, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2139.40.
348. Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363, 1370-71, 2 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1801, 1805-06 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affd, 623 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
349. Kuhn, 637 P.2d at 318-19, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2139-40.
350. Id. at 318, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2139.
351. Id. at 318 n.4, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2139 n.4.
352. Id. at 318, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2139.
353. Id. at 316, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2137.
354. See id. at 318-19, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2139-40.
355. 659 P.2d 1351, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1257 (Colo. 1983).
356. Id. at 1361-62, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1264-65.
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pie of Alioto and Bruno above,357 the Burns court took liberties with
the earlier Kuhn case, unpersuasively finding similarities and uncon-
vincingly applying the norm to find fault with the media defendant.
In Burns, a broadcaster reported that a policeman with the Den-
ver Police Department Bomb Squad was injured in an explosion on
the job. The reporter detailed the policeman's injury and stated that
"his wife and five children have deserted him since the accident." 358
The policeman's ex-wife sued the broadcaster, arguing that the word
"deserted" falsely described her actions and defamed her in the eyes
of the community.359 A Colorado jury found for the plaintiff.360
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the finding of actual mal-
ice.361 As in Kuhn, the court identified a number of research deficien-
cies3 62 and then focused on the "wording"-in this case, on the word
"deserted. '363 The court first dismissed the defendant broadcaster's
argument that the word was privileged as "opinion"; the court ruled
that the word, in the context of the story, implied that the reporter
"had inside knowledge" of "undisclosed circumstances" that sup-
ported the charge of desertion and hence did not qualify as pure opin-
ion under analysis based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts.31
On the issue of actual malice, the court catalogued what the re-
porter "knew" before using the disputed word on the newscast. The
reporter knew that the policeman and his wife had had marital
problems before his injury, that the wife had "compelling reasons for
divorcing" the policeman, and that she had filed for divorce before the
injury occurred.3 65 The court also said that the reporter knew that
"there had been a temporary reconciliation before and during [the
policeman's] convalescence," but that a divorce had been granted two
357. See supra notes 327-43 and accompanying text.
358. Burns, 659 P.2d at 1354, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1258.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 1354, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1257.
361. Id. at 1362, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1265.
362. Id. at 1361-62, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1263-64.
363. Id. at 1356-61, 1362, 9 Media L. Rep. 1260-63, 1264.
364. Id. at 1360, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1263. The case pre-dates Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), in which the United States Supreme Court declined
to interpret the First Amendment as requiring a "wholesale defamation exemption" for
"opinion" independent of existing doctrines of the law of defamation. Id. at 18. However,
as Professor Smolla has pointed out, the Court did not endorse libel actions based on
opinion but rather "substituted the old dichotomy between 'fact and opinion' with a new
dichotomy between 'fact and non-fact.' " SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION, supra note 17,
§ 6.03[7][d]. From that perspective, it is unlikely that the outcome on the fact-opinion issue
in Burns would be different under Milkovich.
365. Burns, 659 P.2d at 1362, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1264.
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years "after the accident." '66 The court acknowledged the reporter's
testimony that she "consciously chose or accepted the words in the
story as an accurate portrayal of the events."367 However, the court
held the writer to the objective standard of the "experienced re-
porter."3 6 s "As an experienced reporter," the court stated,
[the defendant] must also have been aware that the word
"deserted," when used in the context of the marital relation-
ship, has an opprobrious connotation in the most common
usage of the term. The use of a term with obvious pejorative
connotations without underlying factual support is evidence
of recklessness especially when the reporter has knowledge
that the description is in fact untrue. 69
The court concluded that, although the reporter "knew" that the wife
had not "deserted" the policeman in the sense of "abandoned without
... right," the reporter "apparently used the word to illustrate more
vividly the situation surrounding [the policeman's] accident despite
the word's emotional and derogatory connotation when applied to the
marital relationship."370
The court then cited Kuhn for a legal conclusion-the proposi-
tion that "[w]hen one uses language which invites an inference that an
individual has acted significantly at variance with community stan-
dards, and one fails to provide a factual basis for the derogatory char-
acterization, then one 'knowingly risks the likelihood that the
statements and inferences are false and thereby forfeits First Amend-
ment protections.' "371
The Burns decision is problematic for a number of reasons, most
notably its reliance on Kuhn. Kuhn's lesson was that words that liter-
ally exceed known facts should not be used if the words in context
amount to a charge of criminal or moral wrongdoing.372 This norm is
slim authority for the discussion of "deserted" in Burns. In the con-
text of its placement in the news story in Burns, use of the term "de-
serted" did not amount to a charge of criminal or even moral
wrongdoing. The word's appearance in one peripheral sentence of the
story, without emphasis or embellishment, suggests that a moral in-
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id., 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1265 (quoting Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Publish-
ing Co., 637 P.2d 315, 319, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2137, 2140 (Colo. 1981)).
372. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
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dictment was neither intended nor likely to be inferred. As a result,
greater leeway in word choice would seem permissible under Kuhn.
The result in Burns demonstrates again how a standard devel-
oped in the context of egregious behavior can be misapplied to words
that are less troublesome, thus contributing to a finding of actual mal-
ice. The norm of Kuhn may have been plausible as applied to Kuhn's
facts, but its invocation in Burns was unfortunate and led to a ques-
tionable conclusion.
3. Discussions of Editing
In Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,373 a public figure
plaintiff sued the publisher of TV Guide. The plaintiff argued that the
magazine defamed her in a summary of the topic to be discussed on a
forthcoming talk show.3 74 The talk show's producer gave TV Guide a
promotional press release which stated the show's title ("From Party-
Girl to Call-Girl?"), named the plaintiff as a scheduled guest, identi-
fied her as a "TV Personality" and author of a book (How to Be a
Party-Girl), and stated that another guest on the same show would be
a "masked-anonymous prostitute! '375 A TV Guide staff writer then
rewrote the release and left out the question mark in the title, omitted
the reference to the prostitute, and added that the plaintiff would dis-
cuss her book.376 The TV Guide editor then rewrote the blurb, nam-
ing the plaintiff as a scheduled guest, deleting the statement that the
plaintiff would discuss her book, again deleting the question mark,
and again omitting any reference to a prostitute.377 The plaintiff ar-
gued that the blurb in its final form378 falsely implied that she herself
was a call girl and would address that part of the show's topic from
personal experience.379
The jury found for the plaintiff.3 80 The California Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, clearly regarding the editing behavior as egregious.
The court stated that "[t]he very nature of the discussion topic-caption
'From Party Girl to Call Girl[?]' should and must have alerted [the
staff writer] and [the editor] to be wary of possible libel by incorrectly
373. 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975).
374. Id. at 187-88.
375. Id. at 188.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. The blurb as finally written stated: "10:30 [2] Pat Michaels-Discussion [ ]
[Color] 'From Party Girl to Call Girl.' Scheduled guest: TV Personality Pat Montandon
and author of 'How to Be a Party Girl.' " Id.
379. Id. at 189-90.
380. Id. at 188.
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labeling or implying that someone was a call girl."'38 ' The court's
sense of egregious editing surely accounts for its overly facile step
from "should" to "must have" in the quoted sentence. The court con-
cluded that the editor's position, that the average reader would not
interpret the published blurb as stating that the plaintiff was a call girl,
"flies in the face of reason." 3s2 While the resulting false impression
"was apparently not intentional, it was one which those responsible
should have foreseen and one which showed a reckless disregard for
the truth or falsity of the statement. '3 3 While the court relied on the
language from St. Amant concerning the legitimacy of inferring state
of mind from objective indicia,384 its conclusion was forced and incom-
plete. The effect of the decision was to set a standard of conduct for
editors akin to the standard for writers indicated in Kuhn: Editors
should not use words that literally go beyond the Imown facts if the
words, read in context, amount to an individualized accusation or
statement of criminal behavior or dubious moral character.
While the norm itself may seem sensible, it is not clear that it was
even violated in Montandon. In the context of TV Guide's brief pro-
gram summaries, could the phrase in question amount to a statement,
much less an accusation, of prostitution? If the implicit norm was not
violated, the "egregiousness" quotient of the case falls, and the legal
conclusion of actual malice seems farfetched. Perhaps the decision is
explicable as a reflection of a mid-1970s sense of "egregious" editing
behavior in the wake of several prominent libel cases that exposed the
often-messy internal processes of journalism.8 5 Moreover, the con-
text of sexual innuendo in a magazine of wide circulation may have
provoked the court. In any event, Montandon is a relatively early ex-
ample of the judicial reliance on perceived (yet dubious) egregious-
ness as a substitute for more rigorous analysis of state of mind.
The larger importance of this state case is its role as a precedent:
It is cited both prominently and approvingly in a celebrated later deci-
381. Id. at 189.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 193.
384. Id. at 192 (citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968)).
385. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), the Supreme Court noted several promi-
nent cases of the latter 1960s that subjected intimate details of "the editorial process"-
including motives for publishing, use of sources, conversations among editors about article
development, decisions about interviews and investigations-to "close examination," id. at
160-61 n.6 (citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v.
Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)). Professor Smolla
writes that the 1974 case, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), "set the tone for
the anti-media mood that would gather increasing steam over the next ten years." ROD-
NEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PREss 57 (1986).
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sion involving editing, Hunt v. Liberty Lobby,386 a federal appellate
case in which the media defendant again lost.
The Hunt case involved another plaintiff linked to unsavory be-
havior. A weekly newspaper published a story reporting "an elabo-
rate plot within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to frame [E.
Howard] Hunt for the Kennedy assassination. ' '387 Hunt's libel suit fo-
cused on the roles of the newspaper's publisher and managing editor;
for jurisdictional reasons, the story's free-lance author was not a
party.388 One of Hunt's arguments was that the editor wrote mislead-
ing and defamatory headlines for the story. 8 9 While the story's text
concerned the CIA's "plan to falsely accuse or frame Hunt"390 for the
President's murder, Hunt argued that the headlines surrounding the
story conveyed quite a different message-that Hunt had in fact killed
the President and would be prosecuted for the crime.39 1
The Eleventh Circuit discussed Montandon at length, identifying
the case as involving editing and reviewing the editor's claim that he
"did not believe that the program note labeled Ms. Montandon a call
girl."3" On the basis of Montandon, the Hunt court concluded that
"an inference of actual malice can be drawn when a defendant pub-
lishes a defamatory statement that contradicts information known to
him, even when the defendant testifies that he believed that the state-
ment was not defamatory and was consistent with the facts within his
knowledge. '393
Applying this conclusion, the Hunt court stated: "[I]t is obvious
that the headlines could have conveyed the impression to a fact finder
that Hunt was involved in the assassination. Viewing the headlines
alone, the jury could have reasonably found that the [newspaper] sim-
ply was reporting a truthful accusation by a federal government
agency. '394 The court then drew on some highly ambiguous testimony
of the editor to conclude that the editor "knowingly chose language
386. 720 F.2d 631, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1097 (11th Cir. 1983).
387. Id. at 634, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1098.
388. Id. at 634 n.1, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1097 n.1.
389. The original headline by the author of the story was "The JFK Assassination: New
Developments and Another Coverup." Id. at 646, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1108. The
court found that the managing editor changed the headline to "the following headlines and
subheadlines: 'CIA to Nail Hunt for Kennedy Killing,' 'CIA to 'Admit' Hunt Involvement
in Kennedy Slaying,' 'They'll Hang Hunt,' and 'Posing as a Bum.' " Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 646, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1108-09.
392. Id. at 644, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1107.
393. Id. at 645, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1107.
394. Id. at 646, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1108.
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that was subject to a false and highly defamatory interpretation," and
again cited Montandon.395
Hunt, then, applied the Montandon norm: Editing must be liter-
ally faithful to known facts when statements, read in context, amount
to serious allegations. But just as the norm may not have been vio-
lated in Montandon, it may not have been violated in Hunt. The court
in Hunt viewed the "headlines alone," removing them from the con-
text of the whole article, and assessing them in isolation.396 In both
cases, then, egregiousness may simply have been lacking, so that the
court's leap to a finding of actual malice was particularly unconvinc-
ing. Still, with the Montandon case as a precedent, it was easy to
make a similar mistake in the even less clear cut scenario of Hunt.
C. Fact-Oriented Discussion of Press Behavior
Fortunately, press behavior is not often "egregious." Restrictive
norms, however, do emerge from other sorts of judicial discussions.
Often courts discuss and analyze press behavior in fact-laden passages
that appear premised on an implicit restrictive norm. These norms are
buried in the judicial opinions; we cannot say that subsequent courts
retrieve and invoke them as precedents in the way courts retrieve
norms from the cases of "egregious" behavior.3 97 Implicit standards
in fact-oriented discussions are nevertheless problematic for at least
two other reasons. First, these standards contribute to the disposition
of the case in which they arise, most often to the disadvantage of the
media defendant in the context of a motion for summary judgment.
Second, over time an unquestioned practice of implicit standards-crea-
tion in fact-laden discussions is likely to become a judicial habit, to the
probable long-term disadvantage of journalistic freedom. As courts
become accustomed to standards creation "between the lines," they
become more comfortable with standards creation for the press gener-
ally. Explicit norms of the precedent-setting kind become easier to
pronounce and defend.
In this section, cases are taken from the three principal categories
of press conduct-research, writing, and editing-to illustrate the
fashioning of implicit behavioral standards in the course of a deci-
sion's factual analysis.
395. Id., 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1109. The citation to Montandon was to the page
discussing "the very nature of the discussion topic-caption" and the editor's interpretation
of the edited text as "fly[ing] in the face of reason." See Montandon v. Triangle Publica-
tions, Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, 189 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975).
396. 720 F.2d at 646, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1108-09.
397. See, e.g., supra notes 326-43 and accompanying text.
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1. Discussions of Press Research
In DeLoach v. Beaufort Gazette,398 the South Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed a plaintiff's jury verdict against a media defendant for
actual and punitive damages. 399 A newspaper erroneously reported
that police arrested the plaintiff and charged him with assault and bat-
tery. In fact, the plaintiff engaged in a "fight or a scuffle" outside a
bar with another person, who then "reported the incident to the City
Police but did not swear out a warrant for the plaintiff."40 The police
completed an incident report but neither arrested the plaintiff nor
charged him "with any crime in relation to the incident." 0' 1
In researching the story, the reporter talked with a police depart-
ment spokesman. 402 At trial, the reporter and police spokesman gave
diametrically different accounts of their conversation; the police
spokesman denied telling the reporter that a warrant had been issued
or that the plaintiff had been arrested (or charged), while the reporter
testified that his source for all the story's misinformation was the po-
lice spokesman.40 3 In affirming a verdict for the plaintiff, the South
Carolina Supreme Court emphasized that "[i]t is obvious that the
jury" believed the police spokesman, and not the reporter.4°  The
court concluded:
In light of [the spokesman]'s version of what he told the re-
porter and in light of that which he denies having told the
reporter, it is clearly inferable that the reporter had a high
degree of awareness of the probable falseness of the state-
ment he printed or had serious doubts as to its truth.40 5
The DeLoach decision is unpersuasive. Even if the jury believed
that the police spokesman did not give erroneous information to the
reporter, it does not follow that the reporter fabricated the item or
seriously doubted its truth. While the court's conclusion explicitly
turned on viewing the case as a matter of credibility, 40 6 earlier discus-
sion in the opinion suggests an additional impetus behind the court's
affirmance of the jury verdict. That discussion included two refer-
ences to unusual behavior on the part of the reporter in researching
398. 316 S.E.2d 139, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1733 (S.C.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 981
(1984).
399. Id. at 141, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1733.
400. ld.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Ild., 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1733-34.
404. Id. at 142, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1734.
405. Id.
406. 1d.
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the story. The references contained no legal citation or rule but were
quite conspicuous in the court's opinion. The court cited the police
spokesman's testimony that the reporter came to the department "al-
most everyday" and "always checked the public arrest docket."4 "7
The implication is that in this instance the reporter must not have veri-
fied his information the usual way. The court then cited the reporter's
own testimony acknowledging a disparity between his usual research
practices and the conduct in question:
The reporter testified that it was his usual practice to check
the public arrest docket, which was in an adjoining room and
easily available to him, before writing a story. On this occa-
sion, he did not, ostensibly because of an eleven o'clock
deadline. 408
The court further noted that the reporter "inadvertently destroyed the
notes" taken during the talk with the police spokesman and failed to
file a report with the newspaper explaining the circumstances sur-
rounding the inaccuracy. 409
By twice mentioning the reporter's failure to check the arrest
docket, the court arguably was suggesting that reporters should follow
research practices that are customary in their organizations, particu-
larly when the information to be published concerns a criminal charge.
In the context of the opinion, the reporter's "usual practices" stood
for a benchmark of normal professional behavior against which the
excuse of a deadline fell flat. The court also apparently cited the re-
porter's other missteps-getting rid of his notes and. neglecting to pro-
vide a written report to his employer-as questionable departures
from the newspaper's standard practices.410 As the DeLoach court
saw matters, the research practices recognized by the newspaper were
reasonable professional norms which the reporter should have
followed.
All this remained implicit in the opinion, probably because the
court realized that elaborating the precise role of a newspaper's inter-
nal norms in the fault calculus would be a complicated matter. Per-
haps the court was wary of considering questions such as: Is a
reporter's "everyday practice" the same thing as an internal norm of a
newspaper? Should courts defer to norms officially adopted by a
newspaper, viewing them as presumptively reasonable? How is a fail-
ure to observe an internal norm relevant to the actual malice inquiry?
407. Id. at 141, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1734.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
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Staying clear of these questions, the DeLoach court implied that a
reporter will be held to "usual" norms of verification when criminal
charges are to be published, as long as those norms strike the court as
reasonable, with "reasonable verification" appearing to mean check-
ing with an obvious and available source.
2. Discussions of Writing
In Golden Bear Distributing Systems v. Chase Revel, Inc.,4 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a jury
verdict in favor of a plaintiff corporation complaining that the juxta-
position of truthful statements in a business column created false and
defamatory implications about the plaintiff's business practices.412 A
regular feature of the defendant's monthly magazine was a column
entitled "Fraud," which exposed "instances of consumer and investor
fraud. '413 The column in question discussed a parent company,
Golden Bear of California, and several of its franchises with similar
names. The column reported a lawsuit brought by the California At-
torney General against the parent company, alleging investment
fraud.414 It also described legal problems faced by one of the
franchises, Golden Bear of Utah; in that context, the column stated
that "Golden Bear['s] promises were consistent throughout the coun-
try' 415 and cited a promotional effort by a marketing director em-
ployed by yet another franchise, Golden Bear of Texas.416 As the
court noted, the article "did not expressly state that Golden Bear of
Texas defrauded investors, or that it was under investigation, ' 41 7 and
it made no false statements or explicit aspersions about the quite inno-
cent Texas franchise.418 Nonetheless, Golden Bear of Texas sued the
magazine on the basis of "the juxtaposition of truthful statements
about one company [i.e., the plaintiff] with truthful statements about
the illegal operations of an independent company of the same name
located in a different state [i.e., the parent company]. 41 9 A jury
awarded compensatory and punitive damages to the plaintiff.420
411. 708 F.2d 944, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1857 (5th Cir. 1983).
412. Id. at 948, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1859.
413. Id. at 946, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1858.
414. Id. at 947, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1858.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 948, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1859.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 946, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1857.
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The court determined that, to a reasonable jury, the juxtaposed
statements could imply false and defamatory meaning about the
plaintiff:
The article stated that Golden Bear's promises were consis-
tent throughout the country. The article went on to charac-
terize the promises made by Golden Bear of California as
false. It was reasonable for the jury to find that an ordinary
reader could conclude that the Texas company's promises
were false as well.42
In effect, the Fifth Circuit signalled to journalists a concern that,
in certain circumstances, the presentation of facts within successive
sentences of an article can mislead and confuse. An implicit norm was
clearly at work: Where allegations of wrongdoing are included, writ-
ers should not "mix" in one place information susceptible to confu-
sion, but should differentiate the information by separate placement
within the text. This norm, unstated but apparent from the court's
logic, addresses narrative structure rather than literal content. In the
face of such analysis, cautious writers may steer clear of danger by
placing one idea per paragraph in stories containing defamatory con-
tent and references to a number of different persons. In Golden Bear,
in which the placement of literally true facts led to liability for a false
implication, the court showed no discomfort with assuming a role
closely akin to that of an editor-in-chief.
3. Discussions of Editing
In Sharon v. Time, Inc.,422 a federal district court judge consid-
ered, in the context of a summary judgment motion, a compendium of
journalistic behavior. Much of the discussion concerned facts sur-
rounding the alleged failure of Time editors to be sufficiently skeptical
of a reporter who had been placed on probation for a prior incident of
"possible unreliability" in political news reporting.4' The court care-
fully recounted deposition testimony relating to the editors' knowl-
edge of the prior incident and their willingness to take the reporter at
his word in the circumstances at issue in Sharon.424
The court interspersed its summaries of deposition testimony
with conclusions about whether summary judgment was appropriate.
After detailing the reporter's previous incident of unreliability, the
court wrote that "[a] jury could.., find that... [in light of the past
421. Id. at 948-49, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1859.
422. 599 F. Supp. 538, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
423. Id. at 572, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1179.
424. Id. at 570-78, 11 Media L. Rep. 1177-85.
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incident, the reporter] should have been more closely supervised by
[the bureau chief] and others at Time."'- 5 This implied an unsurpris-
ing standard: Editors should supervise closely a reporter whose recent
conduct has raised serious questions of credibility. However, the
court did not stop there. Still discussing the prior incident, the court
recounted that Time's chief of correspondents had noticed that the
reporter had "read into" a source's "denial of [a story] a confirmation
of his story.""4 6 The court concluded that "a jury could find" that the
editors knew that the reporter "had a tendency to report to his superi-
ors that he had confirmed a story even though the person giving the
'confirmation' had not clearly been questioned about the information
for which he was being used as a source."427 In essence, this conclu-
sion stated a standard for both reporters and their editors: Reporters
should corroborate facts by engaging their sources in direct dialogue;
they should not merely draw inferences from conversations had with
sources. Furthermore, editors should enforce the standard, particu-
larly if they are aware that a reporter has not followed this model of
confirmation in the past.
The court also noted deposition testimony about the "fact-check-
ing process" employed generally by the media defendant as well as the
manner in which that process was employed in writing the story at
issue in Sharon.4 The court observed that Time's fact-checkers did
not double-check the story other than to compare the story with other
Time-generated materials (i.e., memoranda on file). "[D]espite the
claim that everyone had read the Commission Report [a public docu-
ment important to the story]," the court wrote, no one at Time "ever
questioned the fact that, in contrast to the Report's discussion of myr-
iad other events, the Report never mentions either [an unpublished
Appendix prominently discussed in the story being litigated in
Sharon] or any Commission exhibit numbers in connection with [the
incident described in the story being litigated]."'- 9 The court sug-
gested, therefore, that fact checking should consist of more than com-
paring a defendant's reporting to the defendant's own previously-
generated materials.
In addition, the court wrote that this "seems to be precisely the
kind of incongruity which the researcher's guide [Time's own internal
rulebook] refers to as cause for checking a story more closely....
425. Id. at 572, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1179.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 572, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1180.
428. Id. at 579, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1185.
429. Id.
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Time's researcher's handbook warns fact checkers to beware of stories
that are 'factually correct sentence by sentence, yet dead wrong in
overall impact.' "430 The court thereby strongly suggested that a me-
dia defendant should follow its own rules of independent verification
of politically sensitive stories-with verification referring not only to
individual statements but also to the "overall impact."
D. Law-Oriented Discussion of Press Behavior
The cases involving behavior considered "egregious" and the
cases containing fact-laden discussions of behavior produced restric-
tive norms-those that limit the discretion of editors and reporters. In
contrast, the cases involving law-oriented analysis produced permis-
sive norms,431 emphasizing the wide scope of discretion accorded to
good-faith research, writing, and editing.
Thus, it seems that Sullivan has spawned two tiers of journalistic
standards fashioned by the courts. One tier is a set of restrictions, the
other a set of freedoms. The restrictive norms seem responsive to the
question, "What is good journalism?" while the permissive norms
seem responsive to the question, "What is good-faith journalism?"
The resulting system-a blend of restrictive and permissive norms-
may be confusing to observers, especially journalists. It would seem
that the two tiers pull the practice of journalism in different directions,
one offering a safe harbor for following certain behavioral rules, the
other offering a safe harbor based primarily on journalistic good faith.
In the section below, we analyze the law-oriented cases, decisions
emphasizing Sullivan and the First Amendment's protection of the
press. In cases in this category involving the writing and editing pro-
cess, the courts favor the press and yield permissive norms.' In cases
involving the research process, the courts are sometimes less permis-
sive.433 In some cases, they rely entirely upon precedent and state
permissive norms for research which favor the press defendant. In
others, they refer less to the legal formulations of precedent and in-
stead delve deeply into the research conduct at issue, impliedly stating
restrictive norms that favor the plaintiff.
430. Id. at 579, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1186.
431. See supra notes 304-09 and accompanying text (indicating that the law-oriented
category of cases is the largest in present study).
432. See supra notes 304-09 and accompanying text (indicating that the large majority
of "writing" and "editing" cases in the present study were classified as law-oriented, and in
all law-oriented "writing" and "editing" cases, media defendants prevailed).
433. See supra notes 295, 300, and 307 and accompanying text. Of thirty-two "research"
cases in the present study, sixteen were classified as law-oriented and twelve were classified
as fact-oriented. The remaining four were in the "egregious" category.
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1. Discussions of Press Research
In Gulf Publishing Co. v. Lee,434 the Mississippi Supreme Court
reversed a verdict for two public-official plaintiffs against a daily
newspaper.435 The paper reported a public outcry against a county
board supervisor's decision not to pave a well-traveled public road.
The story's unflattering portrait of the supervisor stated that the su-
pervisor paved a less-used road that provided access to a new subdivi-
sion developed by two local public officials (the plaintiffs), and that
the supervisor paved another road on which only one person, the su-
pervisor's daughter, had a home. 36 In their libel suit, the two public
officials argued that the allegations about the paved roads contained
material inaccuracies that conveyed the impression that the plaintiffs
"were recipients of favored treatment" by the supervisor.437 The
plaintiffs claimed the story implied that they had obtained private ad-
vantage because of their public status.
The plaintiffs' proof of actual malice focused on the reporter's
research. One plaintiff testified that he told the reporter in an inter-
view hours before deadline that the roads in question had been pri-
vately paved at plaintiffs' expense. 438 In addition, one of the plaintiffs
testified that he offered to show the reporter canceled checks and in-
voices as proof, but that the reporter "told him this was unneces-
sary. ' 439 The reporter denied that this conversation took place,
conceding only that a conversation occurred after the relevant edition
of the paper had been published.440 The plaintiff's theory, then, was
that the reporter's research turned up contrary information that the
reporter chose to ignore.
The Mississippi Supreme Court's analysis of fault focused on the
reporter's state of mind. The court twice quoted and italicized the
language of St. Amant requiring "sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of the publication."'441 Invoking Sullivan,442 Curtis,443
434. 434 So. 2d 687, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1865 (Miss. 1983).
435. Id. at 688, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1866.
436. Id. at 689-90, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1867.
437. Id. at 693, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1871.
438. Id. at 690, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1868.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 692, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1869.
441. Id. at 696, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1873 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).
442. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
443. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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Gertz,' other Supreme Court libel opinions, and Mississippi cases,
the "law-oriented" decision showed no inclination by the court to
treat the case as if it involved "egregious" research or required inten-
sive factual examination of the research methods employed or ig-
nored." In fact, after recounting the boiler-plate doctrinal language
from leading cases, the court confined its analysis to the reporter's
post-publication conduct, discounting evidence that the jury appar-
ently had believed.4 6 For the court, the reporter's post-publication
statement to his editor that he had "messed up" indicated "a state of
mind contrary to any supposition that when he submitted the article
for publication he either knew or seriously doubted that it was
false."" 7 In addition, the newspaper had published a retraction in the
next edition."'
Gulf Publishing, heavily influenced by Sullivan's press-protective
spirit and rule, conceives of journalism in terms of good-faith inquiry
and speech. According to this view, the mechanics of research are less
important than a good-faith effort. Gulf Publishing thus suggests a
permissive norm of research. Under this norm, good-faith journalism
can include error followed by admission of the error and prompt pub-
lication of a correction.449
Sometimes the same set of facts will generate a fact-oriented, re-
strictive approach to research on one level of judicial action but a law-
oriented, permissive approach to research on another level. An exam-
ple is Costello v. Capital Cities Communications Co.,45 in which a
newspaper editorial charged that the plaintiff, an elected chair of a
county board, "lied" during his campaign when he said he would op-
444. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
445. Gulf Publishing, 434 So. 2d at 695-97, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1872-74.
446. Id. at 697, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1874.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Some commentators believe that this degree of permissiveness is precisely the
drawback of Sullivan and that the Supreme Court has countenanced too wide a spectrum
of press behavior. See, e.g., Clark R. Mollenhoff, 25 Years of Times v. Sullivan, THE QUILL,
Mar. 1989, at 27. Others insist on the necessity of the behavioral " 'breathing space,' "
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,272 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963)), made possible by generous legal rules and do not see a debasing of the jour-
nalistic enterprise through permissive doctrine. See, e.g., Bruce W. Sanford, Times v. Sulli-
van: The Music Still Plays Sweetly, THE QUILL, Mar. 1989, at 7. Those taking the latter
approach would view at least some permissive norms as consistent with both good journal-
ism and good-faith journalism.
450. 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1738 (I1. Cir. Ct. 1985), affd in part, rev'd in part, 505
N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), rev'd, 532 N.E.2d 790, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2407 (Ill.
1988) [hereinafter Costello If].
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pose a new sales tax absent a voter referendum on the issue.4 51 The
newspaper based its charge on two facts: The plaintiff expressed op-
position to a new tax in a pre-election interview, and, once elected, the
plaintiff failed to express his views at a county board meeting where
plans for a tax were set in motion. The newspaper's editorial blasted
the plaintiff for his silence at the meeting.45
2
The plaintiff argued that the newspaper's editorial was wholly in-
accurate and that fault could be inferred from the editorial writer's
lack of research. Instead of flip-flopping on the tax issue, the plaintiff
instead had maneuvered opposition to the tax behind the scenes and
had kept silent at the meeting to comply with parliamentary rules re-
quiring neutrality of the chair.45 3 Lacking this information, the news-
paper's publisher and editor concluded that the plaintiff was a liar
"sitting on his gavel," indistinguishable "from any other politician in
the bunch. '454
In a bench trial, the judge focused on the newspaper's research
into the allegation of dishonesty. Noting "the cavalier lack of care and
effort of the defendants in their investigative procedures, 455 the judge
singled out the editorial writer's questionable reliance on two novice
board members whom the judge considered superficial sources of in-
formation and whose testimony failed, in the judge's estimation, to
support the newspaper's claim of ignorance about the true facts.45 6
The judge then listed knowledgeable officials whom the newspaper
failed to consult, including senior board members of both political
parties, and pointed out that the newspaper's own past stories about
the plaintiff cast doubt on the allegations in the editorial.45 7 This fact-
laden discussion suggested that the defendants' "objective fact-gather-
ing efforts were... woeful and inadequate," 5" and that "[i]n essence,
they did not know the truth, nor care to print the truth. ' 45 9 Plainly,
the judge's opinion was driven by the implicit norm that when journal-
ists make serious charges of political dishonesty, they should check
with clearly knowledgeable sources.
451. Id. at 1739; see also Costello v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 13, 14, 9
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1434 (II. App. Ct. 1982) [hereinafter Costello 1].
452. Costello 1, 445 N.E.2d at 14-15, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1434-35.
453. Costello II, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1739-40.
454. Costello 1, 445 N.E.2d at 15, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1435.
455. Costello If, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1740.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 1741.
459. Id. at 1740.
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The Illinois Supreme Court viewed the reporter's research efforts
differently.460 That court adopted a law-oriented approach to re-
search,461 and rejected the trial court's conclusions a.4 6  Most likely
driven by a permissive norm that good-faith checking into the possi-
bility of dishonesty based on one public meeting does not require in-
quiry into the views of political veterans, the high court concluded
that while "[t]he evidence does convincingly demonstrate that the de-
fendants were careless and professionally inadequate in investigating
[the plaintiff's behavior]," the requisite state of mind had not been
established with convincing clarity.4 3
The Costello decisions, then, illustrate the use of fact-oriented
analysis and a restrictive norm at one level, and law-oriented analysis
and a permissive norm at another level of the same case. As noted
earlier, the choice of one kind of analytic approach and norm over
another seems related to the judicial choice of the underlying question
at the outset: "What is good journalism?" on the one hand, versus
"What is good-faith journalism?" on the other. We might then ask
what lies behind the choice of one of these situating questions. A few
explanations can be put forth. First, and most mundane, the Costello
opinions disclose a basic difference in the reading of key testimony;
the trial judge believed that one of the sources told the newspaper the
truth about the plaintiff in advance of publication,464 while the high
court was much less sure.465 Believing a key fact prompted the trial
judge to stress the facts as he saw them, whereas uncertainty about the
fact prompted a more law-oriented focus in the high court.
A second explanation may lie in the difference between a "consti-
tutional" orientation and a "tort" orientation on the part of the
judges-or, more precisely, the difference between a "liberty" analysis
and a "duty" analysis. In the context of journalistic research, liberty
analysis errs on the side of the media defendant, views the press as a
fragile voice jeopardized by censorial forces in society and blocked by
impediments to information, and seeks to preserve for the press as
much discretion and as wide a margin of error as possible. The prem-
460. Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 532 N.E.2d 790, 15 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2407 (Ill. 1988) [hereinafter Costello 111].
461. The court cited St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,731 (1968), for the rules that
reckless disregard "may be found only where the evidence shows that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts" and that "[a]ctual malice is not measured by what a reasonably
prudent person would have published or should have investigated before publishing."
Costello II, 532 N.E.2d at 797-98, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2413-14.
462. Costello II, 532 N.E.2d at 798-99, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2414-15.
463. Id. at 798, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2414.
464. Costello II, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1740.
465. Costello 111, 532 N.E.2d at 798-99, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2414.
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ise of liberty analysis is that the press's freedom to check governmen-
tal authority makes self-governance possible; liberty analysis invokes
the rule of law to deflect undue judicial intrusion into editorial deci-
sions. Duty analysis, on the other hand, errs on the side of the plain-
tiff. It views the press not as a fragile institution but as a robust player
in the social and political environment, secure in its role as the "fourth
estate," with a corresponding obligation to exercise care in the gather-
ing and publication of defamatory information. Duty analysis consid-
ers individual reputation as the imperilled social value, seeks to ensure
press accountability through the deterrent effect of tort law, and often
manifests itself in fact-intensive opinions.
In taking a duty approach to the Costello case, the trial judge may
have justified his exacting standard by viewing research as one step
removed from the core compositional process of writing and editing
and thus subject to greater legal control. The appropriate measure of
that control-the scope of a duty of careful research-was apparently
determined by the trial judge with reference to the seriousness of the
charges that the newspaper was about to make. For the high court, on
the other hand, the touchstone was not duty but liberty-the press's
liberty to perform the journalistic role emphasized in Sullivan, the lib-
erty to inform, to enlighten, and to provoke public debate. This ap-
proach clearly tilts in favor of the concerns of constitutional law and
against the worries of tort.
The product of the high court's analysis was not a norm of good
journalism; the court emphasized that the press behavior was
shoddy.466 The court made clear, however, that the conduct passed
inspection for good faith. The effect of the press victory was to situate
that conduct just within the bounds of acceptability, if not in the main-
stream. While journalists may applaud the final result in Costello, the
conflicting judicial approaches and norms in the opinions may leave
them bewildered about the law's relation to their own professional
behavior. Sullivan has spawned a standards-creating enterprise from
which two sets of norms have emerged, restrictive and permissive,
with little apparent connection between the two. As illustrated by the
two Costello opinions, a profession that lacks its own universal code of
conduct is unlikely to find straightforward direction in the law.
466. Id. at 798, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2414.
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2. Discussions of Writing
In Margoles v. Hubbart,467 the Washington Supreme Court dis-
avowed decisions by both a trial judge and an appellate panel denying
a press defendant's motion for summary judgment.46 s The plaintiff, a
public official, was the manager of a port district that had been the
subject of a state audit. The auditor's report became the basis of three
"highly critical" stories in the defendant's newspaper.469 The plaintiff
maintained that certain words in the series seriously exaggerated-to
the point of falsity-the findings and characterizations of the auditor's
report, and that the use of those words, coupled with evidence of ill
will on the part of the newspaper, constituted actual malice.470
The high court cited the leading Supreme Court cases on libel,
particularly with respect to state of mind and the plaintiff's burden in
resisting a motion for summary judgment.471 Having set forth the ba-
sic doctrine as all-controlling and having established a sense of the
public plaintiff's legal vulnerability at the summary judgment stage of
a libel action, the court analyzed the newspaper's use of clearly dra-
matic terms in reporting the results of the audit-words like "fun-
neled" 472 and "misappropriated." 473  The court's analysis was not
wholly consistent. On the one hand, the court cited Webster's Third
New International Dictionary for the literal (and innocent) meaning of
"funnel"; on the other hand, the court acknowledged that both "fun-
neled" and "misappropriation" had darker meanings as well.474 On
the latter point, however, the court relied on Sullivan for the proposi-
tion that "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at-
tacks on government and public officials" are privileged absent actual
467. 760 P.2d 324, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1196 (Wash. 1988).
468. Id. at 325-26, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1197-98.
469. Id. at 325, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1197.
470. Id. at 328-29, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1199-1200.
471. Id. at 326-27, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1198-99. Like the Gulf Publishing court,
see supra note 441 and accompanying text, the Margoles court noted the subjective nature
of the actual malice inquiry and cited the same passage from St. Amant. Margoles, 760
P.2d at 327, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1199 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 731 (1968)).
472. Margoles, 760 P.2d at 328, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1200 ("At least $12,750 was
funneled to [the plaintiff] through [a private company], evidently by consent of the port
commissioners.").
473. Id. at 329, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1200 ("A final report by the state examiners
contains a laundry list of irregularities and discrepancies in expense account vouchers and
other payments to [the plaintiff]. It even states that he owes the port a refund of at least
$294 in misappropriated funds.").
474. Id. at 328-29, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1200.
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malice.475 The court decided that the newspaper's use of "funneled"
and "misappropriated" "appear[ed] to be no more than a highly criti-
cal way of describing what the auditor's final report said. '4 76 The
combination of ill will and exaggeration of charges did not move the
court to find a triable issue of fault.477
The court's permissive norm was clearly that a journalist's report
of a critical document about a public office can go even further than
the critical document itself-that a selection of words amounting to an
exaggeration does not rob the report of good faith, even when cou-
pled with spite or ill will. This decision ardently protects journalists
when the creative process of writing is under fire. Margoles, there-
fore, is rigorously faithful to the meaning of Sullivan; it takes Sullivan
seriously as law, that is, as requiring proof of mental state, and as in-
sisting on "convincing clarity '4 78 of culpable mental state rather than
behavior-influenced guesswork about the subjective requirement.
It is useful to compare the high court's law-oriented opinion and
permissive norm with the lower appellate court's brief but quite differ-
ent approach to the same facts. The appellate court disposed of the
writing exaggerations with fact-oriented analysis. The court simply
stated that "funneled" had been used "to describe a transaction
whereby Port money was paid to a company for which Mr. Margoles
worked and, in turn, received by Mr. Margoles in salary,"4 79 and that
"misappropriated" had been used "to describe Mr. Margoles' accept-
ance of payments from one Port District while attending meetings and
making a trip on behalf of another Port District."48 0 This comparison
of the reporter's dramatic word choices to the less dramatic "facts" as
understood by the court implied that the reporter's terms were false
and could be considered intentionally or recklessly so. The appellate
court's fact-oriented approach to writing therefore had the effect of
setting a restrictive norm of accuracy, while the high court's opinion
represented a permissive norm of good-faith writing produced by a
law-oriented discussion.
As noted in the above discussion of research,481 the difference
between judicial approaches in Margoles suggests a difference in judi-
475. Id at 329, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1200 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
476. Id.
477. Id. at 330-31, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1201-02.
478. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
479. Margoles v. Hubbart, 733 P.2d 554, 556, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2103, 2104
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 760 P.2d 324 (Wash. 1988).
480. Id.
481. See supra text accompanying notes 460-66.
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cial orientation. The fact-based approach represents a personal-injury
"tort" approach; it emphasizes a duty of careful writing and measures
compliance with the duty by referring to the seriousness of the risk of
reputational harm. Although writing is at the very core of the compo-
sitional process, judges like those on the appellate bench in Margoles
clearly do not shrink from penalizing slanted use of words; they recog-
nize that words can do violence. The law-oriented approach repre-
sents a constitutional approach; it protects the liberty of overstated
and vehement writing in the context of political debate. In the Margo-
les high court's law-oriented approach to journalistic writing, the se-
lection of words becomes the intellectual core of political
participation. The liberty to inform the public expressively, rather
than the duty of care to the person criticized, becomes the central ju-
dicial concern.
Finally, the permissive norm that emerged in the high court's
opinion was different from the permissive norm established in Gulf
Publishing, a standard of conduct just within the bounds of acceptabil-
ity. In Margoles, the high court stressed that the conduct at issue was
well within the mainstream of acceptable journalism. The newspa-
per's choice of words amounted to "no more than a highly critical way
of describing what the auditor's final report said," and the challenged
articles were a "far cry" from presenting any legal problem.482 The
court underlined the acceptability of the press's caustic summary of
the auditor's report: "We fail to see anything in the record which es-
tablishes that the word 'funneled' in this context is even false."" 3 The
permissive norm in Margoles, then, was characterized as consistent
with both good-faith journalism and good journalism, whereas the
permissive norm in Gulf Publishing was characterized as consistent
with good-faith journalism but as falling short of the professionalism
that the court associated with good journalism.
3. Discussions of Editing
In Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche,44 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit reversed a jury verdict of over $100,000
for a public-figure plaintiff against Doubleday & Company and the
author of a non-fiction book about Ernest Hemingway.485 The book
contained a number of "very uncomplimentary references" to the per-
482. Margoles, 760 P.2d at 329-30, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1200-01.
483. Id. at 328, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1200.
484. 551 F.2d 910, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834
(1977).
485. Id. at 911, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1545.
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sonality of the plaintiff, an acquaintance of Hemingway, and seemed
to be based on the author's personal knowledge and observations. 48 6
In addition, the book attributed to Hemingway the statement: "I
don't really trust [the plaintiff]." 487
The plaintiff argued that Doubleday "had cause seriously to sus-
pect that [the author's] opinions of [the plaintiff] were without foun-
dation," necessitating independent verification by Doubleday.48 8 In
addition, the plaintiff argued that Doubleday had cause to doubt the
book's truth because of the author's apparent hostility to the plaintiff;
that because passages of the book were incapable of independent ver-
ification, Doubleday doubted their truth; and that Doubleday's edit-
ing of the Hemingway quotation indicated reckless disregard of the
truth.489
The Hotchner court reviewed the Supreme Court's libel cases and
drew the following conclusions:
These strict tests may sometimes yield harsh results. Individ-
uals who are defamed may be left without compensation.
But excessive self-censorship by publishing houses would be
a more dangerous evil. Protection and encouragement of
writing and publishing, however controversial, is of prime
importance to the enjoyment of first amendment freedoms.
Any risk that full and vigorous exposition and expression of
opinion on matters of public interest may be stifled must be
given great weight. In areas of doubt and conflicting consid-
erations, it is thought better to err on the side of free
speech.49°
This language faithfully captured Sullivan's insistence on favoring ex-
pression in close cases, on accepting the sometimes "harsh results" of
the Sullivan test, and on remaining attentive to the larger concern of
libel law: preserving a margin of error for debate on matters of public
concern.
491
This emphasis on the legal standard marked the court's treatment
of the facts and its elaboration of permissive standards for editors.
The court noted that Doubleday had no cause to doubt that its author
had a first-hand basis for the defamatory statement made about the
plaintiff. Doubleday could properly rely on photographs that placed
Hemingway with both the author and the plaintiff. Doubleday could
486. Id. at 911-12, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1545-46.
487. Id. at 912, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1546.
488. IcL at 914, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1547.
489. Id. at 913-14, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1547-48.
490. Id. at 913, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1547.
491. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-73 (1964).
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also properly rely on its author's reputation as a writer and the reputa-
tion of a Spanish publisher that originally published the book.4 2 Edi-
tors and publishers may rely in good faith on writers who have a
publishing career with no known blemishes.493
The court added that a publisher's or editor's knowledge of a
writer's "ill will" does not "by itself prove knowledge of probable fal-
sity," that is, the book's unflattering references to the plaintiff, while
signalling the author's low regard, does not present a "red flag" neces-
sitating editorial verification.494 Editors need not assume that an au-
thor's belligerence or lack of objectivity indicate a lack of truthfulness.
In addition, the court recognized editorial freedom to publish even if a
passage is "incapable of independent verification," as long as "there
are no convincing indicia of unreliability."4 95 An author's hostility ap-
parently is not a "convincing" sign of unreliability. Finally, editorial
alteration of a quotation, although amounting to "fictionalizing to
some extent," is acceptable so long as the "defamatory impact" has
not been changed.4 96
The Hotchner court thus provided considerable leeway to editors
and publishers. A law-oriented approach led to permissive norms
that, like those in Gulf Publishing497 and Margoles,"98 were faithful to
Sullivan's protection of all expression but the clearly culpable. 499 Like
those cases, the Hotchner court reversed a lower court decision in a
tone that sought to correct any impulse to let questionable trials pro-
ceed beyond the phase of a motion for summary judgment or directed
verdict.
E. Judicial Choice of Emphasis of One Behavioral Category Over
Another
As stated in the previous section, different modes of analysis can
appear at different levels of court action in the same case. Thus, an
intermediate court may take a fact-oriented approach to research con-
duct, while a high court may take a law-oriented approach to the same
conduct. Another way in which courts can differ from each other in
492. Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 913, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1547.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 914, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1547.
495. Id., 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1547-48.
496. Id., 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1548.
497. See supra note 449 and accompanying text.
498. See supra notes 461-77 and accompanying text.
499. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,285-86 (1964) (stating that plaintiffs
must prove actual malice with convincing clarity).
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libel adjudication is in the choice of emphasis of one behavioral cate-
gory over another.
Libel opinions involving public plaintiffs almost uniformly in-
volve two, three, or more journalistic behaviors, as plaintiffs seek to
accumulate sufficient indicia of actual malice to survive motions for
summary judgment or directed verdict. These combinations of behav-
iors depend, of course, on the facts of the individual cases, perceptions
of past successful combinations, and the attorney's prowess at casting
a case into a successful mold. Professor Bloom has written extensively
on the sorts of combinations that can amount to clear and convincing
evidence of actual malice.5 °°
Combinations of behaviors are important for another reason.
Courts sometimes emphasize one sort of behavior rather than an-
other, and the emphasis will facilitate the disposition of the case. For
example, in a case involving issues of both writing and research, a
court may decide to dispose of the case by seeing it as essentially a
"writing case," adopting a law-oriented approach, and adopting or fol-
lowing a permissive norm of writing. Another court might decide to
stress the research component, adopting a fact-oriented approach and
deciding the case with a restrictive norm of research. Similarly, in
cases involving issues of editing and research, a court might stress the
"editing" behavior and opt for a law-oriented approach with a permis-
sive norm, or stress research and conduct a fact-oriented discussion
with a restrictive norm.
The following discussion provides examples of writing and re-
search cases first,501 and then an editing and research case, 5°2 showing
how emphasis can be all-important. As will be seen, a fact-oriented
focus on research can be a way to find for a plaintiff, while a law-
oriented focus on editing or writing generally favors the defendant. A
law-oriented research approach is, of course, entirely possible and a
defendant can be expected to profit from it; the following discussion,
however, is devoted to the choice between a fact-oriented research
approach and a law-oriented approach to either writing or editing.
1. Writing Emphasized Over Research
In Fremont Energy v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer,50 3 a federal trial
judge granted a newspaper's motion for summary judgment in a libel
500. See generally Bloom, supra note 17 (discussing proof requirements for defamation
litigation).
501. See infra notes 503-31 and accompanying text.
502. See infra notes 532-55 and accompanying text.
503. 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1569 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
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suit brought by a public-figure corporate plaintiff and its principal.5°4
The newspaper published that Fremont Energy "used to be known"
under a different corporate name and that "several principals" of that
former corporation had been sentenced to jail for securities fraud in
1975.*5 The plaintiffs claimed that the story was factually wrong:
Only two of the former corporation's principals, not "several," had
been convicted and sentenced and at the time of their sentencing they
were not principals of the former corporation.506 The plaintiffs also
complained that the story gave the false impression that several of-
ficers of the successor corporation, Fremont, were the same individu-
als who were sentenced to jail for securities fraud in 1975.507
The plaintiffs sought to prove actual malice in part by pointing to
the reporter's admitted doubts about the completeness of his research.
A memorandum was unearthed in which the had reporter "told his
superiors that he did not know whether the individuals who were
[convicted in 1975] were officers or directors of Fremont., 50 8 The re-
porter had "asked [the newspaper] to pay his expenses to fly to Los
Angeles in order to conduct a further investigation."5 0 9 The court
stated that "[t]he newspaper apparently declined that request. 5 10
The court next found that the reporter's "failure to investigate"
the identities of the convicted persons "does not constitute actual mal-
ice"-not because the investigation was adequate in the eyes of the
court or because the non-pursuit of additional information did not
smack of "serious doubt," but for reasons relating to the way in which
the story was written.5 11 In other words, the court essentially dropped
the plaintiffs' line of argument concerning research and instead fo-
cused on the language of the article. That focus proved beneficial to
the defendant. The court referred to Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary, Unabridged for the definition of "several," finding
its meaning to be "more than one," and concluded that the story was
thus "not inaccurate."51 2 As for the rest of the article, the court found
that it was "[a]t most.., arguably misleading" in that "a reader could
believe" that it alleged that some present officers of the plaintiff cor-
504. Id. at 1574.
505. Id. at 1573.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id. at 1574.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
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poration had criminal records.513 The court's own choice of words
demonstrated a lack of sympathy for any argument of the plaintiff
based on the reporter's written product; regardless of what "a reader
could believe," the court clearly preferred a literal reading that would
cast no doubt on the defendant's good faith. Citing the law-oriented
passage from St. Amant, the court concluded that there was no evi-
dence that the article had been written with actual malice.51
4
The court addressed the plaintiff's claim of suspect research in
one conclusory sentence: "[N]o evidence comes even near" to meet-
ing the requirement of "clear and convincing" evidence of fault at the
time of publication.515 It next examined another sentence from the
story in an equally literal fashion, avoiding any recognition of the
plaintiff's claim that subtle word choice left another false impression.
Again, the court adopted a law-oriented focus-that no reasonable
jury could find actual malice on the basis of the article's mode of ex-
pression-rather than considering research arguments that may have
been raised.516
In the Fremont case, then, we see a court choosing to focus on
and articulate a First Amendment-based solicitude for the freedom of
writing as a creative process, rather than a tort-based concern for a
duty of responsible research. The court's first step, its apparent classi-
fication of the case as a "writing" case, paved the way for all that fol-
lowed: a St. Amant-based discussion applying a permissive writing
norm on the acceptability of literalistic writing, rather than a fact-
based discussion applying a restrictive norm on the unacceptability of
concededly incomplete research.
2. Research Emphasized Over Writing
In Nash v. Keene Publishing Corp., the New Hampshire
Supreme Court took an approach almost opposite to the Fremont
court's approach. The court in Nash reversed a grant of summary
judgment for the defendant newspaper.1 8 The plaintiff asked the
court to focus on the newspaper's research and, in effect, to adopt a
restrictive norm requiring additional research when a newspaper re-
ceives information from an obviously suspect source. 519 The defend-
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. 498 A.2d 348, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1025 (N.H. 1985).
518. Id. at 349, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1025.
519. Id. at 355, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1030.
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ant asked the court to focus on the writing in question and, in effect,
to adopt a permissive norm allowing short hyperbolic articles contain-
ing some factual assertions to be treated as fundamentally hyperbolic
and hence entirely privileged.520
The plaintiff, a policeman, arrested a motorist for driving under
the influence.5 21 The incensed driver later wrote a letter about the
policeman which the defendant newspaper published in its Letters to
the Editor section.522 In addition to an angry, sarcastic tone, the letter
contained a number of personal attacks and a statement that the city
attorney "has numerous complaints on the matter of [the plaintiff]. ' 5z
An editor accepted the "scrawled, handwritten" letter "containing
profanity" from the driver, who "[had come] to the paper in an agi-
tated state" the day after the alleged incident.524 The editor's "re-
search" consisted of telephoning the city attorney who said that the
policeman had been the subject of just one complaint-from the
driver. The editor sought no verification of the other charges in the
letter and published it.5' An "editor's note" published beneath the
letter noted the city attorney's denial that other complaints had been
made about the policeman.5 26 A "Letters Policy" on the same page
said: "The readers' column is for your opinions .... [W]e do not
publish letters we feel to be libelous ... or to make allegations we are
unable to verify independently."527
The court declined to adopt the defendant's view of the case. The
court focused on statements in the letter that it considered a jury
could find factual and remained silent on the letter's context and con-
sistently hyperbolic tone.5" If the court had seen the case as princi-
pally about context, word choice, and meaning-in short, about
writing-it could have given weight to the accompanying "Letters Pol-
icy" which said that "the readers' column is for your opinions."5 29 In
addition, it could have given weight to the letter's internal hyperbolic
520. Id. at 352, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1027.
521. Id. at 350, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1025.
522. Id., 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1025-26.
523. Id., 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1025.
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id. at 350-51, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1026.
527. Id. at 351, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1026.
528. Id. at 352, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1027.
529. Id.
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context within which the seemingly factual statements lost much of
their identifiably factual character.530
For the court, however, the case was far more about the appropri-
ate level of verification of information obtained from a suspect source.
In a detailed, fact-laden discussion, the court noted distinct signs of a
suspect source: agitation, scrawled penmanship, profanity, omission
of detrimental facts, proven inaccuracy of one assertion, implausibility
of another.531 In reversing summary judgment for the newspaper on
this basis, the court implicitly adopted a restrictive norm of research-
a duty to verify further when a previously untested source's appear-
ance, manner, speech, and plausibility would send danger signals to a
reasonable reporter. By emphasizing the research issue rather than
the writing issue, the court chose duty analysis over liberty analysis,
tort over First Amendment, deterrence over "breathing space."
3. Research Emphasized Over Editing
In Reuber v. Food Chemical News, Inc.,532 a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit undertook a fact-ori-
ented emphasis on research which led to the use of an implied restric-
tive norm to affirm a jury verdict against the press defendant.533
However, when the case was reheard en banc, the court engaged in a
law-oriented emphasis on editing which led to the use of a permissive
norm to reverse the verdict.534
The public-figure plaintiff in Reuber was a scientist with a re-
search firm on contract with a public agency, the National Cancer In-
stitute (NCI). "On his own time," the plaintiff conducted research
into likely carcinogens and wrote papers that he circulated pri-
vately.535 One manuscript contained his office address and the names
of his employer and the NCI, thus "creat[ing] confusion" over
whether his views were the official views of the NCI. The confusion
provoked a "scathing letter" of reprimand from his boss, accusing the
plaintiff of detailed "professional misconduct. 536 This letter was
530. Nash predates Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), the Supreme
Court's recent pronouncement on the place of "opinion" in libel doctrine. See supra note
364.
531. Nash, 498 A.2d at 355, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1030.
532. 899 F.2d 271, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1537 (4th Cir.), vacated, 922 F.2d 197 (4th
Cir. 1990) (en banc), reh'g, 925 F.2d 703, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1689 (4th Cir.) (en
banc) [hereinafter Reuber 1], cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
533. Id. at 279, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1542.
534. Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703,712-14, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1689, 1695-97 (4th Cir. 1991) (en bane) [hereinafter Reuber II].
535. Reuber I, 899 F. 2d at 275, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1538.
536. Id. at 275, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1539.
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leaked to the editor of a chemical association newsletter, who pub-
lished "most of the contents" of the letter and an article about it.5 37 In
the editor's words, the decision to publish included a "conscious deci-
sion not to inquire into whether the statements contained in [the let-
ter] were true or false."-538 A jury later found that the letter and
article contained false statements. 39
The three-judge appellate panel affirmed a libel verdict against
the newsletter. The media defendant had cast the case in part as in-
volving a broad freedom of editors to publish matters pertaining to
the public interest; specifically, the defendant argued that the editor's
treatment of the leaked letter was protected by a privilege of "fair
report" of official actions. 4 The plaintiff, however, characterized the
case as a research case involving a duty to verify questionable factual
information in confidential correspondence before publishing.54'
The panel adopted the plaintiff's characterization, emphasizing
the newsletter's paucity of research and relegating comments about
editorial privilege largely to a footnote.5 42 The panel stated that
"[t]he editor of the [newsletter] took no steps to ascertain the accu-
racy of the letter."543 All that was known to the editor was that
someone in the chemical industry, with a vested interest in
discrediting [the plaintiff], claimed to have received the letter
from an anonymous source. Despite the fact that it was the
537. Id. at 275-76, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1539.
538. Id. at 275, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1539.
539. Id. at 277, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1540.
540. Id. at 280-81, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1543-44. The "fair report" privilege is
"an exception to the common-law rule that the republisher of a defamation was subject to
liability similar to that risked by the original defamer." Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134,
137, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2529, 2531 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981). The
privilege thus enables the news media to "publish accounts of official proceedings or re-
ports even when these contain defamatory statements." Id. at 137, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
at 2531-32. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides this formulation: "The publication
of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or
of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if
the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgment of the occurrence reported." RE-
STATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 611 (1977). The Medico court identified three ratio-
nales for the privilege: it enables the one who attends a public proceeding to inform
members of the public of what took place; it facilitates public supervision of official pro-
ceedings; and it serves the general public interest in learning of important matters.
Medico, 643 F. 2d at 141-43, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2534-36. See generally SACK &
BARON, supra note 78, §§ 6.3.2.2-6.3.2.3, at 370-90 (1994) (discussing the fair report privi-
lege). The question in Reuber was whether the fair report privilege should apply to the
publication of the contents of the reprimand letter concerning the plaintiff's research activ-
ities. Reuber I, 899 F.2d at 280 n.17, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1543 n.17.
541. Reuber 1, 899 F.2d at 279-80, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1542-43.
542. Id. at 280-81 n.17, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1543-44 n.17.
543. Id. at 279, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1542.
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most severe letter of reprimand that [the editor] had ever
seen, she did not telephone [the plaintiff] to get his response
or even call [the writer of the letter] to verify that he had
actually written such a letter.... [The editor] also testified
that she could have published the letter even though per-
suaded that several or all of the statements in it were false.544
The court found that the editor "had wholly abandoned all responsi-
bility for accurately reporting the news. '545
For the panel, the crux of the case was the editor's lack of com-
mitment to researching the story. While the panel cited legal authori-
ties, its essential analysis was fact-oriented, yielding a restrictive norm:
Editors must insist on some minimal affirmative checking of serious
factual allegations contained in private materials leaked by interested
parties.
4. Editing Emphasized Over Research
In the Fourth Circuit's opinion issued after rehearing en banc,546
however, a quite different emphasis is apparent. The court focused
broadly on the editor's protected discretion to select information to
publish, rather than narrowly on the research steps taken. The court
first recognized the applicability of the fair report privilege to the
case.547 While the reprimand letter was written by a private employer
to an employee, the court noted the connection of the employer to a
public agency, the National Cancer Institute, and the fact that the em-
ployer's letter "invoked the power and the prestige" of the agency.548
The court suggested that the defendant, in effect, had reported on
quasi-official action. The court stressed that the underlying rationales
for the fair report privilege applied when, as in Reuber I, the editor
provided information to assist citizens in monitoring government as
well as information about a public controversy.5 49 By ruling that the
privilege applied in this attenuated context, the court indicated that an
editor's decision to publish a government-related letter and story
544. Id. at 279-80, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1542-43.
545. Id. at 280, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1543.
546. Reuber I, 925 F.2d 703, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1689 (4th Cir.) (en bane), cert.
denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
547. Id. at 712, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1695.
548. Reuber II, 925 F.2d at 713, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1696 (quoting Reuber v.
United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
549. The court stated: "[The letter] provides citizens with information they need to
evaluate how the carcinogenic properties of various chemicals are determined and, by ex-
tension, how an important government agency, the NCI, is waging war against cancer."
Reuber II, 925 F.2d at 713, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1697.
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without verification of defamatory facts is a core journalistic behavior
protected by the First Amendment.
The court showed little concern about research. It disassembled
the component aspects of the research issue and declared each sepa-
rate part insignificant.550 For example, the most troubling evidence-
the editor's testimony that she made a "conscious decision not to in-
quire into the truth or falsity" of the letter's allegations-was said to
be non-dispositive 551 The court stressed its own assessment that there
was "no apparent reason to question the truthfulness" of the letter.552
In the midst of numerous citations to St. Amant and other precedent,
the court dismissed other evidence as "murky" and "remote. '553 The
court concluded with the permissive norm that an editor has no duty
to "parse" information "in detail" even when the information appears
to conflict with itself in part and has been obtained from interested
parties through a leak, especially when delay of the story would de-
prive readers of a "timely report. 554
The court's emphasis on editing over research amounted to a
broad solicitude for behavior perceived to be at the core of journal-
ism, namely, the editor's liberty to select and publish material about
public issues and government in the role of public watchdog.5 5 Thus,
the panel and en banc opinions reflect a basic difference in orientation
and emphasis, a difference in methodology, and, of course, a differ-
ence in the substantive content of the journalistic norm deemed rele-
vant to the case.
III. CONCLUSIONS
This study has examined two aspects of judicial application of the
actual malice rule. First, we chronicled the range of journalistic be-
haviors examined by judges in libel opinions.55 6 Second, we analyzed
how courts treat journalistic behaviors in a selection of cases. 57 In
these cases, we looked at how various modes of judicial treatment can
550. Id. at 716-17, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1699-1700.
551. Id. at 716, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1699.
552. Id.
553. Id. at 717, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1699-1700.
554. 1L at 717-18, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1700-01.
555. Id. at 718, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1701. One problem with the decision was
that, in a sense, the editor did not choose at all; she was conduit for information. By
slighting the significance of research, the court may have undercut to some extent its own
rationale that the purpose of protecting the press is to protect informed intellectual
activity.
556. See supra notes 83-290 and accompanying text.
557. See supra notes 291-555 and accompanying text.
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result in explicit or implicit statements of professional standards for
journalists.
The study leads to four principal conclusions:
A. Libel law today is working contrary to the spirit of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,558
B. While the development of standards in libel law is inconsistent
with Sullivan, the essential dynamic at work is familiar in the common
law and should not be surprising;55 9
C. The norms identified in this study reflect greater judicial will-
ingness to be restrictive in the objective category of research behavior
than in the subjective or "compositional" realms of writing and edit-
ing;560 and
D. Judicial discretion to emphasize one sort of behavior over an-
other in a given case allows judges considerable, indeed strategic, flex-
ibility to decide cases the way they want to decide them.56'
We discuss these conclusions next. Then we address the implica-
tions of these conclusions for the profession of journalism and for libel
law.562
A. Libel Law and the Spirit of Sullivan
The study suggests that the actual malice privilege is functioning
in a way that, while technically consistent with New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,563 is contrary to Sullivan's fundamental design. Sullivan did
more than announce a new "federal rule" for public-official plaintiffs
in libel actions. It fashioned the rule as a means to an end. That end
was a sharp reduction in the universe of defendants who would be
subject to libel suits by public officials. The Court signalled this objec-
tive in several ways: conceptually, doctrinally, and in its application of
the new doctrine.
First, the Court conceptualized the case in a way that lent great
cultural symbolism to the work of the press and indicated that liability
should be exceedingly rare. The Court recalled the origins of Ameri-
can democracy, harkening back to the founding principles of the re-
public.5 4 It viewed the case not simply as a libel action in which one
of the defendants happened to be a newspaper, but as a dispute in-
558. See infra part III.A.
559. See infra part III.B.
560. See infra part III.C.
561. See infra part III.D.
562. See infra part IV.
563. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
564. Id. at 270-77.
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volving "freedom of expression upon public questions."5 65 Citing Jus-
tice Brandeis's eloquent concurrence in Whitney v. California,66 the
Court invoked "a fundamental principle of American government"
that "public discussion is a political duty. '567 The Court then sug-
gested that protection of "free public discussion of the stewardship of
public officials" was fundamental to American government. 68 In ad-
dition, it equated the press defendant with the "citizen-critic of gov-
ernment,' 569 even though the Times's challenged "criticism" was not
an editorial or a news story but a paid advertisement for which the
Times was legally responsible only through the "republication" princi-
ple of defamation law.5 70 The thrust of the Court's decision was to
conceptualize the media defendant as a commentator whose good-
faith fulfillment of a political duty demands protection even when it
publishes false, defamatory material. The Court thus established a
context in which the reach of the libel action would be greatly limited.
Second, the Court fashioned a rule that would achieve the reduc-
tion of libel defendants doctrinally. Seeking to provide increased pro-
tection to citizen critics, yet not willing to countenance a role for lies
in political debate, the Court created a rule that would be a test for
bad faith. 7' The practical effect of the test would be to narrow the
range of primary inquiry in public-official libel litigation, from tradi-
tional questions of truth and the defamatory character of the chal-
lenged statement, to proof of state of mind. Faced with this narrowed
but onerous new inquiry, plaintiffs would be discouraged from suing
in the first place. For those who persisted, the requirement that state
of mind be proven with "convincing clarity"572 would diminish the
chances of prevailing.
Third, the Court supplemented its conceptual and doctrinal ef-
forts by applying the new test in a way that would support the larger
goal. Through a cursory application of the actual malice test to the
facts of Sullivan, the Court signalled that the inquiry into whether a
defendant lied would not be particularly searching, 573 that is, that the
courts would not readily infer the requisite state of mind from objec-
565. Id. at 269.
566. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
567. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (citing Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76.)
568. Id. at 273, 275.
569. Id at 282.
570. See SACK & BARON, supra note 78, § 6.1, at 362 n.9.
571. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
572. Id. at 285-86.
573. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
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tive evidence. Would-be plaintiffs would, therefore, have an addi-
tional reason to doubt the utility of filing suit.
Thus, the spirit of the Sullivan decision was to limit the universe
of speakers and publishers for whom libel litigation would be a threat.
The limitation took the form of a new privilege that would deter plain-
tiffs by concentrating the scope of legal inquiry to proof of mental
state. In addition, the limitation would be perfected by judicial appli-
cation of the privilege in a way that would discourage public plaintiffs
from suing in the first place.
In operation, however, the rule appears to have had a different
effect. While the spirit of Sullivan was to confine tort exposure to
defendants who were liars, it later became clear that this goal would
be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve through the means chosen by
the Court. As Justice Black predicted, 74 absent an absolute privilege
for factual error, many plaintiffs were not deterred from suing the me-
dia, even with a prima facie case that now included a requirement that
fault be proven with convincing clarity. After all, presumed and puni-
tive damages remained available; juries were suspected of being sym-
pathetic toward plaintiffs suing corporate defendants; jury (and
judicial) understanding of the difference between subjective and ob-
jective tests of fault was not likely; and, in the late 1970s, the public's
Watergate-era faith in the power of the press had waned. 75 Perhaps
Sullivan relied too heavily on the effectiveness of the actual malice
privilege as an instrument of its larger objective. A perceptible reduc-
tion in the universe of media defendants did not occur.
Moreover, instead of narrowing the inquiry to evidence that
plaintiffs would likely be unable to produce, the actual malice rule has
had the opposite effect. Virtually any conduct related to the research,
writing, or editing of the challenged material is relevant to the issue of
state of mind,576 and plaintiffs use discovery to unearth newsroom
conversations, internal memoranda, and other evidence of the publi-
cation process.5 77 Judicial discussion of a wide range of press behavior
has become commonplace, 5 7 arguably in excess of the press-protec-
tive design of Sullivan.
574. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293-97 (Black, J., concurring).
575. See generally SMOLLA, SUING rm PRESS, supra note 385, at 9-15 (1986) (discussing
Americans' loss of faith in the press).
576. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
577. See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762,793-97, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2377,
2401-04 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987).
578. See, e.g., id.; Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 567-81, 11 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1153, 1175-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Of course, no one doubts that under Sullivan and Herbert v.
Lando,579 circumstantial evidence of behavior may be probative of
state of mind; a trier of fact properly may draw an inference of actual
malice from objective facts about a journalist's performance. How-
ever, while attention to performance is logically permissible, the rigor
of that attention in a particular case and the comprehensiveness of
that attention over time are inconsistent with the spirit of Sullivan.
The cases in this study make clear that courts are analyzing a breath-
taking array of journalistic conduct in the course of inquiring into
state of mind. These evaluations are becoming guides for future com-
pliance. Editors, lawyers, and scholars make lists of behaviors that
have been legally acceptable and those that have not.580 Perceived
rules of legal acceptability transform into norms of journalistic accept-
ability, resulting in a system that is a far cry from, yet a product of,
Sullivan itself.
Finally, Sullivan's cursory application of the actual malice test,
attending very little to the conduct offered as evidence, clearly has not
been followed. The present study found judicial discussions that were
typically far more detailed than the discussion in Sullivan.581 Despite
their statistically poor chances of prevailing in a suit against the press,
many public plaintiffs appear to believe that filing suit is worth the
effort.5"2 Some will be able to gather and present detailed facts of
media performance for close scrutiny by a court and jury.
In sum, the objective of the Court in 1964 has not come to pass.
Suits are prevalent, the inquiry is broad, and courts look closely at the
plaintiff's evidence and discuss it in decisions with far-reaching impact.
B. The Dynamic of Standards Development: In Part Familiar, In
Part Novel
A second conclusion involves the common-law dynamic dis-
cerned in the present study. This dynamic has two parts. First, in or-
der to prove intent or reckless disregard on the part of defendants,
plaintiffs are permitted to offer circumstantial proof in the form of
evidence of objective behavior. Second, courts (mostly appellate) dis-
cuss the objective behavior presented at trial. While these discussions
579. 441 U.S. 153, 169 (1979) (declining to recognize a First Amendment-based privi-
lege against responding to a libel plaintiff's inquiries about relevant aspects of the editorial
process).
580. See, e.g., SMOLLA, LAw OF DEFAMATION, supra note 17, §§ 3.17-3.23; SANFORD,
supra note 17, § 8.4.
581. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 670-
85, 690-93 (1989).
582. See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 177-81.
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in a formal sense are about whether the requisite mental state has
been proven, this study suggests that the discussions produce state-
ments that can take on a life of their own, as behavioral norms for
journalists.
The first part of the dynamic is not surprising to discover, nor is it
inherently disturbing. In the law of torts, when the standard of fault is
intent or recklessness, common-law tradition teaches that both litiga-
tion and judicial review will focus on objective indicia. As Professor
Keeton wrote long ago about proof of the tort of misrepresentation,
"it would be monstrous to require direct proof or something in the
nature of an admission of bad faith."583
Both surprising and disturbing, however, is what happens in the
second part of this dynamic-the judicial discussions of press conduct.
Particularly troubling are the range and specificity of such discussions
in particular cases, the use of such discussions as precedents, and the
susceptibility of such discussions to interpretation by journalists as de-
claring or implying behavioral norms. Moreover, because the courts
appear largely unaware of the norm creation in which they are engag-
ing, the danger is that their work is ill conceived or simply unin-
formed. Even when norms emerging from the judicial process present
no substantive problems, this activity represents an intolerable intru-
sion of the judiciary into the American press by creating a de facto
regulatory system for press behavior.
Some may object that this judicial intrusion is a positive develop-
ment because law should check the powerful institution of the press.
But an interest in providing a check on the media does not necessarily
require continuation of the current libel system. When examined
comprehensively, that system appears much more problematic in its
interference and entanglement with press freedom than previously ac-
knowledged. A check on the press may be necessary or inevitable,
but the breadth of the current system's intrusion, as demonstrated in
this study, is indefensible.
C. Research Cases and Restrictive Norms
A third conclusion concerns the norms themselves, specifically
the nature of judicial involvement with respect to the three behavioral
categories studied and the degree of judicial intrusiveness in each.
Nature of Judicial Involvement. In judicial statements about press
behavior in libel decisions, courts are creating two sorts of norms: re-
583. Page Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
583, 584 (1958).
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strictive norms and permissive norms. Restrictive norms limit the
range of professional discretion for journalists. These norms arise in
two ways. One way is through a clear-cut or strongly implied judicial
statement of fact or law about press behavior in an opinion signalling
the court's perception that it is dealing with egregious conduct. 584 A
second way is through implication in an opinion in which the court is
making factual statements about press behavior, usually in the context
of denying a press defendant's motion for summary judgment. 5 5
Permissive norms amount to a set of freedoms for journalists.
These arise in judicial statements about the meaning of Sullivan and
its progeny in the context of a particular case, specifically about
whether the press behavior in question is probative of actual
malice. 86
Degree of Judicial Involvement. An additional conclusion that
can be drawn from the cases examined in Part II is that courts more
often made restrictive norms, and held for plaintiffs, in research cases
than in writing and editing cases.587 One explanation for this different
treatment simply may be comfort level, in the sense that courts may
see research cases as involving a kind of activity more amenable to
judicial treatment than writing and editing. Courts may view research
cases as involving the objective action of gathering information, while
writing and editing cases involve speech itself, that is, the composi-
tional enterprise, the more purely creative and subjective process of
selecting and revising words.588
A second explanation for less judicial restrictiveness in the writ-
ing and editing cases of Part II than in the research cases may be that
judges more easily identify with journalists as writers and editors than
with journalists as researchers. Judges write every day. As writers
and editors themselves, many become intimately familiar with some of
the fundamental problems of authorship: the ease with which lan-
584. See supra notes 311-96 and accompanying text.
585. See supra notes 397-430 and accompanying text.
586. See supra notes 431-99 and accompanying text.
587. See supra notes 432-33 and accompanying text.
588. Perhaps a subconscious analogy is made to the action/speech dichotomy in First
Amendment jurisprudence, and to the notion that while action is subject to varieties of
regulation, speech is for the most part sacrosanct. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF ExPRssioN 8-9 (1970) (discussing the expression/action dichotomy). But
see RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SociETY 24-27 (1992) (criticizing the
expression/action dichotomy). Research behavior thus would appear more "touchable" by
courts than the compositional behaviors of writing and editing. Courts, then, might find
that a dichotomy between research and writing/editing cases creates a certain decisional
comfort level, which may be a function of judicial experience with the action/speech di-
chotomy in First Amendment law generally.
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guage can assume a life of its own; the constant possibility that a text
will be given an interpretation that was not intended, even when care-
fully edited; the inadequacy of language itself to express an idea. A
certain amount of solicitude for journalistic writing and editing thus
may be a function of judicial appreciation for the delicacy of composi-
tional behaviors that courts have in common with the press.
Of course, judges conduct research as well. However, American
lawyers are trained that legal research is either correct or it is not, an
attitude that surely continues in the judiciary. The courts' greater
readiness to find fault with journalistic research may be related to
their insistence on correct legal research.
Yet, in their greater tendency to take a restrictive approach to
research than to writing and editing, courts may be missing an oppor-
tunity to be more faithful to Sullivan. Actual malice, after all, is the
test, and it refers to mental state. Perhaps actual malice is more easily
and reliably inferred from a defendant's selection of words, emphasis,
exaggeration, and the like, than from evidence of inadequate research
techniques. Arguably the language used in a news story is more
closely derived from, or related to, the mental state of the writer than
the number of sources he checked or whether he consulted "obvious"
sources before he wrote the story. Nevertheless, the cases examined
in Part II suggest that courts are more likely to make restrictive norms
and hold for plaintiffs in discussions of research behaviors than in dis-
cussion of compositional behaviors.
D. The Open Range of Judicial Discretion
A fourth conclusion concerns the strategic usefulness of a habit of
judicial permissiveness with respect to norms in one sort of case, and a
habit of judicial restrictiveness with respect to norms in another sort
of case. Courts can emphasize writing or editing, make or apply a
permissive norm in a law-oriented discussion, and rule for the press.589
Or if the facts of the case permit, they can emphasize research, make
or apply a restrictive norm, and rule for the plaintiff. 9 Perhaps these
options represent a balance struck by the tort system in the libel con-
text since Sullivan: The courts have created frameworks of both per-
missiveness and restrictiveness, protection and control, liberty and
duty.
589. See supra notes 503-15 and accompanying text (emphasis on writing), and notes
546-55 and accompanying text (emphasis on editing).
590. See supra notes 517-45 and accompanying text (emphasis on research).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR JOURNALISM AND LAW
A. Implications for Journalism
The study suggests several questions that journalists need to dis-
cuss candidly and comprehensively. These questions relate to the role
of courts in defining standards, the role of lawyers in the news process,
and fears about confronting change in the libel tort.
1. Is the Role of Courts Discussed in this Study Acceptable to the
Journalism Profession?
Journalists need to reflect upon whether they are benefitting from
the dynamic of libel litigation. In that dynamic, the parties dispute
journalistic behavior in pleadings, discovery, at trial, and on appeal.
Trial judges and appellate judges evaluate the behavior in published
decisions. Lawyers then transmit the published decisions to new-
srooms. Newsrooms in some cases adjust behavior. Professors gather
the precedents in treatises. Subsequent courts cite the holdings and
dicta in other cases. Slowly an understanding of what are considered
good and bad practices crystallizes. To be sure, the majority of norms
arising from these cases are permissive, but a number are not. More-
over, all of the norms, permissive or restrictive, come from courts that
lack expertise in journalism. In addition, courts formulate these
norms in discrete cases in which relevant considerations about particu-
lar norms may be missing. The question for journalists is whether the
role of the courts as ad hoc formulators of standards should continue.
2. Is the Role of Counsel in the News Process Acceptable to the
Journalism Profession?
The judicial role recounted here necessarily leads to a significant
role for lawyers in the newsroom. Judicial opinions, as we have seen,
can contain explicit or implicit norms, and can run the gamut of jour-
nalistic behaviors. Lawyers are needed to carefully translate these
opinions to writers and editors, and to suggest steps-perhaps changes
in the way stories are researched, written, and edited-by which the
media organization can avoid liability. Lawyers are needed, too, for
prepublication review of copy for statements that may run afoul of
existing norms. They also are needed to represent the media client in
libel litigation that often is drawn out, fact-intensive, and behavior-
based. Journalists should question the "middle-man" role that libel
law has created for lawyers and the intrusion of lawyers into the jour-
nalistic process. Does the behavior-based dynamic of libel litigation
promote over-engagement by lawyers in the enterprise of their cli-
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ents? Does the lawyer's role in translating judicial opinions and advis-
ing newsrooms on preventive measures amount to a quasi-editorial
function? Would the lawyer's role be reduced if the fault element of
libel and its behavioral framework were eliminated? Today's libel law
is problematic not only because judges are creating standards, but also
because lawyers are not protesting this phenomenon on behalf of their
clients. Instead, lawyers are transmitting judge-made norms to new-
srooms, are counseling reporters on compliance, and in effect are le-
gitimating the entire process.
3. How Reasonable is the Profession's Fear of Changing the Status
Quo?
Even after examining the present study, journalists may wish to
preserve the status quo in libel law because they win most cases and
may be uncomfortable with the unknown, i.e., whatever system would
come next. The logic of this discomfort is straightforward: It is one
thing to criticize the system that has derived from Sullivan, but it is
another thing to support steps to change it. Might not a "new order,"
however balanced it appears on paper, leave the press ultimately in a
worse position? Uncertainty about potential dangers of a new system
may underlie the profession's opposition to recent libel reform
efforts.591
It is useful to juxtapose the journalism profession's discomfort
with libel reform to the profession's discomfort with detailed universal
codes of conduct written by journalists themselves. The profession
historically has shunned such codes. The American Society of News-
paper Editors, for example, in its Statement of Principles, summons
editors to "the highest ... professional performance," 519 but leaves
the phrase largely undefined. The Statement of Principles, like the
codes of ethics of other journalism groups, favors generalities. Pro-
scriptions, even by peers, are seen by many in the profession as in-
fringing on editorial independence. As one prominent editor put it,
591. For a discussion of several recent reform proposals, see infra notes 602-18 and
accompanying text. See generally REFORMING LIBEL LAW (John Soloski & Randall P.
Bezanson eds., 1992) (gathering significant recent proposals for statutory revision of libel
law). See also David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REv.
487 (1991) (evaluating current state of libel law and reform efforts). Professor Anderson
writes, "Media skepticism of reform proposals is understandable. They are being asked to
trade risks that are generally known, sometimes controllable, and nearly always insurable,
for changes whose effects are at least as unpredictable now as the effects of Sullivan and
Gertz were when those cases were decided." 1d. at 549.
592. American Society of Newspaper Editors, Statement of Principles, reprinted in
JOHN L. HULTENG, PLAYING IT STRAIGHT: A PRACTICAL DISCUSSION OF THE ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES OF THs AmERicAN SocIr= OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS 3 (1981).
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I think that there is an obligation on the part of each editor,
each reporter, each publisher, to decide upon her or his own
ethical standard.... I do not believe in regulation of the
newspaper business from the outside, and, philosophically, I
have to be against regulation from the inside. I do not want
to sit in judgment on other newspapers and I do not think it
is a healthy thing to do. 93
The paradox, then, is that while journalists oppose self regulation
through detailed professional rules of behavior,594 they have been si-
lent about regulation by the judiciary through libel decisions. Report-
ers and editors appear to tolerate the surrender to court control and
the unpredictable regulations the courts produce. It may be that some
journalists are simply unaware of the scope of the courts' activity in
this area.
Journalists' discomfort with the unknown can be reduced by a
clear understanding that courts are devising standards. Because
courts are engaged in precisely the activity that journalists think
should be avoided, the profession should at least undertake a more
active part in addressing libel law and its future. Leaving such discus-
sions to the media bar and others may be a luxury that the profession
can no longer afford.
B. Implications for the Law
This study has demonstrated that the actual malice privilege
works against the values that prompted its creation and is therefore
fundamentally flawed. Our conclusion raises the question of how
American libel law should respond. The fundamental concern of the
Sullivan case remains compelling-that the possibility of debilitating
jury verdicts in common-law libel actions against the press may cause
journalists to "play it safe" by not publishing certain stories that are
believed to be true but may pose problems of provable truth for the
593. Remarks by A.M. Rosenthal, ASNE 1987, Proceedings of the 1987 Convention of
the American Society of Newspaper Editors, at 36, 45.
594. In a major departure, the Ethics Committee of the Associated Press Managing
Editors Association presented a draft of a six-page ethics code at the annual meeting of the
organization in September 1993. The proposal defined professional standards for journal-
ism in much greater detail than the one-page Ethics Code adopted by the editors in 1975
and in considerably greater detail than any other journalism group has attempted. See
Mark Fitzgerald, A Debate About Ethics Code, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Oct. 9, 1993, at 9.
However, criticism by journalists and media lawyers of the proposal's specificity caused the
proposal to be modified drastically so that it more closely resembles the 1975 version. The
revised draft was scheduled to be debated by the Associated Press editors at their annual
meeting in October 1994. See Tony Case, APME Retreats on Strict Ethics Code, EDrrOR &
PUBLISHER, Aug. 13, 1994, at 18-19.
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defense if suit should be filed.595 The question becomes how to ad-
dress the "chilling effect" of the threat of strict liability in a way that
avoids the pitfalls of the actual malice privilege. Several options de-
serve a fresh look.
1. Return to the Common-Law Tort, with a Twist (or TWo)
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.596 Justice
White's concurring opinion openly questioned the means chosen in
Sullivan to address the perceived effect of the strict liability tort. Jus-
tice White declared that the actual malice privilege "countenances two
evils: first, the stream of information about public officials and public
affairs is polluted and often remains polluted by false information; and
second, the reputation and professional life of the defeated plaintiff
may be destroyed." 597 In considering roads that might have been
taken, Justice White articulated an approach based on restoration of
the common-law tort, but with an important difference. Justice White
observed: "[I]nstead of escalating the plaintiff's burden of proof to an
almost impossible level, we could have achieved our stated goal by
limiting the recoverable damages to a level that would not unduly
threaten the press. ' 598 In addition, "[p]unitive damages might have
been scrutinized . . . or perhaps even entirely forbidden" and
"[p]resumed damages... might have been prohibited, or limited, as in
Gertz."5 99 Thus, Justice White felt that whatever chilling effect was
induced by common-law strict liability could be addressed sufficiently
under the First Amendment by a cap on damages.
In the same paragraph, Justice White indicated, although not so
explicitly, another change. He wrote: "Had... the common-law stan-
dard of liability been retained, the defamed public official, upon prov-
ing falsity, could at least have had a judgment to that effect. His
595. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,278 (1964) (criticizing large damage
awards under common law libel for the resulting "pall of fear and timidity. . . upon those
who would give voice to public criticism"). See generally Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and
the First Amendment: Unravelling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REv. 685, 689-94 (1978)
(arguing that a chilling effect occurs when an individual seeking to engage in an activity
protected by the First Amendment is deterred by a governmental regulation not specifi-
cally directed at that protected activity, causing some individuals to refrain from saying or
publishing that which they actually could and should say or publish).
596. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
597. Id. at 769 (White, J., concurring).
598. Id. at 771 (White, J., concurring).
599. Id. (White, 3., concurring). In Gertz, the Court held that a private plaintiff could
not recover presumed damages absent clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
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reputation would then be vindicated...." 6  This statement implies
that in a restored common-law action the plaintiff could be required
to prove falsity, in contrast to the original tort in. which falsity was
presumed and the defendant could defend on the g-rounds of truth.601
Justice White's interest in taking a second look at the common-
law tort has scholarly support. Noting that the actual malice privilege
seems to have failed to reduce public-plaintiff libel actions against the
press, and attributing the last decade's wave of libel litigation to the
availability of large jury verdicts even under Sullivan, Professor Ep-
stein has proposed a return to the strict liability tort, again with a
twist.602 In Epstein's proposal, "some damage award [would] remain
appropriate," but "it should be carefully circumscribed. '60 3 Epstein
takes seriously the chilling effect of the common-law tort, but thinks
that Sullivan's solution is inferior to a strict liabilitj system with a cap
on damages. Besides being fairer to plaintiffs by dispensing with the
burden of proving actualmalice,6°4 the latter system would benefit the
press by diminishing the attractiveness and hence the frequency of
filed suits. 6 5 Litigation costs, he believes, also would drop.6 6 Abol-
ishing the actual malice element would reduce damages in litigated
cases since "juries and judges are far less likely to be inflamed if the
only evidence they see relates to the statement made and its conse-
quences for the plaintiff's welfare. '6 7 Epstein also advises considera-
tion of "a fixed [statutory] maximum on recovery in all libel cases," or
a rule linking damages to defendants' revenues. 0 8
If the flaws associated with the actual malice privilege are taken
seriously, the common-law tort may serve, at the very least, as a
600. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 771 (White, J., concurring).
601. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 116, at
839 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing common-law rule of libel that "the defamatory statement is
regarded as false unless the defendant proves truth").
602. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times Co. v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHi.
L. REv. 782, 814-17 (1986).
603. Id. at 815.
604. Id. at 801 (arguing that the Sullivan rule "offends the sense of justice because it
makes innocent persons bear the harms that have been inflicted upon them by other per-
sons, including those who have acted with negligence or even gross negligence").
605. Id. at 806 (speculating that "in part the number of cases brought may well be a
function of the types of damages that are demanded under the actual malice rule"); id. at
807 (theorizing that large awards of actual and punitive damages are a function of the
actual malice test which highlights media "culpability").
606. Id. at 810 (noting "the relationship between litigation expenses and the shape of
the substantive rule" and suggesting that the actual malice rule creates a "high uncertainty/
high stakes game[ ]" that "generates high litigation expenses for plaintiffs and defendants
alike").
607. Id. at 815.
608. Id.
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framework for change, leading to modifications as a cap on damages
and a shifted burden with respect to truth and falsity.
2. Press Immunity in Public-Plaintiff Damages Suits, and Provision
for Declaratory Judgment
As Professor Epstein pointed out, the actual malice privilege
amounts to a "compromise between the strict liability and no liability
positions."'60 9 If a shift to strict liability, however modified, seems in-
appropriate, a shift to the opposite end of the scale may be preferable.
In Sullivan, Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg were unim-
pressed with the Court's compromise. 610 As noted earlier, Justice
Black forcefully pointed out in his concurrence that
"[m]alice," even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, ab-
stract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove. The re-
quirement that malice be proved provides at best an
evanescent protection for the right critically to discuss public
affairs and certainly does not measure up to the sturdy safe-
guard embodied in the First Amendment. 611
The three Justices would have ruled that the New York Times and the
other defendants in Sullivan enjoyed an absolute right to publish ex-
pression critical of official conduct.6"2
Given the present study's evidence of how truly "evanescent" the
actual malice privilege has turned out to be, and given uncertainty as
to whether a modified strict-liability regime would meet concerns
about the threat of lawsuits and consequent self-censorship, it may be
that the better reform is to abolish entirely the public plaintiff's cause
of action for damages. Clearly the compromise of Sullivan has not
worked, and some may think that another compromise within the
structure of the tort itself, along the lines that Justice White and Pro-
fessor Epstein have contemplated,1 3 will not appreciably solve the
problem.
Of course, abolition of the public plaintiff's damages suit will
leave those plaintiffs without a legal remedy. This raises questions of
609. Id. at 801 (arguing that the actual malice rule departs from the no-fault rule of the
common-law cause of action and yet stops short of the rule of absolute immunity for the
press advocated by Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg in Sullivan).
610. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964) (Black, J., concur-
ring); id. at 297-305 (Goldberg, J., concurring in the result). Justice Douglas joined in both
Justice Black's and Justice Goldberg's opinions.
611. Id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring).
612. Id. at 296-97 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 304-05 (Goldberg, J., concurring in the
result).
613. See supra notes 596-608 and accompanying text.
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fairness. In addition, the public interest in at least approximating
political truth may suffer if there is no forum for public persons to
contest damaging statements made about them. Moreover, some ar-
gue that, without such a forum, worthy individuals will be deterred
from pursuing public lives or careers.614 Gauging the accuracy of that
position, of course, is difficult. In any event, although abolition of the
cause of action by definition eradicates the problem of self-censorship,
it may also leave plaintiffs without protection and the public without a
built-in apparatus for receiving competing information about public
matters.
Therefore, it may be appropriate to take another look at propos-
als advocating the creation of an action for declaratory judgment for
public plaintiffs, in which plaintiffs would seek not money damages
but a judicial finding that the challenged publication was false. Practi-
cally speaking, this was the design of the 1985 proposal by Congress-
man Charles Schumer.615 A recent variation would require a losing
defendant in an action for declaratory judgment to publish or cause to
be published either a correction satisfactory to the plaintiff or the con-
tents of the court's finding on falsity.616 Whether mandatory publica-
tion of this kind can survive First Amendment scrutiny depends in
part on the applicability of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.617
Even if a scheme involving both declaratory judgment and mandatory
614. See Anderson, supra note 591, at 531-33; Epstein, supra note 602, at 799.
615. H.R. 2846,99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID
A. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 409-10 (1990).
616. MODEL COMMUNICATrvE TORTS Acr § 9-107, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 64
(1990). A similar provision, known as "the vindication remedy," appeared in Section 7 of
the proposed Uniform Defamation Act (Committee Draft 1991), reprinted in REFORMING
LmEL LAW, supra note 591, at 323-51. The proposed Act was the work of a Drafting
Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. After a
number of drafts and considerable controversy over the vindication remedy, the proposed
Act was withdrawn in 1993. See generally Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to
Defamation Law through Uniform Legislation: The Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C.
L. REv. 291, 302-11 (1994) (recounting streamlining elements of the proposed act and ana-
lyzing the vindication remedy).
617. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In Tornillo, the United States Supreme Court reviewed Flor-
ida's "right of reply" statute which required that a newspaper publish, at its own expense, a
political candidate's reply to any statement made by the newspaper assailing the candi-
date's personal character or charging the candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in
office. Id. at 244-45 n.2. The court invalidated the statute, declaring that it "fails to clear
the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors."
Id. at 258. In his analysis of the vindication remedy of the proposed Uniform Defamation
Act, Professor Ackerman suggests that its rule of mandatory publication could "run afoul
of the First Amendment" under Tornillo. Ackerman, supra note 616, at 309. In addition,
although the proposed Act would allow a media defendant to avoid publishing the vindica-
tion itself by paying to secure its publication elsewhere, "such payment might [be] consid-
ered damages in violation of the fault requirements of Sullivan and Gertz." Id. at 309 n.95.
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publication survives review, practical dilemmas may make it unwork-
able, such as the problem of providing attorneys an incentive to repre-
sent plaintiffs in a non-damages action of this kind. 1
3. Comprehensive Statutory Reconfiguration of the Libel Tort
A third option is to reconfigure the cause of action in a way that,
while not eliminating the actual malice privilege, is likely to reduce
significantly the role of actual malice in libel litigation. This approach
would limit the output of judicial decisions addressing fault and, by
extension, journalistic behavior. An example is the Annenberg Libel
Reform Proposal of 1988.619 This proposal creates a set of priorities
and incentives to steer the parties away from the conventional action
for damages. It addresses a range of other matters as well, such as the
fact/opinion distinction, the burden of proving falsity, and common-
law privileges.620 At the heart of the proposal are "forceful retraction
and reply mechanisms, requiring every potential plaintiff to seek from
the defendant either a retraction or an opportunity to reply before
filing suit."' If the defendant acquiesces in the request, the suit must
end.6' If the parties are deadlocked at this stage, either party may
designate the suit as an action for declaratory judgment.621 Choosing
this option ends the plaintiff's right to seek damages. 24 An action for
damages thus is possible only when the preliminary options have not
been exercised. For our purposes, the significance of the Annenberg
Proposal is that the retraction/reply and declaratory judgment provi-
sions are calculated to shrink dramatically the importance of actual
malice in resolving libel disputes.
It may be that "compulsory access to privately owned print media is an idea whose time
has come and gone." SACK & BARON, supra note 78, § 8.6.2, at 530.
618. See SACK & BARON, supra note 78, § 8.6.3, at 533 (speculating on the role of the
attorney's financial incentive in declaratory judgment litigation). The proposed Uniform
Act included a provision awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff in a vindication
action under specified circumstances. See UNIFORM DEFAMATION Acr § 8 (Committee
Draft 1991), reprinted in REFORMING LIBEL LAW, supra note 591, at 332. Professor Acker-
man raises constitutional and policy questions about this fee-shifting provision. See Acker-
man, supra note 616, at 309-10. Fee shifting has been a prominent feature of other libel
reform proposals. See Franklin, Declaratory Judgment Alternative, supra note 81, at 842-44.
619. ANNENBERO PROPOSAL, supra note 81.
620. Id. at §§ 2, 6, 8.
621. Rodney A. Smolla & Michael J. Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposalk
The Case for Enactment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 25, 32 (1989).
622. ANNENBERO PROPOSAL, supra note 81, § 3(a)(3).
623. Id. § 4(a), (e).
624. Id. § 4(b).
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A proposal more limited in scope is the recent Uniform Correc-
tion or Clarification of Defamation Act.6" The Uniform Act, a ves-
tige of the withdrawn Uniform Defamation Act,6 26 deals exclusively
with the pre-fling stage of a libel dispute. As a prerequisite to seek-
ing damages, a would-be plaintiff must make a "timely and adequate
request for correction or clarification."'627 If the correction or clarifi-
cation is made, the plaintiff can recover only "provable economic
loss," defined as "special, pecuniary loss caused by a false and defama-
tory publication."6' Again, the objective is to obviate the need for a
damage suit. With fewer suits, judges would have fewer occasions to
address actual malice and fewer decisions would relate to press con-
duct. The problem raised by the present study would not go away, to
be sure. But as opportunities for judicial creation of journalistic stan-
dards diminish, courts may become more self-conscious about what
they are doing and less willing to do it.
4. Bar Against Plaintiff's Use of "Compositional Behaviors" as
Evidence of Actual Malice
If the actual malice requirement is a problem because it invites
judicial creation of professional standards and hence seriously in-
trudes into the practice of journalism, a way to address the problem
short of dropping the fault requirement altogether might be to limit
the types of behavioral evidence that plaintiffs can introduce on the
malice issue. As noted above,6 29 cases examined in the present study
suggested that courts are more restrictive in setting standards for re-
search-oriented behaviors than they are for the creative, composi-
tional behaviors associated with writing and editing. Perhaps libel
doctrine formally should provide for what some courts instinctively
seem to know: that the processes of writing and editing are at the
heart of the intellectual project of journalism, and -that these processes
must be free from scrutiny or second-guessing by judges or juries.
This conclusion would appear to fly in the face of Herbert v.
Lando,630 in which the Supreme Court declined -to recognize a First
625. UNIFORM CORRECTION OR CLARIFICATION OF DEFAMATION Acr (Unofficial Fi-
nal Draft Oct. 13, 1993).
626. For a discussion of the relationship between the Uniform Defamation Act and the
Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act, see Ackerman, supra note 616, at
314.
627. UNIFORM CORRECTION OR CLARIFICATION OF DEFAMATION Acr § 3 (Unofficial
Final Draft Oct. 13, 1993).
628. Id. §§ 1(2), 5.
629. See supra notes 432-33 and accompanying text.
630. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
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Amendment-based privilege against responding to plaintiff's inquiries
about all relevant aspects of the editorial process in an actual malice
case.631 However, the Herbert decision was premised on the viability
of Sullivan, particularly on the balance struck by that case in creating
the actual malice test.632 The present study questions that test in a
fundamental way and therefore questions the cases that build on Sulli-
van as well. Moreover, none of the arguments considered and re-
jected by the Court in Herbert is equivalent to the critique of the
present study, that is, that judicial discussions of behaviors in the jour-
nalistic process lead to explicit and implicit professional standards,
and thus intrude expansively into the free speech of publishers. Fi-
nally, the Herbert case is confined to First Amendment analysis and
does not preclude statutory and other legal avenues of recognizing a
bar against evidenc6 relating to the editorial process in libel cases.633
A fourth conclusion, then, derives directly from the present
study. Courts should not consider writing and editing behaviors as
circumstantial evidence of actual malice. These behaviors should re-
main protected from scrutiny because they are central to the intellec-
tual process of expression which must be unregulated in order to
thrive. Many courts today do seem to be deferential in these areas,
undoubtedly sensing the inappropriateness and incompetence of judi-
cial involvement. However, not all courts are deferential. It is worth
considering a rule that such evidence should be barred. Evidence of
research-including, among other things, the reliability of sources and
source material-would remain permissible.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: TiH SULLIVAN PARADOX
This has been a study of the workings over time of one of modem
American law's most dramatic doctrinal developments: the actual
malice requirement of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Once an occa-
sion for "dancing in the streets, 634 that requirement now has perme-
ated thirty years of litigation. It has also been the subject of fertile
scholarly discussion, particularly in the last decade when the rule
631. Id. at 169-75.
632. I. at 169 (reaffirming "the balance struck in New York Times").
633. See Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly 445 A.2d 376, 383 (NJ. 1982) (noting that
Herbert v. Lando "simply held that the First Amendment does not grant a privilege to
withhold editorial processes," and holding that "the New Jersey Shield Law affords new-
spersons an absolute privilege not to disclose confidential sources and editorial processes,
absent any conflicting constitutional right").
634. See supra note 6.
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seemed powerless to deter a siege of high-proffle lawsuits.6 35 Calls for
reform have centered on reducing the likelihood of litigation through
adoption of various steps and procedures to promote the early correc-
tion of error.636 However, despite the high quality of the continuing
debate, the status quo remains unshakable. Perhaps this is because
the participants have overlooked what may be the most basic problem
with the Sullivan requirement: its propensity to place judges in the
role of shapers of journalistic standards.
Our study demonstrates that courts have become entangled in
evaluations of virtually every aspect of the news process, from the first
steps in researching a story, through the complex business of writing
and editing the final product. Lip service is paid to "accepted journal-
istic practice" and expert witnesses opine on the witness stand about
what that phrase means in a given context, but the courts reserve to
themselves the final word on acceptable press behavior. In applying
the actual malice requirement, courts sift through evidence of press
conduct and invariably-and inevitably-characterize it. Opinions
are then written that state or strongly suggest the sorts of conduct that
will "count" in judicial analyses of fault. As media institutions and
their lawyers track such decisions, they come to appreciate both the
specificity of the decisions and the costs of not paying attention. At
the same time, they may suffer confusion at the courts' reserved dis-
cretion to deploy various modes of analysis, as well as their selectivity
in fashioning restrictive norms in some cases and permissive norms in
others.
The future of the judicial role in libel cases is the ultimate ques-
tion posed by the study. Is the current role appropriate? Can the
journalism profession continue to countenance the judicial shaping of
standards without qualm or objection? This year's thirtieth anniver-
sary of the Supreme Court's landmark ruling may be precisely the mo-
ment for the press-the regulated party in the libel system-to come
to grips with the price and the paradox of Sullivan.
635. See SMOLLA, SUING THE PREss, supra note 385, at 3-6 (describing "explosion of
litigation" in the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s).
636. See supra notes 602-18 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
Journalistic Behaviors At Issue in Actual Malice Cases
Journalistic Behavior
1. Failure to verify information provided
by a source.
2. Story written in an unclear way that
could cause readers to misconstrue its
meaning.
3. Failure to provide an accurate
summary of information.
4. Failure to investigate adequately the
information in the story.
5. Failure to verify unreliable information.
6. Animosity toward plaintiff.
7. Use of an unreliable source.
8. Story exaggerated charges against the
plaintiff.
9. Lack of due care in reporting story.
10. Story not evenly balanced.
11. Failure of a reporter or editor to act on
information that the story contained
false information prior to publication.
12. Story repeated false information about
plaintiff.
13. Story omitted pertinent information.
14. Use of a source hostile to the plaintiff.
15. Failure to provide plaintiff with an
opportunity to respond to allegations.
16. Failure to correct information in story
after being informed that it was false.
17. Insufficient correction or apology.
18. Failure to follow accepted journalistic
practices.
19. Story edited in a way that defamed the
plaintiff.
20. Use of a confidential source.
21. Use of an inaccurate quotation.
22. Headline was inaccurate or misleading.
23. Failure to contact an obvious source.
Percentage
of Cases
29.0%
28.0%
26.6%
23.3%
17.6%
11.9%
11.4%
8.8%
8.6%
8.6%
7.4%
6.9%
5.9%
5.9%
5.7%
5.5%
5.2%
5.0%
4.8%
4.0%
4.0%
4.0%
3.3%
Number of
Cases
122
118
112
98
74
50
48
37
36
36
31
29
25
25
24
23
21
20
17
17
17
14
13
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24. Failure to check identification of 3.1% 9
plaintiff.
25. Misleading use of photograph. 2.1% 9
26. Lack of formal procedures for verifying 2.1% 9
the story information.
27. Technical error caused plaintiff to be 1.4% 6
harmed.
28. Failure to find additional sources who 1.0% 4
would contradict information provided
by other sources.
29. Reporter coached sources. .5% 2
30. Media had destroyed information .2% 1
pertinent to the story and the libel suit.
Total 251.8%* 1060
* The percentage exceeds 100% because more than one behavior was cited in most
cases.
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TABLE 2
Journalistic Behaviors At Issue in Actual Malice Cases
Compared with Case Outcome
Journalistic Behavior
1. Media destroyed information pertinent
for the story and libel suit.
2. Failure to verify unreliable information.
3. Failure to contact an obvious source.
4. Lack of formal procedures for verifying
story information.
5. Failure to correct information in story
after being informed it was false.
6. Failure to follow accepted journalistic
practices.
7. Story repeated false information about
the plaintiff.
8. Story omitted pertinent information.
9. Story edited in a way that defamed the
plaintiff.
10. Failure of a reporter or editor to act on
information that the story contained
false information prior to publication.
11. Failure to provide plaintiff with an
opportunity to respond to allegations.
12. Use of an unreliable source.
13. Use of a confidential source.
14. Technical error caused the plaintiff to
be harmed.
15. Insufficient correction or apology.
16. Headline inaccurate or misleading.
17. Use of a source hostile to the plaintiff.
18. Lack of due care in reporting story.
19. Failure to verify information provided
by source.
20. Failure to find additional sources who
would contradict information provided
by other sources.
21. Failure to provide an accurate
summary of information.
22. Animosity toward the plaintiff.
Percentage
of Cases
Won by
Plaintiffs
100%
67.6%
57.1%
55.6%
52.2%
47.6%
41.4%
40.0%
40.0%
38.7%
37.5%
35.4%
35.3%
33.3%
31.8%
29.4%
28.0%
27.8%
27.0%
25.0%
24.1%
Number of
Cases
1
74
14
9
23
21
29
25
20
31
24
48
17
6
22
17
25
36
122
4
112
24.0% 50
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23. Failure to investigate adequately the 22.4% 98
information in the story.
24. Story written in unclear way that could 18.6% 118
cause readers to misconstrue its
meaning.
25. The story was not evenly balanced. 16.7% 36
26. The story exaggerated charges against 16.2% 37
the plaintiff.
27. Use of an inaccurate quotation. 11.8% 17
28. Misleading use of photograph. 11.1% 9
29. Failure to check identification of 7.7% 13
plaintiff.
30. Reporter coached sources. 0.0% 2

